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AUTHENTICATED U.S. GOVERNMENT INFORMATION

To promote democracy and human rights in Burma, and for other purposes.

#### IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

NOVEMBER 2, 2017

Mr. MCCAIN (for himself, Mr. CARDIN, Mr. DURBIN, Mr. YOUNG, Mr. MAR-KEY, Mr. RUBIO, Mr. MERKLEY, Mrs. FEINSTEIN, Mr. SCHATZ, Mr. KAINE, Mr. VAN HOLLEN, Ms. BALDWIN, Mr. BOOKER, Mrs. SHAHEEN, Mr. COONS, Ms. COLLINS, and Mr. CASEY) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

FEBRUARY 12, 2018

Reported by Mr. CORKER, with an amendment

[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed in italic]

### A BILL

To promote democracy and human rights in Burma, and for other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-

2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be eited as the "Burma Human Rights

5 and Freedom Act of 2017".

#### 1 SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

2 Congress makes the following findings:

3 (1) The United States policy of principled en4 gagement since 1988 has fostered positive demo5 cratic reforms in Burma, which have led to signifi6 cant milestones on the path to full democracy.

7 (2) On November 8, 2015, Burma held historie 8 elections in which the National League for Democ-9 racy won a supermajority of seats in the combined 10 national parliament. On March 30, 2016, Htin 11 Kyaw was inaugurated as the President of Burma, 12 the country's first civilian President in more than 50 13 years. Aung San Suu Kyi, President of the National 14 League for Democracy, was barred from becoming 15 President due to the provisions of section 59(f) of 16 the 2008 Constitution, and therefore assumed the 17 office of State Counsellor, a position created for her 18 that made her the country's de facto leader.

19 (3) Aung San Suu Kyi's first acts as State 20 Counsellor after her National League for Democracy 21 party took office included releasing more than 100 22 political prisoners, including well-known journalists 23 and student activists held on politically motivated 24 charges. However, as of September 2017, there are 25 220 political prisoners in Burma, 42 of which are 26 currently serving prison sentences, 51 of which are

<del>WD.</del>

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1 awaiting trial inside prison, and 127 of which are 2 awaiting trial outside prison, according to the Assist-3 ance Association for Political Prisoners. 4 (4) The Government of Burma also continues 5 to systematically discriminate against the Rohingya 6 people. Burma's 1982 citizenship law stripped 7 Rohingya Burmese of their Burmese citizenship, 8 rendering them stateless, and the Government con-9 tinues to restrict Rohingya births, deny them free-10 dom of movement, access to healthcare, land, edu-11 cation, voting, political participation, and marriage. 12 (5) Despite the meaningful steps taken toward 13 democracy in Burma, there still remain important 14 structural and systemic impediments to the realiza-15 tion of a fully democratic civilian government, in-16 eluding-17 (A) reform of the 2008 Constitution; 18 (B) the disfranchisement of groups of peo-19 ple who voted in previous elections; 20 (C) social, political, and economic condi-21 tions in Rakhine State, particularly those faced 22 by the Rohingya population; and 23 (D) addressing and ending the current hu-24 manitarian and human rights crisis affecting

Burma's Rohingya population and residents of

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the Rakhine, Kachin, and Shan states, including ethnic cleansing, extrajudicial killings, sexual and gender-based violence, and forced displacement.

5 (6) Actions of the military of Burma, known as 6 the Tatmadaw, including continuing assaults on per-7 sonnel and territory controlled by armed ethnic organizations, military offenses immediately preceding 8 9 the peace conference in Navpyitaw, and human 10 rights abuses against noncombatant civilians in con-11 flict areas, undermine confidence in establishing a 12 eredible nationwide cease-fire agreement to end Bur-13 ma's civil war.

14 (7) The people of Burma continue to suffer 15 from an ongoing civil war between the Tatmadaw 16 and nearly 20 armed ethnic organizations. Any pros-17 peets for a full democracy in Burma are contingent 18 on ending the civil war and finding a path toward 19 national reconciliation between Burma's Bamar ma-20 jority and its various ethnic minorities.

21 (8) Since 2011, over 98,000 people have been
22 displaced in Kachin and northern Shan State over
23 the escalating violence and instability, resulting in
24 continued massive internal displacement, causing a
25 massive humanitarian crisis, and continuing to un-

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1 dermine the trust necessary to achieve a durable, 2 lasting peace, and disproportionately affecting the 3 lives of innocent civilians and the thousands of inter-4 nally displaced persons forced from their homes. Ac-5 cording to the United Nations Office for the Coordi-6 nation of Humanitarian Affairs, some 50 percent of 7 these displaced persons are staying in areas beyond 8 Government control where humanitarian access is 9 limited.

10 (9) In 2015, the nongovernmental campaign 11 Global Witness found that, in 2014, the estimated 12 value of official production of jade equated up to 48 13 percent of the official gross domestic product of 14 Burma. However, because of corruption and a lack 15 of transparency the economic gains of Burma are 16 being pocketed by notorious leaders from the mili-17 tary junta, including former dietator Than Shwe and 18 United States-sanctioned drug lord Wei Hsuch 19 Kang, and vested interests in jade are undermining 20 prospects for resolving the most intractable armed 21 conflict in Burma.

(10) On August 31, 2016, State Counsellor
Aung San Suu Kyi and the Government of Burma
initiated the Union Peace Conference 21st Century
Panglong, where more than 1,400 representatives of

1	various concerned parties attended a peace con-
2	ference in Naypyitaw in an effort to begin the proc-
3	ess of ending Burma's civil war and discuss options
4	in forming a democratic state of Burma. On May
5	24, 2017, the Government of Burma held a second
6	Panglong Peace Conference, with mixed results.
7	(11) On October 31, 2016, the Department of
8	State determined that Burma remains designated as
9	a country of particular concern for religious freedom
10	under section 402(b) of the International Religious
11	Freedom Act (22 U.S.C. 6442(b)), and that "mem-
12	bers of the Rohingya community in particular face
13	abuses by the Government of Burma, including
14	those involving torture, unlawful arrest and deten-
15	tion, restricted movement, restrictions on religious
16	practices, discrimination in employment, and access
17	to social services".
18	(12) The February 2017 panels set up by the
19	Burmese army and the Home Affairs Ministry are
20	widely perceived to lack independence and impar-
<b>.</b> .	

Burmese army and the Home Affairs Ministry are widely perceived to lack independence and impartiality. The December 2016 commission established by Burma's President Htin Kyaw to investigate the October 2016 attacks dismissed claims of misconduct by security forces due to "insufficient evidence". The 2012 commission government estab-

1	lished to investigate violence in Rakhine State that
2	year never held anyone accountable.
3	(13) In a public address on October 12, 2017,
4	State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi laid out 3 goals
5	for Rakhine State:
6	(A) Repatriation of those who have crossed
7	over to Bangladesh and the effective provision
8	of humanitarian assistance.
9	(B) Resettlement of displaced populations.
10	(C) Economic development and durable
11	<del>peace.</del>
12	(14) According to the Bangladesh Foreign Min-
13	istry, at least 3,000 Rohingya have been killed and
14	over an estimated 600,000 Rohingya have fled to
15	Bangladesh since August 2017 for fear of loss of
16	livelihoods, shelter, and disproportionate use of force
17	by the military of Burma. Congress recognizes the
18	longstanding support and hospitality of the Govern-
19	ment and the people of Bangladesh; however, it is
20	important that people fleeing violence in Burma are
21	not deported or turned back.
22	(15) On October 23, 2017, the Department of
23	State said, "We express our gravest concern with re-
24	cent events in Rakhine State and the violent, trau-
25	matic abuses Rohingya and other communities have

endured. It is imperative that any individuals or en tities responsible for atrocities, including non-state
 actors and vigilantes, be held accountable.".

4 (16) At a Senate Foreign Relations Committee
5 hearing on October 24, 2017, the Department of
6 State indicated that "refugees continue to cross into
7 Bangladesh, and we continue to receive credible re8 ports of sporadic violence in northern Rakhine
9 State".

10 (17) Amnesty International and Human Rights 11 Watch have reported and documented a campaign of 12 violence perpetuated by the security forces of 13 Burma, which have indiscriminately fired on and 14 killed civilians, raped women and girls, and arbi-15 trarily arrested Rohingya men without any informa-16 tion about their whereabouts or charges which "may 17 amount to crimes against humanity" and "ethnic 18 eleansing". Satellite images reveal that, out of the 19 approximately 470 villages in northern Rakhine 20 State, nearly 300 were partially or completely de-21 stroyed by fire since August 25, 2017, most of them 22 completely or partially populated with Rohingya 23 **Muslims**.

24 (18) The Government of Burma has continued
25 to block access to northern Rakhine State by United

1	Nations and other humanitarian groups. For much
2	of the last three months, hundreds of thousands of
3	vulnerable people in Rakhine State who needed hu-
4	manitarian aid, both Rohingya, Rakhine, and other
5	groups and including children with acute malnutri-
6	tion, were being blocked from receiving such aid,
7	and aid groups now expect that levels of malnutri-
8	tion and even starvation have dramatically increased.
9	(19) In response to previous violence between
10	the Burmese military and the ethnic Rohingya peo-
11	ple in 2016, Aung San Suu Kyi established the Ad-
12	visory Commission on Rakhine State headed by
13	former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi
14	Annan to address tensions in Northern Rakhine. She
15	has since also endorsed the Commission's ree-
16	ommendations and established a group to move for-
17	ward with implementation.
18	SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
19	In this Act:
20	(1) Appropriate congressional commit-
21	TEES.—The term "appropriate congressional com-
22	mittees" means—

23 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations
24 and the Committee on Armed Services of the
25 Senate; and

	10
1	(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and
2	the Committee on Armed Services of the House
3	of Representatives.
4	(2) CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY.—The term
5	"crimes against humanity" includes, when com-
6	mitted as part of a widespread or systematic attack
7	directed against any civilian population, with knowl-
8	edge of the attack—
9	(A) murder;
10	(B) deportation or forcible transfer of pop-
11	ulation;
12	(C) torture;
13	(D) rape, sexual slavery, or any other form
14	of sexual violence of comparable gravity;
15	(E) persecution against any identifiable
16	group or collectivity on political, racial, na-
17	tional, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender or
18	other grounds that are universally recognized as
19	impermissible under international law;
20	(F) enforced disappearance of persons;
21	(G) the crime of apartheid; and
22	(H) other inhumane acts of a similar char-
23	acter intentionally causing great suffering, or
24	serious injury to body or to mental or physical
25	health.

