

## Calendar No. 142

116TH CONGRESS  
1ST SESSION

# S. 1102

To promote security and energy partnerships in the Eastern Mediterranean,  
and for other purposes.

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### IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

APRIL 10, 2019

Mr. MENENDEZ (for himself, Mr. RUBIO, Mr. VAN HOLLEN, Mr. PETERS, Mr. COONS, Mr. CRUZ, and Mr. CRAMER) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

JULY 10, 2019

Reported by Mr. RISCH, with an amendment

[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed in *italic*]

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## A BILL

To promote security and energy partnerships in the Eastern  
Mediterranean, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*  
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Eastern Mediterranean  
5 Security and Energy Partnership Act of 2019”.

1 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

2 Congress makes the following findings:

3 (1) The security of partners and allies in the  
4 Eastern Mediterranean region is critical to the secu-  
5 rity of the United States and Europe.

6 (2) Greece is a valuable member of the North  
7 Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and a key pil-  
8 lar of stability in the Eastern Mediterranean.

9 (3) Israel is a steadfast ally of the United  
10 States and has been designated a “major non-NATO  
11 ally” and “major strategic partner”.

12 (4) Cyprus is a key strategic partner and  
13 signed a Statement of Intent with the United States  
14 on November 6, 2018, to enhance bilateral security  
15 cooperation.

16 (5) The countries of Greece, Cyprus, and Israel  
17 have participated in critical trilateral summits to im-  
18 prove cooperation on energy and security issues.

19 (6) Secretary of State Mike Pompeo partici-  
20 pated in the trilateral summit among Israel, Greece,  
21 and Cyprus on March 20, 2019.

22 (7) All four countries oppose any action in the  
23 Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea that  
24 could challenge stability, violate international law, or  
25 undermine good neighborly relations, and in a joint  
26 declaration on March 21, 2019, agreed to “defend

1       against external malign influences in the Eastern  
2       Mediterranean and the broader Middle East”.

3           (8) The recent discovery of potentially the re-  
4       gion’s largest natural gas field off the Egyptian  
5       coast and the newest discoveries of natural gas off  
6       the Cypriot coast could represent a significant posi-  
7       tive development for the Eastern Mediterranean and  
8       the Middle East, enhancing the region’s strategic en-  
9       ergy significance.

10          (9) Turkish government officials have expressed  
11       an intent to purchase the S-400 system from the  
12       Russian Federation, which could trigger the imposi-  
13       tion of mandatory sanctions under the Countering  
14       America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (Pub-  
15       lic Law 115-44).

16          (10) It is in the national security interests of  
17       the United States to promote, achieve, and maintain  
18       energy security among, and through cooperation  
19       with, allies.

20          (11) Natural gas developments in the Eastern  
21       Mediterranean have the potential to provide eco-  
22       nomic gains and contribute to energy security in the  
23       region and Europe, as well as support European ef-  
24       forts to diversify away from natural gas supplied by  
25       the Russian Federation.

1           (12) The soon to be completed Trans Adriatic  
2 Pipeline is a critical component of the Southern Gas  
3 Corridor and the European Union's efforts to diver-  
4 sify energy resources.

5           (13) The proposed Eastern Mediterranean pipe-  
6 line if commercially viable would provide for energy  
7 diversification in accordance with the European  
8 Union's third energy package of reforms.

9           (14) The United States acknowledges the  
10 achievements and importance of the Binational In-  
11 dustrial Research and Development Foundation  
12 (BIRD) and the United States-Israel Binational  
13 Science Foundation (BSF) and supports continued  
14 multiyear funding to ensure the continuity of the  
15 programs of the Foundations.

16           (15) The United States has welcomed Greece's  
17 allocation of 2 percent of its gross domestic product  
18 (GDP) to defense in accordance with commitments  
19 made at the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales.

20           (16) Energy exploration in the Eastern Medi-  
21 terranean region must be safeguarded against  
22 threats posed by terrorist and extremist groups, in-  
23 cluding Hezbollah and any other actor in the region.

