

116TH CONGRESS  
1ST SESSION

# H. R. 1477

To require a threat assessment and strategy to counter Russian influence in Venezuela, an assessment of foreign acquisition of CITGO assets in the United States, and for other purposes.

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## IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY 28, 2019

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ (for herself, Mr. DIAZ-BALART, Mr. SOTO, Ms. MUCARSEL-POWELL, and Ms. SHALALA) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on the Judiciary, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

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## A BILL

To require a threat assessment and strategy to counter Russian influence in Venezuela, an assessment of foreign acquisition of CITGO assets in the United States, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*  
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Russian-Venezuelan  
5 Threat Mitigation Act”.

1 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

2 Congress finds the following:

3 (1) The Russian Federation's increased pres-  
4 ence in the western hemisphere is of concern to the  
5 United States and our allies in the region.

6 (2) In December 2018, the Russian Federation  
7 sent two Tu-160 nuclear-capable bombers to Ven-  
8 ezuela for joint exercises with the Venezuelan mili-  
9 tary. The Tu-160 can carry conventional or nuclear-  
10 tipped cruise missiles with an estimated maximum  
11 range of around 3,000 miles.

12 (3) Russian and Venezuelan forces took part in  
13 a joint 10-hour exercise across the Caribbean in De-  
14 cember 2018 with the Tu-160 nuclear-capable  
15 bombers.

16 (4) The Maduro regime has turned to the Rus-  
17 sian Federation, one of its strongest political allies,  
18 for financial support during its current economic cri-  
19 sis.

20 (5) Nicolas Maduro secured loans from the  
21 Russian Federation to be repaid through future oil  
22 exports, but fell behind on those payments in 2017.  
23 News reports in December 2018 suggest that Rus-  
24 sian State oil company Rosneft has lent Venezuelan  
25 state oil company Petroleos de Venezuela (PdVSA)  
26 \$6.5 billion partly as prepayment for crude oil, \$3.1

1 billion of which remained outstanding as of the end  
2 of September 2018.

3 (6) In 2016, PdVSA secured a \$1.5 billion loan  
4 from Rosneft, and PdVSA used 49.9 percent of its  
5 shares in United States-based and Venezuelan-  
6 owned company CITGO as collateral. A Venezuelan  
7 default could lead to potential Russian ownership of  
8 United States energy infrastructure.

9 (7) At the conclusion of a 3-day visit to Moscow  
10 in December 2018, Maduro announced \$6 billion  
11 worth of Russian investment pledges focused on the  
12 oil and mining sectors as well as the export of  
13 600,000 tons of Russian wheat to Venezuela to  
14 cover its 2019 needs.

15 **SEC. 3. THREAT ASSESSMENT AND STRATEGY TO COUNTER**  
16 **RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IN VENEZUELA.**

17 (a) THREAT ASSESSMENT.—Not later than 120 days  
18 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary  
19 of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional  
20 committees an assessment on Russian-Venezuelan security  
21 cooperation and the potential threat such cooperation  
22 poses to the United States and countries in the Western  
23 Hemisphere.

24 (b) STRATEGY.—Not later than 30 days after the  
25 submission of the threat assessment required under sub-

1 section (a), the Secretary of State shall submit to the ap-  
2 propriate congressional committees a strategy to address  
3 Russian-Venezuelan cooperation.

4 (c) DEFINITION.—In this section, the term “appro-  
5 priate congressional committees” means the Committee on  
6 Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the  
7 Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

8 **SEC. 4. ASSESSMENT OF FOREIGN ACQUISITION OF CITGO**  
9 **ASSETS IN THE UNITED STATES.**

10 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the  
11 date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall  
12 transmit to the appropriate congressional committees an  
13 assessment of the security risks posed by potential Rus-  
14 sian acquisition of CITGO’s United States energy infra-  
15 structure holdings.

16 (b) DEFINITION.—In this section, the term “appro-  
17 priate congressional committees” means the Committee on  
18 Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations of  
19 the House of Representatives and the Committee on For-  
20 eign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of  
21 the Senate.

22 **SEC. 5. ALIENS INELIGIBLE FOR VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PA-**  
23 **ROLE.**

24 (a) IN GENERAL.—An alien who the Secretary of  
25 State or the Secretary of Homeland Security (or a des-

1 ignee of one of such Secretaries) knows, or has reason to  
2 believe, is an alien who is acting or has acted on behalf  
3 of the Russian Government in direct support of the Ven-  
4 ezuelan security forces is—

5 (1) inadmissible to the United States;

6 (2) ineligible to receive a visa or other docu-  
7 mentation to enter the United States; and

8 (3) otherwise ineligible to be admitted or pa-  
9 roled into the United States or to receive any other  
10 benefit under the Immigration and Nationality Act  
11 (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.).

12 (b) CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.—

13 (1) IN GENERAL.—The issuing consular officer,  
14 the Secretary of State, or the Secretary of Home-  
15 land Security (or a designee of one of such Secre-  
16 taries) shall, in accordance with section 221(i) of the  
17 Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1201(i)),  
18 revoke any visa or other entry documentation issued  
19 to an alien described in subsection (a) regardless of  
20 when the visa or other entry documentation is  
21 issued.

22 (2) EFFECT OF REVOCATION.—A revocation  
23 under paragraph (1) shall—

24 (A) take effect immediately; and

1 (B) automatically cancel any other valid  
2 visa or entry documentation that is in the  
3 alien's possession.

4 (c) EXCEPTION TO COMPLY WITH UNITED NATIONS  
5 HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT OR FOR NATIONAL SECU-  
6 RITY REASONS.—

7 (1) INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS.—This sec-  
8 tion shall not apply to an alien if admitting the alien  
9 into the United States is necessary to permit the  
10 United States to comply with—

11 (A) the Agreement regarding the Head-  
12 quarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake  
13 Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force  
14 November 21, 1947, between the United Na-  
15 tions and the United States; or

16 (B) other applicable international obliga-  
17 tions of the United States.

18 (2) NATIONAL SECURITY.—The President may  
19 waive the application of this section to an alien if  
20 the President—

21 (A) determines that such a waiver is in the  
22 national interest of the United States; and

23 (B) transmits to the Committee on For-  
24 eign Affairs of the House of Representatives

1           and the Committee on Foreign Relations a no-  
2           tice of and justification for such waiver.

3           (d) TERMINATION.—This section shall terminate on  
4 the earlier of—

5           (1) the date that is three years after the date  
6           of the enactment of this Act; or

7           (2) the date on which the President certifies to  
8           the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of  
9           Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Re-  
10          lations of the Senate that the Government of Ven-  
11          ezuela has returned to a democratic form of govern-  
12          ment with respect for the essential elements of rep-  
13          resentative democracy as set forth in Article 3 of the  
14          Inter-American Democratic Charter.

15          (e) DEFINITION.—In this subsection, the term “Ven-  
16          ezuelan security forces” includes the following:

17               (1) The Bolivarian National Armed Forces, in-  
18               cluding the Bolivarian National Guard.

19               (2) The Bolivarian National Intelligence Serv-  
20               ice.

21               (3) The Bolivarian National Police.

22               (4) The Bureau for Scientific, Criminal and Fo-  
23               rensic Investigations of the Ministry of Interior, Jus-  
24               tice, and Peace.

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