1	(3) ETHNIC CLEANSING.—The term "ethnic
2	cleansing" means a purposeful policy designed by
3	one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent
4	and terror-inspiring means the civilian population of
5	another ethnic or religious group from certain geo-
6	<del>graphic</del> <del>areas.</del>
7	(4) GENOCIDE.—The term "genocide" means
8	any offense described in section 1091(a) of title 18,
9	United States Code.
10	(5) Hybrid Tribunal.—The term "hybrid tri-
11	bunal" means a temporary criminal tribunal that in-
12	volves a combination of domestic and international
13	<del>lawyers, judges, and other professionals to prosecute</del>
14	individuals suspected of committing war crimes,
15	crimes against humanity, or genocide.
16	(6) Transitional justice.—The term "tran-
17	sitional justice" means the range of judicial, non-
18	judicial, formal, informal, retributive, and restorative
19	measures employed by countries transitioning out of
20	armed conflict or repressive regimes—
21	(A) to redress legacies of atrocities; and
22	(B) to promote long-term, sustainable
23	<del>peace.</del>

1	(7) WAR CRIME.—The term "war crime" has
2	the meaning given the term in section 2441(c) of
3	title 18, United States Code.
4	SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
5	It is the policy of the United States that—
6	(1) the pursuit of a calibrated engagement
7	strategy is essential to support the establishment of
8	a peaceful, prosperous, and democratic Burma that
9	includes respect for the human rights of all its peo-
10	ple regardless of ethnicity and religion; and
11	(2) the guiding principles of such a strategy to
12	support and complete the transition to democracy
13	and genuine national reconciliation include—
14	$(\Lambda)$ support for meaningful legal and con-
15	stitutional reforms that remove remaining re-
16	strictions on civil and political rights and insti-
17	tute civilian control of the military, civilian con-
18	trol of the government, and the constitutional
19	provision reserving 25 percent of parliamentary
20	seats for the military, which provides the mili-
21	tary with veto power over constitutional amend-
22	ments;
23	(B) the establishment of a fully demo-
24	eratic, pluralistic, eivilian controlled, and rep-
25	resentative political system that includes regu-

1	larized free and fair elections in which all peo-
2	<del>ple of Burma can vote;</del>
3	(C) the promotion of genuine national rec-
4	onciliation and conclusion of a credible and sus-
5	tainable nationwide cease-fire agreement, polit-
6	ical accommodation of the needs of ethnic Shan,
7	Kachin, Chin, Karen, and other ethnic groups,
8	and constitutional change allowing inclusive
9	<del>permanent</del> <del>peace;</del>
10	(D) accountability for ethnic eleansing,
11	crimes against humanity, and genocide per-
12	petrated against ethnic minorities like the
13	Rohingya by the Government, military, and se-
14	<del>curity forces of Burma, violent extremist</del>
15	groups, and other combatants involved in the
16	<del>conflict;</del>
17	(E) strengthening the government's civilian
18	institutions, including support for greater trans-
19	parency and accountability;
20	(F) the establishment of professional and
21	nonpartisan military, security, and police forces
22	that operate under civilian control;
23	(G) empowering local communities, eivil so-
24	<del>ciety,</del> and independent media;

1 (H) promoting responsible international and regional engagement; 2 3 (I) strengthening respect for and protee-4 tion of human rights and religious freedom; and 5 (J) addressing and ending the humani-6 tarian and human rights crisis, including by supporting the return of the displaced Rohingya 7 8 to their homes and providing equal access to 9 full restoration of full citizenship for the

10 Rohingya population.

#### 11 SEC. 5. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE.

12 (a) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be appropriated \$104,000,000 for assistance to the victims of the 13 Burmese military's ethnic cleansing campaign targeting 14 15 Rohingya in Rakhine State, including those displaced in Bangladesh, Burma, and the region, support for voluntary 16 resettlement or repatriation efforts regionally, and for ree-17 oneiliation programs in Rakhine State, including support 18 for credible, independent humanitarian organizations, 19 20 United Nations agencies, and nongovernmental organiza-21 tions supporting the implementation of the recommenda-22 tions of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State or 23 otherwise seeking to provide humanitarian assistance to 24 victims of violence and destruction in Rakhine State, ineluding victims of gender-based violence and unaccom-25

panied minors. Additional significant and sustained fund ing will be necessary to address the medium and long-term
 impacts of this crisis.

4 (b) FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT OF REFUGEES AND IN-TERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS.—Congress calls on the 5 Government of Bangladesh to ensure all refugees have 6 7 freedom of movement and under no circumstances are 8 subject to unsafe, involuntary, or uninformed repatriation. 9 Congress also calls on the Government of Burma to ensure 10 the dignified, safe, and voluntary return of those displaced from their homes, and offer to those who do not want to 11 return meaningful means to obtain compensation or res-12 titution. 13

#### 14 SEC. 6. MULTILATERAL ASSISTANCE.

(a) RESTRICTIONS.—Except as provided under sub-15 section (b), the Secretary of the Treasury should instruct 16 the United States executive director of each international 17 financial institution to use the voice and vote of the United 18 States to support a project in Burma only if the project 19 20 does not partner with, contract or subcontract with, or 21 otherwise involve or benefit enterprises owned or directly 22 or indirectly controlled by the military of Burma, the Ministry of Defense, members of the Burmese military or se-23 24 eurity forces, or related entities.

1	(b) EXCEPTION.—The Secretary of the Treasury may
2	approve projects otherwise restricted under this section
3	<del>if -</del>
4	(1) senior Burmese military officials have—
5	(A) publicly acknowledged their role in
6	committing past human rights abuses;
7	(B) cooperated with independent efforts to
8	investigate such abuses;
9	(C) been held accountable for such abuses;
10	(D) demonstrated substantial progress in
11	reforming their behavior with respect to the
12	protection of human rights in the conduct of
13	civil-military relations;
14	(E) demonstrably and verifiably indicated
15	their support for extending civil and political
16	rights, including citizenship and access to the
17	rule of law, to all the people of Burma con-
18	sistent with international standard including
19	the Rohingya; and
20	(F) are cooperating with efforts to secure
21	a credible cease-fire agreement, political accom-
22	modation, and constitutional change allowing
23	inclusive permanent peace; and
24	(2) doing so is in the vital interest of the
25	United States

25 United States.

#### 1 SEC. 7. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON RIGHT OF RETURNEES.

- 2 It is the sense of Congress that the Government of 3 Burma, in collaboration with the regional and inter-4 national community, including the United Nations High 5 Commissioner for Refugees—
- 6 (1) should ensure the dignified, safe, and vol7 untary return of all those displaced from their
  8 homes, especially from Rakhine State, without an
  9 unduly high burden of proof; and
- 10(2) should fully implement all of the ree-11ommendations of the Advisory Commission on12Rakhine State.

#### 13 SEC. 8. MILITARY COOPERATION.

14 (a) PROHIBITION.—Except as provided under subsection (b), the United States Government may not supply 15 any security assistance or engage in any military-to-mili-16 tary programs with the armed forces of Burma, including 17 training or observation or participation in regional exer-18 19 eises, until the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, can certify to the appropriate con-20 gressional committees that the Burmese military has dem-21 22 onstrated significant progress in abiding by international 23 human rights standards and is undertaking meaningful and significant security sector reform, including trans-24 parency and accountability to prevent future abuses, as 25 26 determined by applying the following criteria:

1 (1) The military adheres to international 2 human rights standards and pledges to stop future 3 human rights abuses.

4 (2) The military supports efforts to carry out 5 meaningful and comprehensive investigations of re-6 cent abuses and is taking steps to hold accountable 7 those in the Burmese military responsible for human 8 rights violations.

9 (3) The Government of Burma, including the 10 military, allows immediate and unfettered humani-11 tarian access to communities in areas affected by 12 conflict, including Rohingya communities in Rakhine 13 State.

(4) The Government of Burma, including the
military, cooperates with the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees and other relevant
United Nations agencies to ensure the protection of
displaced persons and the safe and voluntary return
of refugees and internally displaced persons.

20 (5) The Government of Burma, including the
21 military, takes steps toward the implementation of
22 the recommendations of the Advisory Commission on
23 Rakhine State.

24 (b) EXCEPTIONS.

1(1)CERTAINEXISTINGAUTHORITIES.—The2Department of Defense may continue to conduct3consultations based on the authorities under section41253 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. "Buck"5McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for6Fiscal Year 2015 (Public Law 113-291; 22 U.S.C.72151 note).

8 (2) HOSPITALITY.—The Department of State 9 and the United States Agency for International De-10 velopment may meet related-hospitality requirements 11 with respect to the 21st Century Panglong Union 12 Peace Conference.

13 (c) MILITARY REFORM.—The certification required 14 under subsection (a) shall include a written justification 15 in classified and unclassified form describing the Burmese 16 military's efforts to implement reforms, end impunity for 17 human rights abuses, and increase transparency and ac-18 countability.

(d) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this Act
shall be construed to authorize Department of Defense assistance to the Government of Burma except as provided
in this section.