1           (17) The energy exploration in the Republic of  
2           Cyprus's Exclusive Economic Zone and territorial  
3           waters—

4                   (A) furthers United States interests by  
5           providing a potential alternative to Russian gas  
6           for United States allies and partners; and

7                   (B) should not be impeded by other sov-  
8           ereign states.

9           (18) The United States Government cooperates  
10          closely with the Government of the Republic of Cy-  
11          prus through information sharing agreements.

12          (19) United States officials have assisted the  
13          Government of the Republic of Cyprus with crafting  
14          that nation's national security strategy.

15          (20) The United States Government provides  
16          training to Cypriot officials in areas such as cyberse-  
17          curity, counterterrorism, and explosive ordnance dis-  
18          posal and stockpile management.

19          (21) The Republic of Cyprus is a valued mem-  
20          ber of the Proliferation Security Initiative to combat  
21          the trafficking of weapons of mass destruction.

22          (22) The Republic of Cyprus continues to work  
23          closely with the United Nations and regional part-  
24          ners in Europe to combat terrorism and violent ex-  
25          tremism.

1           (23) Despite robust economic and security rela-  
 2           tions with the United States, the Republic of Cyprus  
 3           has been subject to a United States prohibition on  
 4           the export of defense articles and services since  
 5           1987.

6           (24) The 1987 arms prohibition was designed  
 7           to restrict United States arms sales and transfer to  
 8           the Republic of Cyprus and the occupied part of Cy-  
 9           prus to avoid hindering reunification efforts.

10          (25) At least 40,000 Turkish troops are sta-  
 11          tioned in the occupied part of Cyprus with some  
 12          weapons procured from the United States through  
 13          mainland Turkey.

14          (26) While the United States has, as a matter  
 15          of policy, avoided the provision of defense articles  
 16          and services to the Republic of Cyprus, the Govern-  
 17          ment of Cyprus has, in the past, sought to obtain  
 18          defense articles from other countries, including coun-  
 19          tries, such as Russia, that pose challenges to United  
 20          States interests around the world.

21 **SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

22          It is the policy of the United States—

23               (1) to continue to actively participate in the tri-  
 24          lateral dialogue on energy, maritime security, cyber

1 security and protection of critical infrastructure con-  
2 ducted among Israel, Greece and Cyprus;

3 (2) to support diplomatic efforts with partners  
4 and allies to deepen energy security cooperation  
5 among Greece, Cyprus, and Israel and to encourage  
6 the private sector to make investments in energy in-  
7 frastructure in the Eastern Mediterranean region;

8 (3) to strongly support the completion of the  
9 Trans Adriatic and Eastern Mediterranean Pipelines  
10 and the establishment of liquified natural gas (LNG)  
11 terminals across the Eastern Mediterranean as a  
12 means of diversifying regional energy needs away  
13 from the Russian Federation;

14 (4) to maintain a robust United States naval  
15 presence and investments in the naval facility at  
16 Souda Bay, Greece and develop deeper security co-  
17 operation with the latter to include the recent MQ-  
18 9 deployments to the Larissa Air Force Base and  
19 United States Army helicopter training in central  
20 Greece;

21 (5) to welcome Greece's commitment to move  
22 forward with the Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria  
23 (IGB pipeline) and additional LNG terminals that  
24 will help facilitate delivery of non-Russian gas to the  
25 Balkans and central Europe;

1           (6) to support deepened security cooperation  
2           with the Republic of Cyprus through the removal of  
3           the arms embargo on the country;

4           (7) to support robust International Military  
5           Education and Training (IMET) programming with  
6           Greece and the Republic of Cyprus;

7           (8) to leverage relationships within the Euro-  
8           pean Union to encourage investments in Cypriot bor-  
9           der and maritime security;