23 (e) <u>REPORT.</u>

24 (1) IN GENERAL. Not later than 180 days
25 after the date of the enactment of this Act, and

1	every 180 days thereafter, the Secretary of Defense,
2	in concurrence with the Secretary of State, shall
3	submit to the appropriate congressional committees
4	a report, in both classified and unclassified form, on
5	the strategy and plans for military-to-military en-
6	gagement between the United States Armed Forces
7	and the military of Burma.
8	(2) ELEMENTS.—The report required under
9	paragraph (1) shall include the following elements:
10	(A) A description and assessment of the
11	Government of Burma's strategy for security
12	sector reform, including as it relates to an end
13	to involvement in the illicit trade in jade and
14	other natural resources, reforms to end corrup-
15	tion and illicit drug trafficking, and constitu-
16	tional reforms to ensure civilian control.
17	(B) A list of ongoing military activities
18	conducted by the United States Government
19	with the Government of Burma, and a descrip-
20	tion of the United States strategy for future
21	military-military engagements between the
22	United States and Burma's military forces, in-
23	cluding the military of Burma, the Burma Po-
24	lice Force, and armed ethnic groups.

1 (C) An assessment of the progress of the 2 military of Burma towards developing a frame-3 work to implement human right reforms, in-4 eluding-5 (i) cooperation with civilian authorities to investigate and prosecute cases of 6 7 gross human rights violations; 8 (ii) steps taken to demonstrate respect 9 for and implementation of the laws of war 10 and international human rights law; and 11 (iii) a description of the elements of 12 the military-to-military engagement be-13 tween the United States and Burma that 14 promote such implementation. 15 (D) An assessment of progress on the 16 peaceful settlement of armed conflicts between 17 the Government of Burma and ethnic minority 18 groups, including actions taken by the military 19 of Burma to adhere to cease-fire agreements 20 and withdraw forces from conflict zones. 21 (E) An assessment of the Burmese's mili-22 tary recruitment and use of children as soldiers. 23 (F) An assessment of the Burmese's mili-24 tary's use of violence against women, sexual vio-

1	lence, or other gender-based violence as a tool
2	of terror, war, or ethnic eleansing.
3	(f) Civilian Channels.—Any program initiated
4	under this section shall use appropriate civilian govern-
5	ment channels with the democratically elected Government
6	of Burma.

7 (g) REGULAR CONSULTATIONS.—Any new program
8 or activity in Burma initiated under this section shall be
9 subject to prior consultation with the appropriate congres10 sional committees.

#### 11 SEC. 9. TRADE RESTRICTIONS.

(a) REINSTATEMENT OF IMPORT RESTRICTIONS ON
 JADEITE AND RUBIES FROM BURMA.—

14 (1) IN GENERAL. Section 3A of the Burmese
15 Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 (Public Law
16 108–61; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by adding
17 at the end the following:

18 "(i) TERMINATION.—Notwithstanding section 9, this 19 section shall remain in effect until the President deter-20 mines and certifies to the appropriate congressional com-21 mittees that the Government of Burma has taken meas-22 ures to reform the gemstone industry in Burma, including 23 measures to require—

24 <u>"(1)</u> the disclosure of the ultimate beneficial
25 ownership of entities in that industry; and

1	"(2) the publication of project revenues, pay-
2	ments, and contract terms relating to that indus-
3	<del>try.".</del>
4	(2) Conforming Amendments.—Section 3A
5	of the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of
6	2003 is further amended—
7	(A) in subsection $(b)$ —
8	(i) in paragraph (1), by striking
9	"until such time" and all that follows
10	through "2008" and inserting "beginning
11	on the date that is 15 days after the date
12	of the enactment of the Burma Human
13	Rights and Freedom Act of 2017"; and
14	(ii) in paragraph (3), by striking "the
15	date of the enactment of this Act" and in-
16	serting "the date of the enactment of the
17	Burma Human Rights and Freedom Act of
18	<del>2017"; and</del>
19	(B) in subsection $(c)(1)$ , by striking "until
20	such time" and all that follows through "2008"
21	and inserting "beginning on the date that is 15
22	days after the date of the enactment of the
23	Burma Human Rights and Freedom Act of
24	<del>2017".</del>

(3) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made
 by this subsection shall apply with respect to articles
 entered, or withdrawn from warehouse for consump tion, on or after the 15th day after the date of the
 enactment of this Act.

6 (b) Review of Eligibility for Generalized Sys7 TEM OF PREFERENCES.—

8 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year 9 after the date of enactment of this Act, the Presi-10 dent shall submit to the committees specified in 11 paragraph (2) a report that includes a detailed re-12 view of the eligibility of Burma for preferential duty 13 treatment under the Generalized System of Pref-14 erences under title V of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 15 U.S.C. 2461 et seq.).

16 (2) COMMITTEES SPECIFIED.—The committees
 17 specified in this paragraph are—

18 (A) the Committee on Appropriations, the
19 Committee on Finance, and the Committee on
20 Foreign Relations of the Senate; and

21 (B) the Committee on Appropriations, the
22 Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of
23 mittee on Ways and Means of the House of
24 Representatives.

1	SEC. 10. VISA BAN AND ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WITH RE-
2	SPECT TO MILITARY OFFICIALS RESPON-
3	SIBLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES.
4	(a) List Required.—
5	(1) In GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after
6	the date of the enactment of this Act, the President
7	shall submit to the appropriate congressional com-
8	mittees a list of senior officials of the military and
9	security forces of Burma that the President deter-
10	mines have played a direct and substantial role in
11	the commission of human rights abuses in Burma,
12	including against the Rohingya minority population.
13	(2) INCLUSIONS.—The list required by para-
14	graph (1) shall include all of the senior officials of
15	the military and security forces of Burma in charge
16	of each unit that was operational during the so-
17	called "elearance operations" that began in October
18	2016 and are ongoing as of the date of the enact-
19	ment of this Act.
20	(3) UPDATES.—Not less frequently than every
21	180 days, the President shall submit to the appro-
22	priate congressional committees an updated version
23	of the list required by paragraph $(1)$ .
24	(b) SANCTIONS.—
25	(1) VISA BAN.—The Secretary of State shall
26	deny a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Secu-

1	rity to exclude from the United States, any indi-
2	vidual on the list required by subsection $(a)(1)$ .
3	(2) List of specially designated nation-
4	ALS AND BLOCKED PERSONS.—
5	(A) In GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days
6	after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
7	President shall—
8	(i) determine whether the individuals
9	specified in subparagraph (B) should be
10	included on the SDN list; and
11	(ii) submit to the appropriate congres-
12	sional committees a report on that deter-
13	mination that includes, with respect to any
14	such individual not included on the SDN
15	list, the reason for not including that indi-
16	vidual on that list.
17	(B) INDIVIDUALS SPECIFIED.—The indi-
18	viduals specified in this subparagraph are—
19	(i) the head of each unit of the mili-
20	tary or security forces of Burma that was
21	operational during the so-called "clearance
22	operations" that began in October 2016
23	and are ongoing as of the date of the en-
24	actment of this Act, including—

1	(I) Senior General Min Aung
2	<del>Illaing;</del>
3	<del>(II)</del> Major General Maung
4	Maung Soe; and
5	(III) Major General Khin Maung
6	Soe; and
7	(ii) any senior official of the military
8	or security forces of Burma for which
9	there are credible allegations that the offi-
10	cial has aided, participated, or is otherwise
11	implicated in gross human rights abuses in
12	Burma, including sexual and ethnic- or
13	gender-based violence.
14	(C) SDN LIST DEFINED.—In this para-
15	graph, the term "SDN list" means the list of
16	specially designated nationals and blocked per-
17	sons maintained by the Office of Foreign Assets
18	Control of the Department of the Treasury.
19	(3) Authority for additional financial
20	SANCTIONS.—The Secretary of the Treasury may
21	prohibit or impose conditions on the opening or
22	maintaining in the United States of a correspondent
23	account or payable-through account by any financial
24	institution or financial agency that is a United
25	States person, for or on behalf of a foreign financial

1	institution, if the Secretary determines that the ac-
2	count is used—
3	(A) by a foreign financial institution that
4	holds property or an interest in property of an
5	individual on the list required by subsection
6	<del>(a)(1); or</del>
7	(B) to conduct a transaction on behalf of
8	an individual on that list.
9	(4) Rule of construction.—Nothing in this
10	subsection may be construed to prohibit any contract
11	or other financial transaction with a credible non-
12	governmental humanitarian organization in Burma.
13	(c) REMOVAL FROM LISTS.—The President may re-
14	move an individual from the list required by subsection
15	(a)(1), or remove an individual included on the SDN list
16	pursuant to subsection (b)(2) from that list, if the Presi-
17	dent determines and reports to the appropriate congres-
18	sional committees that—
19	(1) the individual has—
20	(A) publicly acknowledged the role of the
21	individual in committing past human rights
22	<del>abuses;</del>
23	(B) cooperated with independent efforts to
24	investigate such abuses;

1	(C) been held accountable for such abuses;
2	<del>OP</del>
3	(D) demonstrated substantial progress in
4	reforming the individual's behavior with respect
5	to the protection of human rights in the con-
6	duct of civil-military relations; and
7	(2) removing the individual from the list is in
8	the vital national interest of the United States.
9	(d) Penalties.—
10	(1) IN GENERAL.—A person that violates, at-
11	tempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a
12	violation of this section or any regulation, license, or
13	order issued to carry out paragraph $(2)$ or $(3)$ of
14	subsection (b) shall be subject to the penalties set
15	forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the
16	International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50
17	U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as a person that
18	commits an unlawful act described in subsection (a)
19	of that section.
20	(2) Rule of construction.—This subsection
21	shall not be construed to require the President to
22	declare a national emergency under section 202 of
23	the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
24	<del>(50 U.S.C.</del> 1701).
25	(e) Exceptions.—

1 (1) HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE.—A require-2 ment to impose sanctions under this section shall 3 not apply with respect to the provision of medicine, 4 medical equipment or supplies, food, or any other 5 form of humanitarian or human rights-related as-6 sistance provided to Burma in response to a humani-7 tarian crisis.

8 (2) UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS AGREE-9 MENT.—Subsection (b)(1) shall not apply to the ad-10 mission of an individual to the United States if such 11 admission is necessary to comply with United States 12 obligations under the Agreement between the United 13 Nations and the United States of America regarding 14 the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at 15 Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force 16 November 21, 1947, or under the Convention on 17 Consular Relations, done at Vienna April 24, 1963, 18 and entered into force March 19, 1967, or other 19 international obligations of the United States.

20 (f) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

21 (1) ACCOUNT; CORRESPONDENT ACCOUNT; PAY22 ABLE-THROUGH ACCOUNT.—The terms "account",
23 "correspondent account", and "payable-through ac24 count" have the meanings given those terms in sec25 tion 5318A of title 31, United States Code.

1	(2) Financial agency; financial institu-
2	TION.—The terms "financial agency" and "financial
3	institution" have the meanings given those terms in
4	section 5312 of title 31, United States Code.
5	(3) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term
6	<u>"United States person" means</u>
7	(A) a United States citizen or an alien law-
8	fully admitted for permanent residence to the
9	United States; or
10	(B) an entity organized under the laws of
11	the United States or of any jurisdiction within
12	the United States, including a foreign branch of
13	such an entity.
13 14	such an entity. SEC. 11. STRATEGY FOR PROMOTING ECONOMIC DEVELOP-
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	SEC. 11. STRATEGY FOR PROMOTING ECONOMIC DEVELOP-
14 15	SEC. 11. STRATEGY FOR PROMOTING ECONOMIC DEVELOP- MENT. (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the
14 15 16 17	SEC. 11. STRATEGY FOR PROMOTING ECONOMIC DEVELOP- MENT. (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the
14 15 16 17 18	SEC. 11. STRATEGY FOR PROMOTING ECONOMIC DEVELOP- MENT. (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,
14 15 16 17 18 19	SEC. 11. STRATEGY FOR PROMOTING ECONOMIC DEVELOP- MENT. (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Administrator of
14 15 16 17 18 19	SEC. 11. STRATEGY FOR PROMOTING ECONOMIC DEVELOP- MENT. (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development
<ol> <li>14</li> <li>15</li> <li>16</li> <li>17</li> <li>18</li> <li>19</li> <li>20</li> </ol>	SEC. 11. STRATEGY FOR PROMOTING ECONOMIC DEVELOP- MENT. (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees
<ol> <li>14</li> <li>15</li> <li>16</li> <li>17</li> <li>18</li> <li>19</li> <li>20</li> <li>21</li> </ol>	SEC. 11. STRATEGY FOR PROMOTING ECONOMIC DEVELOP- MENT. (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a strategy to support sustainable and broad-based eco-
<ol> <li>14</li> <li>15</li> <li>16</li> <li>17</li> <li>18</li> <li>19</li> <li>20</li> <li>21</li> <li>22</li> </ol>	SEC. 11. STRATEGY FOR PROMOTING ECONOMIC DEVELOP- MENT. (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a strategy to support sustainable and broad-based eco- nomic development, in accordance with the priorities of

section (a) shall include a plan to promote inclusive and
 responsible economic growth, including through the fol lowing initiatives:

4 (1) Develop an economic reform road-map to 5 diversify control over and access to participation in 6 key industries and sectors. The United States Gov-7 ernment should support the Government of Burma 8 to develop a roadmap to assess and recommend 9 measures to remove barriers to a level playing field 10 that increases competition, access and opportunity in 11 sectors dominated by the military, former military 12 officials, and their families, and businesspeeple con-13 neeted to the military. The roadmap should include 14 areas related to government transparency, account-15 ability, and governance.

16 (2) Increase transparency disclosure require-17 ments in key sectors to promote responsible invest-18 ment. Provide technical support to develop and im-19 plement policies, and revise existing policies on pub-20 lie disclosure of beneficial owners of companies in 21 key sectors identified by the Government of Burma, 22 including the identities of those seeking or securing 23 access to Burma's most valuable resources. Such 24 new requirements should complement disclosures due 25 to be put in place in Burma as a result of its participation in the Extractives Industry Transparency Ini tiative (EITI).

# 3 SEC. 12. REPORT ON ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ETHNIC 4 CLEANSING, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, 5 AND GENOCIDE IN BURMA.

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the 7 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State 8 shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees 9 a report on allegations of ethnic cleansing, crimes against 10 humanity, and genocide, and on potential transnational 11 justice mechanisms in Burma.

12 (b) ELEMENTS.—The reports required under sub13 section (a) shall include—

14 (1) a description of alleged ethnic cleaning,
15 erimes against humanity, including the erime of
16 apartheid, and genocide perpetrated against the
17 Rohingya ethnic minority in Burma, including—

18 (A) incidents that may constitute ethnic
19 cleansing, crimes against humanity, and geno20 cide committed by the Burmese military, and
21 other actors involved in the violence;

(B) the role of the civilian government in
the commission of such activities;

24 (C) incidents that may constitute ethnic
25 cleansing, crimes against humanity, or genocide

1	committed by violent extremist groups or
2	antigovernment forces;
3	(D) any incidents that may violate the
4	principle of medical neutrality and, if possible,
5	identification of the individual or individuals
6	who engaged in or organized such incidents;
7	and
8	(E) to the extent possible, a description of
9	the conventional and unconventional weapons
10	used for such crimes and the origins of such
11	weapons;
12	(2) a description and assessment by the Depart-
13	ment of State, the United States Agency for Inter-
14	national Development, the Department of Justice,
15	and other appropriate Federal departments and
16	agencies of programs that the United States Govern-
17	ment has already or is planning to undertake to en-
18	sure accountability for ethnic eleansing, erimes
19	against humanity, and genocide perpetrated against
20	the Rohingya and other ethnic minority groups by
21	the Government, security forces, and military of
22	Burma, violent extremist groups, and other combat-
23	ants involved in the conflict, including programs—
24	(A) to train investigators within and out-

side of Burma and Bangladesh on how to docu-

ment, investigate, develop findings of, and identify and locate alleged perpetrators of ethnie eleansing, crimes against humanity, or genocide in Burma; (B) to promote and prepare for a transitional justice process or processes for the perpetrators of ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, and genocide in Burma; and (C) to document, collect, preserve, and protect evidence of ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, and genocide in Burma, including support for Burmese and Bangladeshi, foreign, and international nongovernmental organizations, United Nations Human Rights Council's

investigative team, and other entities; and

16 (3) a detailed study of the feasibility and desir-17 ability of potential transitional justice mechanisms 18 for Burma, including a hybrid tribunal, to address 19 ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, and geno-20 eide perpetrated in Burma, including recommenda-21 tions on which transitional justice mechanisms the 22 United States Government should support, why such 23 mechanisms should be supported, and what type of 24 support should be offered.

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1 (c) PROTECTION OF WITNESSES AND EVIDENCE. 2 The Secretary shall take due care to ensure that the iden-3 tification of witnesses and physical evidence are not pub-4 liely disclosed in a manner that might place such persons 5 at risk of harm or encourage the destruction of evidence 6 by the Government of Burma.

#### 7 SEC. 13. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AUTHORIZED.

8 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in con-9 sultation with the Department of Justice and other appro-10 priate Federal departments and agencies, is authorized to provide appropriate assistance to support entities that, 11 with respect to ethnic cleansing, erimes against humanity, 12 and genocide perpetrated by the military, security forces, 13 and Government of Burma, Buddhist militias, and all 14 15 other armed groups fighting in Rakhine State—

16 (1) identify suspected perpetrators of ethnic
 17 eleansing, crimes against humanity, and genocide;

- 18 (2) collect, document, and protect evidence of
  19 erimes and preserve the chain of custody for such
  20 evidence;
- 21 (3) conduct criminal investigations; and

22 (4) support investigations by third-party states,
23 as appropriate.

24 (b) ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE. The Secretary of
25 State, after consultation with appropriate Federal depart-

ments and agencies and the appropriate congressional 1 committees, and taking into account the findings of the 2 3 transitional justice study required under section 12(b)(3), 4 is authorized to provide assistance to support the creation 5 and operation of transitional justice mechanisms, including a potential hybrid tribunal, to prosecute individuals 6 7 suspected of committing ethnic cleansing, crimes against 8 humanity, or genocide in Burma.

### 9 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

10 This Act may be cited as the "Burma Human Rights
11 and Freedom Act of 2018".

### 12 SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

13 Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The United States policy of principled engagement since 1988 has fostered positive democratic
reforms in Burma, which have led to significant milestones on the path to full democracy.

18 (2) On November 8, 2015, Burma held historic 19 elections in which the National League for Democracy 20 won a supermajority of seats in the combined na-21 tional parliament. On March 30, 2016, Htin Kyaw 22 was inaugurated as the President of Burma, the 23 country's first civilian President in more than 50 24 years. Aung San Suu Kyi, President of the National 25 League for Democracy, was barred from becoming

President due to the provisions of section 59(f) of the
 2008 Constitution, and therefore assumed the office of
 State Counsellor, a position created for her that made
 her the country's de facto leader.

(3) Aung San Suu Kyi's first acts as State 5 6 Counsellor after her National League for Democracy 7 party took office included releasing more than 100 po-8 litical prisoners, including well-known journalists 9 and student activists held on politically motivated 10 charges. However, as of November 2017, there were 11 228 political prisoners in Burma, 46 of which were 12 serving prison sentences, 49 of which were awaiting 13 trial inside prison, and 133 of which were awaiting 14 trial outside prison, according to the Assistance Asso-15 ciation for Political Prisoners.

16 (4) The Government of Burma also continues to 17 systematically discriminate against the Rohingya 18 people. Burma's 1982 citizenship law stripped 19 Rohingya Burmese of their Burmese citizenship, ren-20 dering them stateless, and the Government continues 21 to restrict Rohingya births and to deny the Rohingya 22 freedom of movement and access to healthcare, land, 23 education, voting, political participation, and mar-24 riage.