10          (9) to support efforts to counter Russian Fed-  
11          eration Government interference and influence in the  
12          Eastern Mediterranean through increased security  
13          cooperation with Greece, Cyprus, and Israel, to in-  
14          clude intelligence sharing, cyber, and maritime do-  
15          main awareness;

16          (10) to support the Republic of Cyprus efforts  
17          to regulate its banking industry to ensure that it is  
18          not used as a source of international money laun-  
19          dering and encourages additional measures toward  
20          that end;

21          (11) to strongly oppose any actions that would  
22          trigger mandatory sanctions pursuant to section 231  
23          of the Countering America's Adversaries Through  
24          Sanctions Act (CAATSA) (Public Law 115-44), to



1 include the purchase by Turkey of an S-400 system  
 2 from the Russian Federation;

3 (12) to continue robust official strategic en-  
 4 gagement with Israel, Greece, and Cyprus;

5 (13) to urge countries in the region to deny  
 6 port services to the Russian Federation vessels de-  
 7 ployed to support the government of Bashar Al-  
 8 Assad in Syria;

9 (14) to support joint military exercises among  
 10 Israel, Greece, and Cyprus;

11 (15) to fully implement relevant CAATSA pro-  
 12 visions to prevent interference by the Government of  
 13 the Russian Federation in the region;

14 (16) to support efforts by countries in the re-  
 15 gion to demobilize military equipment supplied by  
 16 the Government of the Russian Federation in favor  
 17 of equipment provided by NATO and NATO-allied  
 18 member countries; and

19 (17) to strongly support the active and robust  
 20 participation of Israel, Cyprus, and Greece in the  
 21 Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program.

22 **SEC. 4. UNITED STATES-EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN EN-**  
 23 **ERGY COOPERATION.**

24 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in con-  
 25 sultation with the Secretary of Energy, may enter into co-

1 operative agreements supporting and enhancing dialogue  
2 and planning involving international partnerships between  
3 the United States and Israel, Greece, and Cyprus.

4 (b) ANNUAL REPORTS.—If the Secretary of State, in  
5 consultation with the Secretary of Energy, enters into  
6 agreements authorized under subsection (a), the Secretary  
7 shall submit an annual report to the appropriate congress-  
8 sional committees that describes—

9 (1) actions taken to implement such agree-  
10 ments; and

11 (2) any projects undertaken pursuant to such  
12 agreements.

13 (c) UNITED STATES-EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN EN-  
14 ERGY CENTER.—The Secretary of Energy, in consultation  
15 with the Secretary of State, may establish a joint United  
16 States-Eastern Mediterranean Energy Center in the  
17 United States leveraging the experience, knowledge, and  
18 expertise of institutions of higher education and entities  
19 in the private sector, among others, in offshore energy de-  
20 velopment to further dialogue and collaboration to develop  
21 more robust academic cooperation in energy innovation  
22 technology and engineering, water science, technology  
23 transfer, and analysis of emerging geopolitical implica-  
24 tions, which include opportunities as well as crises and

1 threats from foreign natural resource and energy acquisi-  
 2 tions.

3 **SEC. 5. REPEAL OF PROHIBITION ON TRANSFER OF ARTI-**  
 4 **CLES ON THE UNITED STATES MUNITIONS**  
 5 **LIST TO THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS.**

6 (a) SENSE OF THE SENATE ON CYPRUS.—It is the  
 7 sense of the Senate that—

8 (1) the direct sale or transfer of arms by the  
 9 United States to the Republic of Cyprus would ad-  
 10 vance United States security interests in Europe by  
 11 helping to reduce the dependence of the Government  
 12 of Cyprus on other countries for defense-related ma-  
 13 teriel, including countries that pose challenges to  
 14 United States interests around the world; and

15 (2) it is in the interest of the United States—

16 (A) to continue to support United Nations-  
 17 facilitated efforts toward a comprehensive solu-  
 18 tion to the division of Cyprus; and

19 (B) for the Republic of Cyprus to join  
 20 NATO's Partnership for Peace program.