1	(5) Despite the meaningful steps taken toward
2	democracy in Burma, there remain important struc-
3	tural and systemic impediments to the realization of
4	a fully democratic civilian government, including—
5	(A) the 2008 Constitution, which is in need
6	of reform;
7	(B) the disfranchisement of certain groups
8	who voted in previous elections;
9	(C) the social, political, and economic con-
10	ditions in Rakhine State, particularly with re-
11	spect to the Rohingya population; and
12	(D) the current humanitarian and human
13	rights crisis affecting Burma's Rohingya popu-
14	lation and residents of the Rakhine, Kachin, and
15	Shan states, including credible reports of ethnic
16	cleansing, crimes against humanity,
17	extrajudicial killings, sexual and gender-based
18	violence, and forced displacement.
19	(6) Actions of the military of Burma, known as
20	the Tatmadaw, including continuing assaults on per-
21	sonnel and territory controlled by armed ethnic orga-
22	nizations, military offensives immediately preceding
23	the peace conference in Naypyitaw, and human rights
24	violations against noncombatant civilians in conflict
25	areas, undermine confidence in establishing a credible

nationwide ceasefire agreement to end Burma's civil
 war.

3 (7) The people of Burma continue to suffer from
4 an ongoing civil war between the Tatmadaw and
5 nearly 20 armed ethnic organizations. Any prospects
6 for a full democracy in Burma are contingent on end7 ing the civil war and finding a path toward national
8 reconciliation between Burma's Bamar majority and
9 its various ethnic minorities.

10 (8) Since 2011, over 98,000 people have been dis-11 placed in Kachin and northern Shan State over the 12 escalating violence and instability, resulting in con-13 tinued massive internal displacement, including in 14 internally displaced person (IDP) camps, which con-15 tinues to undermine the trust necessary to achieve a 16 durable, lasting peace, and has caused a massive hu-17 manitarian crisis which disproportionately affects the 18 lives of innocent civilians and internally displaced 19 persons forced from their homes. According to the 20 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Hu-21 manitarian Affairs, some 50 percent of these dis-22 placed persons are staying in areas beyond Govern-23 ment control where humanitarian access is limited. 24 Even in areas controlled by the Government, delivery 25 of humanitarian assistance has been increasingly restricted through onerous bureaucratic requirements re sulting in limited access by international and local
 humanitarian organizations.

(9) In 2015, the nongovernmental campaign 4 5 Global Witness found that, in 2014, the estimated 6 value of official production of jade equated to up to 7 48 percent of the official gross domestic product of 8 Burma. Because of corruption and a lack of trans-9 parency, much of the proceeds of the Burmese jade 10 trade enrich notorious leaders from the military 11 junta, including former dictator Than Shwe and 12 United States-sanctioned drug lord Hsueh Kang Wei, 13 and vested interests in jade are undermining pros-14 pects for resolving the most intractable armed conflict 15 in Burma.

16 (10) On August 31, 2016, State Counsellor Aung 17 San Suu Kyi and the Government of Burma initi-18 ated the Union Peace Conference 21st Century 19 Panglong in Naypyitaw, which more than 1,400 rep-20 resentatives of various concerned parties attended in 21 an effort to begin the process of ending Burma's civil 22 war and to discuss options in forming a democratic 23 state of Burma. On May 24, 2017, the Government of 24 Burma held a second Panglong Peace Conference, 25 with mixed results.

1 (11) On January 4, 2018, the Department of 2 State determined that Burma remains designated as 3 a country of particular concern for religious freedom 4 under section 402(b) of the International Religious 5 Freedom Act (22 U.S.C. 6442(b)), and that "members" 6 of the Rohingya community in particular face abuses 7 by the Government of Burma, including those involv-8 ing torture, unlawful arrest and detention, restricted 9 movement, restrictions on religious practices, dis-10 crimination in employment, and access to social serv-11 ices".

12 (12) The February 2017 panels set up by the 13 Burmese army and the Home Affairs Ministry are 14 widely perceived by the international community to 15 lack independence and impartiality. The December 16 2016 commission established by Burma's President 17 Htin Kyaw to investigate the October 2016 attacks 18 dismissed claims of misconduct by security forces due 19 to "insufficient evidence." A Burmese army internal 20 inquiry completed in November 2017 claimed there 21 had been no abuses committed by the military. The 22 2012 commission government established to investigate violence in Rakhine State that year never held 23 24 anyone accountable.

1	(13) In a public address on October 12, 2017,
2	State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi laid out 3 goals
3	for the Rakhine State:
4	(A) Repatriation of those who have crossed
5	over to Bangladesh and effective provision of hu-
6	manitarian assistance.
7	(B) Resettlement of displaced populations.
8	(C) Economic development and durable
9	peace.
10	(14) According to the Médecins Sans Frontières
11	estimates, at least 6,700 Rohingya have been killed,
12	including 730 children, and that at least 2,700 others
13	died from disease and malnutrition and over an esti-
14	mated 680,000 Rohingya have fled to Bangladesh
15	since August 2017, fearing loss of livelihood and shel-
16	ter and disproportionate use of force by the military
17	of Burma.
18	(15) On October 23, 2017, the Department of
19	State said, "We express our gravest concern with re-
20	cent events in Rakhine State and the violent, trau-
21	matic abuses Rohingya and other communities have
22	endured. It is imperative that any individuals or en-
23	tities responsible for atrocities, including non-state
24	actors and vigilantes, be held accountable.".

1	(16) At a Senate Foreign Relations Committee
2	hearing on October 24, 2017, the Department of State
3	indicated that "refugees continue to cross into Ban-
4	gladesh, and we continue to receive credible reports of
5	sporadic violence in northern Rakhine State".
6	(17) Amnesty International and Human Rights
7	Watch have reported and documented a campaign of
8	violence perpetuated by the security forces of Burma
9	that "may amount to crimes against humanity" and
10	"ethnic cleansing" and includes—
11	(A) indiscriminate attacks on civilians;
12	(B) rape of women and girls; and
13	(C) arbitrary arrest and detention of
14	Rohingya men without charge.
15	(18) According to Human Rights Watch, Bur-
16	mese security forces have committed widespread rape
17	against women and girls as part of a campaign of
18	ethnic cleansing against Rohingya Muslims in Bur-
19	ma's Rakhine State. Survivors said that soldiers
20	gathered them together in groups and then raped or
21	gang raped them.
22	(19) Because survivors of conflict-related sexual
23	or gender-based violence know very little about the
24	abusers, aside from identifying the abuser as a mem-
25	ber of a military unit, existing laws and account-

ability mechanisms often fail to protect victims of
 such violence.

3 (20) Satellite images captured by Human Rights
4 Watch reveal that, out of the approximately 470 vil5 lages in northern Rakhine State, most of which were
6 completely or partially populated with Rohingya
7 Muslims, nearly 300 were partially or completely de8 stroyed by fire after August 25, 2017.

9 (21) The Government of Burma has continued to 10 block access to northern Rakhine State by United Na-11 tions and other humanitarian organizations, pre-12 hundreds of thousands venting ofvulnerable 13 Rohingya, Rahkine, and other ethnic groups, includ-14 ing children with acute malnutrition, from receiving 15 humanitarian aid. According to a report by the 16 United Nations Children's Fund, a diphtheria out-17 break has led to 424 cases and 6 deaths since Decem-18 ber 6, 2017. In addition, the levels of global acute 19 malnutrition in refugees from Burma exceeds the 20 World Health Organization's threshold by 15 percent 21 in children aged 6–59 months. Over 50 percent of the 22 Rohingya children are reported to be suffering from 23 anemia.

24 (22) In response to previous violence between the
25 Burmese military and the ethnic Rohingya people in

1	2016, Aung San Suu Kyi established the Advisory
2	Commission on Rakhine State headed by former
3	United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan to ad-
4	dress tensions in Northern Rakhine. She has since
5	also endorsed the Commission's recommendations and
6	established an "Advisory Team for the Committee for
7	the Implementation of Recommendations on Rakhine
8	State" to move forward with implementation.
9	(23) On December 21, 2017, using the authority
10	granted by the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Ac-
11	countability Act (subtitle F of title XII of Public Law
12	114–328), the President imposed sanctions on Maung
13	Maung Soe, a Major General who was the chief of the
14	Burmese Army's Western command during the Au-
15	gust 2017 attack in Rakhine state.
16	(24) On November 22, 2017, Secretary of State
17	Rex Tillerson stated, "After careful and through anal-
18	ysis of available facts, it is clear that the situation in
19	northern Rakhine state constitutes ethnic cleansing
20	against the Rohingya. Those responsible for these
21	atrocities must be held accountable.".
22	(25) Ethnic cleansing is a despicable evil, and
23	while it is not an independent crime under domestic
24	or international law, it is often accomplished through

25 acts that constitute war crimes, crimes against hu-

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1	manity, or genocide, and the perpetrators of such
2	crimes in Burma must be held accountable.
3	SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
4	In this Act:
5	(1) Appropriate congressional commit-
6	TEES.—The term "appropriate congressional commit-
7	tees" means—
8	(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations
9	and the Committee on Armed Services of the
10	Senate; and
11	(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and
12	the Committee on Armed Services of the House
13	of Representatives.
14	(2) GENOCIDE.—The term "genocide" means any
15	offense described in section 1091(a) of title 18, United
16	States Code.
17	(3) Hybrid tribunal.—The term "hybrid tri-
18	bunal" means a temporary criminal tribunal that in-
19	volves a combination of domestic and international
20	lawyers, judges, and other professionals to prosecute
21	individuals suspected of committing war crimes,
22	crimes against humanity, or genocide.
23	(4) TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE.—The term "transi-
24	tional justice" means the range of judicial, non-
25	judicial, formal, informal, retributive, and restorative

1	measures employed by countries transitioning out of
2	armed conflict or repressive regimes—
3	(A) to redress legacies of atrocities; and
4	(B) to promote long-term, sustainable peace.
5	(5) WAR CRIME.—The term "war crime" has the
6	meaning given the term in section 2441(c) of title 18,
7	United States Code.
8	SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
9	It is the policy of the United States that—
10	(1) the pursuit of a calibrated engagement strat-
11	egy is essential to support the establishment of a
12	peaceful, prosperous, and democratic Burma that in-
13	cludes respect for the human rights of all its people
14	regardless of ethnicity and religion; and
15	(2) the guiding principles of such a strategy in-
16	clude—
17	(A) support for meaningful legal and con-
18	stitutional reforms that remove remaining re-
19	strictions on civil and political rights and insti-
20	tute civilian control of the military, civilian con-
21	trol of the government, and the constitutional
22	provision reserving 25 percent of parliamentary
23	seats for the military, which provides the mili-
24	tary with veto power over constitutional amend-
25	ments;