21 (b) MODIFICATION OF PROHIBITION.—Section  
 22 620C(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.  
 23 2373(e)) is amended by adding at the end the following  
 24 new paragraph:

1       “(3) The requirement under paragraph (1) shall not  
 2     apply to any sale or other provision of any defense article  
 3     or service to Cyprus if the end-user of such defense article  
 4     or service is the Republic of Cyprus.”.

5       (c) EXCLUSION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RE-  
 6     PUBLIC OF CYPRUS FROM CERTAIN RELATED REGULA-  
 7     TIONS.—Beginning on the date of the enactment of this  
 8     Act, the Secretary of State shall not apply a policy of de-  
 9     nial for exports, re-exports, or transfers of defense articles  
 10    and defense services destined for the Republic of Cyprus  
 11    if—

12           (1) the request is made by or on behalf of the  
 13     Republic of Cyprus; and

14           (2) the end-user of such defense articles or de-  
 15     fense services is the Republic of Cyprus.

16   **SEC. 6. IMET COOPERATION WITH GREECE AND CYPRUS.**

17       There is authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year  
 18     2020 \$2,000,000 for International Military Education and  
 19     Training (IMET) assistance for Greece and \$2,000,000  
 20     for such assistance for Cyprus. The assistance shall be  
 21     made available for the following purposes:

22           (1) Training of future leaders.

23           (2) Fostering a better understanding of the  
 24     United States.

1           ~~(3) Establishing a rapport between the United~~  
 2           ~~States military and the country's military to build~~  
 3           ~~alliances for the future.~~

4           ~~(4) Enhancement of interoperability and capa-~~  
 5           ~~bilities for joint operations.~~

6           ~~(5) Focusing on professional military education.~~

7           ~~(6) Enabling countries to use their national~~  
 8           ~~funds to receive a reduced cost for other Department~~  
 9           ~~of Defense education and training.~~

10          ~~(7) Provision of English Language Training as-~~  
 11          ~~sistance.~~

12 **SEC. 7. FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING.**

13          There is authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year  
 14 2020 \$3,000,000 for Foreign Military Financing (FMF)  
 15 assistance for Greece to assist the country in meeting its  
 16 commitment as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty  
 17 Organization (NATO) to dedicate 20 percent of its de-  
 18 fense budget to enhance research and development.

19 **SEC. 8. LIMITATION ON TRANSFER OF F-35 AIRCRAFT TO**  
 20 **TURKEY.**

21          ~~(a) IN GENERAL.—~~Except as provided under sub-  
 22 section (b), no funds may be obligated or expended—

23               ~~(1) to transfer, facilitate the transfer, or au-~~  
 24               ~~thorize the transfer of, an F-35 aircraft to the Re-~~  
 25               ~~public of Turkey;~~

1           (2) to transfer intellectual property or technical  
2       data necessary for or related to any maintenance or  
3       support of the F-35 aircraft; or

4           (3) to construct a storage facility for, or other-  
5       wise facilitate the storage in Turkey of, an F-35 air-  
6       craft transferred to Turkey.

7       (b) EXCEPTION.—The President may waive the limi-  
8       tation under subsection (a) upon a written certification to  
9       Congress that the Government of Turkey does not plan  
10      or intend to accept delivery of the S-400 air defense sys-  
11      tem.

12      (c) TRANSFER DEFINED.—In this section, the term  
13      “transfer” includes the physical relocation outside of the  
14      continental United States.

15      (d) APPLICABILITY.—The limitation under sub-  
16      section (a) does not apply to F-35 aircraft operated by  
17      the United States Armed Forces.