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1	(B) the establishment of a fully democratic,
2	pluralistic, civilian controlled, and representa-
3	tive political system that includes regularized
4	free and fair elections in which all people of
5	Burma, including the Rohingya, can vote;
6	(C) the promotion of genuine national rec-
7	onciliation and conclusion of a credible and sus-
8	tainable nationwide ceasefire agreement, polit-
9	ical accommodation of the needs of ethnic Shan,
10	Kachin, Chin, Karen, and other ethnic groups,
11	safe and voluntary return of displaced persons to
12	villages of origins, and constitutional change al-
13	lowing inclusive permanent peace;
14	(D) investigations into credible reports of
15	ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, sex-
16	ual and gender-based violence, and genocide per-
17	petrated against ethnic minorities like the
18	Rohingya by the government, military, and secu-
19	rity forces of Burma, violent extremist groups,
20	and other combatants involved in the conflict;
21	(E) accountability for determinations of
22	ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, sex-
23	ual and gender-based violence, and genocide per-
24	petrated against ethnic minorities like the
25	Rohingya by the Government, military, and se-

1	curity forces of Burma, violent extremist groups,
2	and other combatants involved in the conflict;
3	(F) strengthening the government's civilian
4	institutions, including support for greater trans-
5	parency and accountability;
6	(G) the establishment of professional and
7	nonpartisan military, security, and police forces
8	that operate under civilian control;
9	(H) empowering local communities, civil so-
10	ciety, and independent media;
11	(I) promoting responsible international and
12	regional engagement;
13	(J) strengthening respect for and protection
14	of human rights and religious freedom;
15	(K) addressing and ending the humani-
16	tarian and human rights crisis, including by
17	supporting the return of the displaced Rohingya
18	to their homes and providing equal access to res-
19	toration of full citizenship for the Rohingya pop-
20	ulation; and
21	(L) promoting broad-based, inclusive eco-
22	nomic development and fostering healthy and re-
23	silient communities.

1	SEC. 5. AUTHORIZATION OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
2	AND RECONCILIATION.
3	(a) HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE.—
4	(1) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be ap-
5	propriated \$103,695,069 for fiscal year 2018 for hu-
6	manitarian assistance for Burma, Bangladesh, and
7	the region. The assistance may include—
8	(A) assistance for the victims of the Bur-
9	mese military's ethnic cleansing campaign tar-
10	geting Rohingya in Rakhine State, including
11	those displaced in Bangladesh, Burma, and the
12	region;
13	(B) support for voluntary resettlement or
14	repatriation efforts regionally; and
15	(C) humanitarian assistance to victims of
16	violence and destruction in Rakhine State, in-
17	cluding victims of gender-based violence and un-
18	accompanied minors.
19	(2) Sense of congress on additional fund-
20	ING.—It is the sense of Congress that additional sig-
21	nificant and sustained funding will be necessary to
22	address the medium and long-term impacts of this
23	crisis.
24	(b) Reconciliation Programs.—There is authorized
25	to be appropriated \$27,400,000 for fiscal year 2018 for rec-

onciliation programs in Burma. The assistance may in clude—

3 (1) reducing the influence of the drivers of inter4 communal conflict;

5 (2) strengthening engagement on areas affecting
6 fundamental freedoms;

7 (3) enhancing the ability of key stakeholders to
8 engage in the peace process; and

9 (4) assisting the implementation of the Kofi
10 Annan Commission report.

### 11 SEC. 6. MULTILATERAL ASSISTANCE.

12 The Secretary of the Treasury should instruct the 13 United States executive director of each international fi-14 nancial institution to use the voice and vote of the United 15 States to support projects in Burma that—

16 (1) provide for accountability and transparency,
17 including the collection, verification and publication
18 of beneficial ownership information related to extrac19 tive industries and on-site monitoring during the life
20 of the project;

(2) will be developed and carried out in accordance with best practices regarding environmental conservation, cultural protection, and empowerment of
local populations, including free, prior, and informed
consent of affected indigenous communities;

1	(3) do not provide incentives for, or facilitate,
2	forced displacement; and
3	(4) do not partner with or otherwise involve en-
4	terprises owned or controlled by the armed forces.
5	SEC. 7. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON RIGHT OF RETURNEES
6	AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT.
7	(a) RIGHT OF RETURN.—It is the sense of Congress
8	that the Government of Burma, in collaboration with the
9	regional and international community, including the
10	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, should—
11	(1) ensure the dignified, safe, and voluntary re-
12	turn of all those displaced from their homes, espe-
13	cially from Rakhine State, without an unduly high
14	burden of proof;
15	(2) offer to those who do not want to return
16	meaningful opportunity to obtain appropriate com-
17	pensation or restitution;
18	(3) not place returning Rohingya in DP camps
19	or "model villages", but instead make efforts to recon-
20	struct Rohingya villages as and where they were;
21	(4) keep any funds collected by the Government
22	by harvesting the land previously owned and tended
23	by Rohingya farmers for them upon their return; and
24	(5) fully implement all of the recommendations

25 of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State. (b) FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT OF REFUGEES AND IN TERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS.—Congress recognizes that
 the Government of Bangladesh has provided long-standing
 support and hospitality to people fleeing violence in Burma,
 and calls on the Government of Bangladesh—

6 (1) to ensure all refugees have freedom of move7 ment and under no circumstance are subject to un8 safe, involuntary, or uninformed repatriation; and

9 (2) to ensure the dignified, safe, and voluntary 10 return of those displaced from their homes, and offer 11 to those who do not want to return meaningful means 12 to obtain compensation or restitution.

### 13 SEC. 8. MILITARY COOPERATION.

14 (a) PROHIBITION.—Except as provided under sub-15 section (b), the President may not furnish any security assistance or to engage in any military-to-military programs 16 with the armed forces of Burma, including training or ob-17 servation or participation in regional exercises, until the 18 19 Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, certifies to the appropriate congressional commit-20 21 tees that the Burmese military has demonstrated significant 22 progress in abiding by international human rights stand-23 ards and is undertaking meaningful and significant secu-24 rity sector reform, including transparency and accountability to prevent future abuses, as determined by applying
 the following criteria:

3 (1) The military adheres to international human
4 rights standards and pledges to stop future human
5 rights violations.

6 (2) The military supports efforts to carry out 7 meaningful and comprehensive investigations of cred-8 ible reports of abuses and is taking steps to hold ac-9 countable those in the Burmese military responsible 10 for human rights violations.

11 (3) The military supports efforts to carry out 12 meaningful and comprehensive investigations of re-13 ports of conflict-related sexual and gender-based vio-14 lence and is taking steps to hold accountable those in 15 the Burmese military who failed to prevent, respond 16 to, investigate, and prosecute violence against women, 17 sexual violence, or other gender-based violence.

18 (4) The Government of Burma, including the
19 military, allows immediate and unfettered humani20 tarian access to communities in areas affected by con21 flict, including Rohingya communities in Rakhine
22 State.

(5) The Government of Burma, including the
military, cooperates with the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees and other relevant United

Nations agencies to ensure the protection of displaced
 persons and the safe and voluntary return of
 Rohingya refugees and internally displaced persons.

4 (6) The Government of Burma, including the
5 military, takes steps toward the implementation of
6 the recommendations of the Advisory Commission on
7 Rakhine State.

8 (b) EXCEPTIONS.—

9 (1) CERTAIN EXISTING AUTHORITIES.—The De10 partment of Defense may continue to conduct con11 sultations based on the authorities under section 1253
12 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. "Buck" McKeon
13 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
14 2015 (Public Law 113–291; 22 U.S.C. 2151 note).

15 (2) HOSPITALITY.—The United States Agency 16 for International Development and the Department of 17 State may provide assistance authorized by part I of 18 the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 19 et seq.) to support ethnic armed groups and the Bur-20 mese military for the purpose of supporting research, 21 dialogues, meetings, and other activities related to the 22 Union Peace Conference, Political Dialogues, and re-23 lated processes, in furtherance of inclusive, sustainable reconciliation. 24

(c) MILITARY REFORM.—The certification required
 under subsection (a) shall include a written justification
 in classified and unclassified form describing the Burmese
 military's efforts to implement reforms, end impunity for
 human rights violations, and increase transparency and ac countability.

7 (d) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this Act
8 shall be construed to authorize Department of Defense as9 sistance to the Government of Burma except as provided
10 in this section.

11 (e) REPORT.—

12 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after 13 the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 14 days thereafter, the Secretary of State and the Sec-15 retary of Defense shall submit to the appropriate con-16 gressional committees a report, in both classified and 17 unclassified form, on the strategy and plans for mili-18 tary-to-military engagement between the United 19 States Armed Forces and the military of Burma.

20 (2) ELEMENTS.—The report required under
21 paragraph (1) shall include the following elements:

(A) A description and assessment of the
Government of Burma's strategy for security sector reform, including as it relates to an end to
involvement in the illicit trade in jade and other

natural resources, reforms to end corruption and 1 2 illicit drug trafficking, and constitutional reforms to ensure civilian control of the Govern-3 4 ment. (B) A list of ongoing military activities 5 6 conducted by the United States Government with 7 the Government of Burma, and a description of 8 the United States strategy for future military-to-9 military engagements between the United States and Burma's military forces, including the mili-10 11 tary of Burma, the Burma Police Force, and 12 armed ethnic groups. 13 (C) An assessment of the progress of the 14 military of Burma towards developing a frame-15 work to implement human rights reforms, including— 16 17 (i) cooperation with civilian authori-18 ties to investigate and prosecute cases of 19 human rights violations; 20 (ii) steps taken to demonstrate respect 21 for internationally-recognized human rights 22 standards and implementation of and ad-23 herence to the laws of war; and 24 *(iii)* a description of the elements of the

25 military-to-military engagement between

1	the United States and Burma that promote
2	such implementation.
3	(D) An assessment of progress on the peace-
4	ful settlement of armed conflicts between the Gov-
5	ernment of Burma and ethnic minority groups,
6	including actions taken by the military of
7	Burma to adhere to ceasefire agreements, allow
8	for safe and voluntary returns of displaced per-
9	sons to their villages of origin, and withdraw
10	forces from conflict zones.
11	(E) An assessment of the Burmese's mili-
12	tary recruitment and use of children as soldiers.
13	(F) An assessment of the Burmese's mili-
14	tary's use of violence against women, sexual vio-
15	lence, or other gender-based violence as a tool of
16	terror, war, or ethnic cleansing.
17	(f) Civilian Channels.—Any program initiated
18	under this section shall use appropriate civilian govern-
19	ment channels with the democratically elected Government
20	of Burma.
21	(g) Regular Consultations.—Any new program or
22	activity in Burma initiated under this section shall be sub-
23	ject to prior consultation with the appropriate congres-
24	sional committees.

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1	SEC. 9. REINSTATEMENT OF IMPORT RESTRICTIONS ON
2	JADEITE FROM BURMA.
3	(a) DEFINITIONS.—Section 3A(a) of the Burmese Free-
4	dom and Democracy Act of 2003 (Public Law 108–61; 50
5	U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended—
6	(1) by striking paragraph $(2)$ and inserting the
7	following:
8	"(2) BURMESE COVERED ARTICLE.—The term
9	'Burmese covered article' means—
10	"(A) jadeite mined or extracted from
11	Burma; or
12	``(B) articles of jewelry containing jadeite
13	described in subparagraph (A).";
14	(2) by striking paragraph $(3)$ and inserting the
15	following:
16	"(3) Non-burmese covered article.—The
17	term 'non-Burmese covered article' means—
18	"(A) jadeite mined or extracted from a
19	country other than Burma; or
20	``(B) articles of jewelry containing jadeite
21	described in subparagraph (A)."; and
22	(3) by striking paragraph $(4)$ and inserting the
23	following:
24	"(4) JADEITE; ARTICLES OF JEWELRY CON-
25	TAINING JADEITE.—

1	"(A) JADEITE.—The term 'jadeite' means
2	any jadeite classifiable under heading 7103 of
3	the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United
4	States (in this paragraph referred to as the
5	<i>'HT8')</i> .
6	"(B) Articles of Jewelry Containing
7	JADEITE.—The term 'articles of jewelry con-
8	taining jadeite' means—
9	"(i) any article of jewelry classifiable
10	under heading 7113 of the HTS that con-
11	tains jadeite; or
12	"(ii) any article of jadeite classifiable
13	under heading 7116 of the HTS.".
14	(b) TERMINATION.—Section 3A of the Burmese Free-
15	dom and Democracy Act of 2003 (Public Law 108–61; 50
16	U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by striking subsections (g)
17	and (h) and inserting the following:
18	"(g) TERMINATION.—Notwithstanding section 9, this
19	section shall remain in effect until the President determines
20	and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees
21	that the Government of Burma has taken measures to re-
22	form the jadeite industry in Burma, including measures to
23	require—
24	"(1) the disclosure of the ultimate beneficial own-
25	ership of entities in that industry; and

1	(1) the multication of project revenues now
	"(2) the publication of project revenues, pay-
2	ments, and contract terms relating to that industry.".
3	(c) Conforming Amendments.—Section 3A of the
4	Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 (Public Law
5	108–61; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended—
6	(1) in the section heading—
7	(A) by striking "AND RUBIES"; and
8	(B) by striking " <b>OR RUBIES</b> ";
9	(2) in subsection (b)—
10	(A) in paragraph (1), by striking "until
11	such time" and all that follows through "2008"
12	and inserting 'beginning on the date that is 180
13	days after the date of the enactment of the
14	Burma Human Rights and Freedom Act of
15	2018"; and
16	(B) in paragraph (3), by striking "the date
17	of the enactment of this Act" and inserting "the
18	date of the enactment of the Burma Human
19	Rights and Freedom Act of 2018"; and
20	(3) in subsection (c)—
21	(A) in paragraph (1), by striking "until
22	such time" and all that follows through "2008"
23	and inserting 'beginning on the date that is 180
24	days after the date of the enactment of the

1	Burma Human Rights and Freedom Act of
2	2018"; and
3	(B) in paragraph (2)(B)—
4	(i) in clause (ii), by striking "or pol-
5	ished rubies"
6	(ii) by striking "or rubies" each place
7	it appears.
8	SEC. 10. VISA BAN AND ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WITH RE-
9	SPECT TO MILITARY OFFICIALS RESPON-
10	SIBLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS.
11	(a) LIST REQUIRED.—
12	(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after
13	the date of the enactment of this Act, the President
14	shall submit to the appropriate congressional commit-
15	tees a list of senior officials of the military and secu-
16	rity forces of Burma that the President determines
17	have knowingly played a direct and significant role
18	in the commission of human rights violations in
19	Burma, including against the Rohingya minority
20	population.
21	(2) INCLUSIONS.—The list required by para-
22	graph (1) shall include all of the senior officials of the
23	military and security forces of Burma—
24	(A) in charge of each unit that was oper-
25	ational during the so-called "clearance oper-

1	ations" that began during or after October 2016;
2	and
3	(B) who knew, or should have known, that
4	the official's subordinates were committing sex-
5	ual or gender-based violence and failed to take
6	adequate steps to prevent such violence or punish
7	the individuals responsible for such violence.
8	(3) UPDATES.—Not less frequently than every
9	180 days, the President shall submit to the appro-
10	priate congressional committees an updated version of
11	the list required by paragraph (1).
12	(b) Sanctions.—
13	(1) VISA BAN.—The Secretary of State shall deny
14	a visa to, and the Secretary of Homeland Security
15	shall exclude from the United States, any individual
16	included in the most recent list required subsection
17	(a).
18	(2) List of specially designated nationals
19	AND BLOCKED PERSONS.—
20	(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days
21	after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
22	President shall—
23	(i) determine whether the individuals
24	specified in subparagraph (B) should be in-
25	cluded on the SDN list; and

1	(ii) submit to the appropriate congres-
2	sional committees a report, in classified
3	form if necessary, on the procedures for in-
4	cluding those individuals on the SDN list
5	under existing authorities of the Depart-
6	ment of the Treasury.
7	(B) INDIVIDUALS SPECIFIED.—The individ-
8	uals specified in this subparagraph are—
9	(i) the head of each unit of the mili-
10	tary or security forces of Burma that was
11	operational during the so-called "clearance
12	operations" that began during or after Oc-
13	tober 2016, including—
14	(I) Senior General Min Aung
15	Hlaing; and
16	(II) Major General Khin Maung
17	Soe;
18	(ii) any senior official of the military
19	or security forces of Burma for which the
20	President determines there are credible re-
21	ports that the official has aided, partici-
22	pated, or is otherwise implicated in gross
23	human rights violations in Burma, includ-
24	ing sexual and ethnic- or gender-based vio-
25	lence; and

1 *(iii) any senior official of the military* 2 or security forces of Burma for which the President determines there are credible re-3 4 ports that the official knew, or should have known, that the official's subordinates were 5 6 committing sexual or gender-based violence 7 and failed to take adequate steps to prevent such violence or punish the individuals re-8 9 sponsible for such violence.

10 (3)AUTHORITY FOR ADDITIONAL FINANCIAL 11 SANCTIONS.—The Secretary of the Treasury may, in 12 consultation with the Secretary of State, prohibit or 13 impose strict conditions on the opening or maintain-14 ing in the United States of a correspondent account 15 or payable-through account by any financial institution that is a United States person, for or on behalf 16 17 of a foreign financial institution, if the Secretary de-18 termines that the account is knowingly used—

19(A) by a foreign financial institution that20knowingly holds property or an interest in prop-21erty of an individual included on the SDN list22pursuant to paragraph (2); or

23 (B) to conduct a significant transaction on
24 behalf of such an individual.

1	(4) Rule of construction.—Nothing in this
2	subsection may be construed to prohibit any contract
3	or other financial transaction by a United States per-
4	son with a credible nongovernmental humanitarian
5	organization in Burma.
6	(c) Removal From List.—The President may remove
7	an individual from the list required by subsection (a) if
8	the President determines and reports to the appropriate
9	congressional committees that—
10	(1) the individual has—
11	(A) publicly acknowledged the role of the in-
12	dividual in committing past human rights viola-
13	tions;
14	(B) cooperated with independent efforts to
15	investigate such violations;
16	(C) been held accountable for such viola-
17	tions; and
18	(D) demonstrated substantial progress in re-
19	forming the individual's behavior with respect to
20	the protection of human rights in the conduct of
21	civil-military relations; and
22	(2) removing the individual from the list is in
23	the national interest of the United States.
24	(d) Exceptions.—

1	(1) HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE.—A requirement
2	to impose sanctions under this section shall not apply
3	with respect to the provision of medicine, medical
4	equipment or supplies, food, or any other form of hu-
5	manitarian or human rights-related assistance pro-
6	vided to Burma in response to a humanitarian crisis.
7	(2) United nations headquarters agree-
8	MENT.—Subsection (b)(1) shall not apply to the ad-
9	mission of an individual to the United States if such
10	admission is necessary to comply with United States
11	obligations under the Agreement between the United
12	Nations and the United States of America regarding
13	the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at
14	Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force
15	November 21, 1947, or under the Convention on Con-
16	sular Relations, done at Vienna April 24, 1963, and
17	entered into force March 19, 1967, or other inter-
18	national obligations of the United States.
19	(e) WAIVER.—The President may waive a requirement
20	of this section if the Secretary of State, in consultation with
21	the Secretary of the Treasury, determines and reports to
22	the appropriate congressional committees that the waiver
23	is important to the national security interests of the United
24	States.

25 (f) Implementation; Penalties.—

1	(1) Implementation.—The President may exer-
2	cise all authorities provided under sections 203 and
3	205 of the International Emergency Economic Powers
4	Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 1704) to carry out this sec-
5	tion.
6	(2) PENALTIES.—A person that violates, at-
7	tempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a vio-

8 lation of paragraph (2) or (3) of subsection (b) or any 9 regulation, license, or order issued to carry out either 10 such paragraph shall be subject to the penalties set 11 forth in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of the 12 International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50) 13 U.S.C. 1705) to the same extent as a person that com-14 mits an unlawful act described in subsection (a) of 15 that section.

16 (3) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—This subsection
17 shall not be construed to require the President to de18 clare a national emergency under section 202 of the
19 International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50
20 U.S.C. 1701).

21 (g) DEFINITIONS.—In this section:

(1) ACCOUNT; CORRESPONDENT ACCOUNT; PAYABLE-THROUGH ACCOUNT.—The terms "account",
"correspondent account", and "payable-through ac-

1	count" have the meanings given those terms in section
2	5318A of title 31, United States Code.
3	(2) FINANCIAL INSTITUTION.—The term "finan-
4	cial institution" has the meaning given that term in
5	section 5312 of title 31, United States Code.
6	(3) KNOWINGLY.—The term "knowingly", with
7	respect to conduct, a circumstance, or a result, means
8	that a person has actual knowledge, or should have
9	known, of the conduct, the circumstance, or the result.
10	(4) SDN LIST.—The term "SDN list" means the
11	list of specially designated nationals and blocked per-
12	sons maintained by the Office of Foreign Assets Con-
13	trol of the Department of the Treasury.
14	(5) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term "United
15	States person" means—
16	(A) a United States citizen or an alien law-
17	fully admitted for permanent residence to the
18	United States;
19	(B) an entity organized under the laws of
20	the United States or of any jurisdiction within
21	the United States, including a foreign branch of
22	such an entity; or
23	(C) any person in the United States.

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, 4 5 the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development shall 6 7 submit to the appropriate congressional committees a strateqy to support sustainable and broad-based economic devel-8 9 opment, in accordance with the priorities of the Government of Burma to improve economic conditions. 10

(b) ELEMENTS.—In order to support the efforts of the
Government of Burma, the strategy required by subsection
(a) shall include a plan to promote inclusive and responsible economic growth, including through the following initiatives:

16 (1) Develop an economic reform road-map to di-17 versify control over and access to participation in key 18 industries and sectors. The United States Government 19 should support the Government of Burma to develop 20 a roadmap to assess and recommend measures to re-21 move barriers and increase competition, access and 22 opportunity in sectors dominated by the military. 23 former military officials, and their families, and 24 businesspeople connected to the military. The road-25 map should include areas related to government 26 transparency, accountability, and governance.

1	(2) Increase transparency disclosure require-
2	ments in key sectors to promote responsible invest-
3	ment. Provide technical support to develop and imple-
4	ment policies, and revise existing policies on public
5	disclosure of beneficial owners of companies in key
6	sectors identified by the Government of Burma, in-
7	cluding the identities of those seeking or securing ac-
8	cess to Burma's most valuable resources. In the ruby
9	industry, this specifically includes working with the
10	Government of Burma to require the disclosure of the
11	ultimate beneficial ownership of entities in the indus-
12	try and the publication of project revenues, payments,
13	and contract terms relating to the industry. Such new
14	requirements should complement disclosures due to be
15	put in place in Burma as a result of its participation
16	in the Extractives Industry Transparency Initiative
17	(EITI).
18	(3) Promote universal access to reliable, afford-

18 (3) Fromote universal access to reliable, affora19 able, energy efficient, and sustainable power, includ20 ing leveraging United States assistance to support re21 forms in the power sector and electrification projects
22 that increase energy access, in partnership with mul23 tilateral organizations and the private sector.

## 1SEC. 12. REPORT ON ETHNIC CLEANSING AND SERIOUS2HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN BURMA.

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State 4 5 shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report detailing the credible reports of ethnic cleansing and 6 7 serious human rights abuses committed against the Rohingya in Burma, including credible reports of war 8 9 crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, and on potential transnational justice mechanisms in Burma. 10

11 (b) ELEMENTS.—The reports required under sub12 section (a) shall include—

(1) a description of credible reports of ethnic
cleaning and serious human rights abuses perpetrated
against the Rohingya ethnic minority in Burma, including—

17 (A) incidents that may constitute ethnic
18 cleansing, crimes against humanity, sexual and
19 gender-based violence, and genocide committed
20 by the Burmese military, and other actors in21 volved in the violence;

(B) the role of the civilian government in
the commission of such activities;

24 (C) incidents that may constitute ethnic
25 cleansing, crimes against humanity, sexual and
26 gender-based violence, or genocide committed by

1 violent extremist groups or antigovernment

2	forces;
3	(D) any incidents that may violate the
4	principle of medical neutrality and, if possible,
5	identification of the individual or individuals
6	who engaged in or organized such incidents; and
7	(E) to the extent possible, a description of
8	the conventional and unconventional weapons
9	used for such crimes and the origins of such
10	weapons;
11	(2) a description and assessment by the Depart-
12	ment of State, the United States Agency for Inter-
13	national Development, the Department of Justice, and
14	other appropriate Federal departments and agencies
15	of programs that the United States Government has
16	already or is planning to undertake to ensure ac-
17	countability for credible reports of ethnic cleansing
18	and reports of war crimes, crimes against humanity,
19	sexual and gender-based violence, and genocide per-
20	petrated against the Rohingya and other ethnic mi-
21	nority groups by the Government, security forces, and
22	military of Burma, violent extremist groups, and
23	other combatants involved in the conflict, including
24	programs—

1	(A) to train investigators within and out-
2	side of Burma and Bangladesh on how to docu-
3	ment, investigate, develop findings of, and iden-
4	tify and locate alleged perpetrators of ethnic
5	cleansing, crimes against humanity, or genocide
6	in Burma;
7	(B) to promote and prepare for a transi-
8	tional justice process or processes for the per-
9	petrators of ethnic cleansing, crimes against hu-
10	manity, and genocide in Burma; and
11	(C) to document, collect, preserve, and pro-
12	tect evidence of reports of ethnic cleansing,
13	crimes against humanity, and genocide in
14	Burma, including support for Burmese and
15	Bangladeshi, foreign, and international non-
16	governmental organizations, the United Nations
17	Human Rights Council's investigative team, and
18	other entities; and
19	(3) A detailed study of the feasibility and desir-
20	ability of potential transitional justice mechanisms
21	for Burma, including a hybrid tribunal, and rec-
22	ommendations on which transitional justice mecha-
23	nisms the United States Government should support,
24	why such mechanisms should be supported, and what
25	type of support should be offered.

(c) PROTECTION OF WITNESSES AND EVIDENCE.—The
 Secretary shall take due care to ensure that the identifica tion of witnesses and physical evidence are not publicly dis closed in a manner that might place such persons at risk
 of harm or encourage the destruction of evidence by the Gov ernment of Burma.

### 7 SEC. 13. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AUTHORIZED.

8 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in consulta-9 tion with the Department of Justice and other appropriate 10 Federal departments and agencies, is authorized to provide appropriate assistance to support entities that, with respect 11 to credible reports of ethnic cleansing, crimes against hu-12 manity, and genocide perpetrated by the military, security 13 forces, and Government of Burma, Buddhist militias, and 14 15 all other armed groups fighting in Rakhine State—

16 (1) identify suspected perpetrators of ethnic
17 cleansing, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
18 genocide;

(2) collect, document, and protect evidence of
crimes and preserve the chain of custody for such evidence;

(3) conduct criminal investigations; and

23 (4) support investigations by third-party states,
24 as appropriate.

22

(b) ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE.—The Secretary of State,
 after consultation with appropriate Federal departments
 and agencies and the appropriate congressional committees,
 and taking into account the findings of the transitional jus tice study required under section 12(b)(3), is authorized to
 provide assistance to support the creation and operation of
 transitional justice mechanisms for Burma.

#### 8 SEC. 14. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON PRESS FREEDOM.

9 In order to promote freedom of the press in Burma,
10 it is the sense of Congress that—

(1) Wa Lone and Kyaw Soe Oo should be immediately released and should have access to lawyers
and their families; and

(2) the decision to use a colonial-era law to arrest these Reuters reporters undermines press freedom
around the world and further underscores the need for
serious legal reform.

18 SEC. 15. MEASURES RELATING TO MILITARY COOPERATION

19 BE

### BETWEEN BURMA AND NORTH KOREA.

- 20 (a) Imposition of Sanctions.—
- 21 (1) IN GENERAL.—The President may, with re-
- 22 spect to any person described in paragraph (2)—
- 23 (A) impose the sanctions described in para-
- 24 graph (1) or (3) of section 10(b); or

1	(B) include that person on the SDN list (as
2	defined in section $10(g)$ ).

3 (2) PERSONS DESCRIBED.—A person described
4 in this paragraph is an official of the Government of
5 Burma or an individual or entity acting on behalf of
6 that Government that the President determines pur7 chases or otherwise acquires defense articles from the
8 Government of North Korea or an individual or enti9 ty acting on behalf of that Government.

10 (b) RESTRICTION ON FOREIGN ASSISTANCE.—The 11 President may terminate or reduce the provision of United 12 States foreign assistance to Burma if the President determines that the Government of Burma does not verifiably 13 and irreversibly eliminate all purchases or other acquisi-14 15 tions of defense articles by persons described in subsection (a)(2) from the Government of North Korea or individuals 16 17 or entities acting on behalf of that Government.

(c) DEFENSE ARTICLE DEFINED.—In this section, the
term "defense article" has the meaning given that term in
section 47 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2794).

21SEC. 16. NO AUTHORIZATION FOR THE USE OF MILITARY22FORCE.

Nothing in this Act shall be construed as an authoriza-tion for the use of force.

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<sup>115</sup>TH CONGRESS 2060

# A BILL

To promote democracy and human rights in Burma, and for other purposes.

February 12, 2018

Reported with an amendment