18      **SEC. 9. SENSE OF THE SENATE ON PURCHASE BY TURKEY**  
19                                      **OF S-400 AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM.**

20           It is the sense of the Senate that, if the Government  
21      of Turkey purchases the S-400 air defense system from  
22      the Russian Federation—

23           (1) such a purchase would constitute a signifi-  
24      cant transaction within the meaning of section

3           (2) such a purchase would endanger the integ-  
4           rity of the NATO alliance;

(3) such a purchase would adversely affect ongoing operations of the United States Armed Forces, including coalition operations in which the United States Armed Forces participate;

9           (4) such a purchase would result in a signifi-  
10        cant impact to defense cooperation between the  
11        United States and Turkey;

(5) such a purchase would significantly increase the risk of compromising United States defense systems and operational capabilities; and

(6) the President should faithfully execute the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 by imposing and applying sanctions under section 235 of that Act (22 U.S.C. 9529) with respect to any individual or entity determined to have engaged in such a significant transaction.

21 ~~SEC. 10. STRATEGY ON UNITED STATES SECURITY AND EN-~~  
22 ~~ERGY COOPERATION IN THE EASTERN MEDI-~~  
23 ~~TERRANEAN.~~

24 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the  
25 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,

1 in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Sec-  
2 retary of Energy, shall submit to the appropriate congres-  
3 sional committees a strategy on enhanced security and en-  
4 ergy cooperation with countries in the Eastern Mediterra-  
5 nean region, including Israel, Cyprus, and Greece.

6 (b) ELEMENTS.—The report required under sub-  
7 section (a) shall include the following elements:

8 (1) A description of United States participation  
9 in and support for the Eastern Mediterranean Nat-  
10 ural Gas Forum.

11 (2) An evaluation of all possible delivery mecha-  
12 nisms into Europe for natural gas discoveries in the  
13 Eastern Mediterranean region.

14 (3) An evaluation of efforts to protect energy  
15 exploration infrastructure in the region, including  
16 United States companies.

17 (4) An assessment of the capacity of Cyprus to  
18 host an Energy Crisis Center in the region which  
19 could provide basing facilities in support search and  
20 rescue efforts in the event of an accident.

21 (5) An assessment of the timing of natural gas  
22 delivery in the region as well as assessment of the  
23 ultimate destination countries for the natural gas  
24 delivery from the region.



1           (6) A plan to work with United States busi-  
 2           nesses seeking to invest in Eastern Mediterranean  
 3           energy exploration, development, and cooperation.

4           (c) FORM.—The report required under subsection (a)  
 5           shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain  
 6           a classified annex.

7           **SEC. 11. REPORT ON RUSSIAN FEDERATION MALIGN INFLU-**  
 8                                   **ENCE IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN.**

9           (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the  
 10          date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State  
 11          shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees  
 12          a report on Russian Federation malign influence in Cy-  
 13          prus, Greece, and Israel since January 1, 2017.

14          (b) ELEMENTS.—The report required under sub-  
 15          section (a) shall include the following elements:

16               (1) An assessment of security, political, and en-  
 17               ergy goals of the Government of the Russian Fed-  
 18               eration in the Eastern Mediterranean.

19               (2) A description of energy projects of the Gov-  
 20               ernment of the Russian Federation in the Eastern  
 21               Mediterranean.

22               (3) A listing of Russian national ownership of  
 23               media outlets in these countries, including the name  
 24               of the media outlet, approximate viewership, and as-

(5) An assessment of efforts supported by the Government of the Russian Federation to influence elections in the three countries, through the use of cyber attacks, social media campaigns, or other malign influence techniques.

~~(c) FORM.—The report required under subsection (a)~~  
shall be submitted in unclassified form; but may contain  
a classified annex.

24 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the  
25 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,

1 in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Sec-  
 2 retary of Energy, shall submit to the appropriate congres-  
 3 sional committees a report listing incidents of interference  
 4 in efforts by the Republic of Cyprus to explore and exploit  
 5 natural resources in its Exclusive Economic Zone and vio-  
 6 lations of the airspace of the sovereign territory of Greece.

7 (b) ELEMENTS.—The report required under sub-  
 8 section (a) shall include the following elements:

9 (1) A listing of incidents since January 1,  
 10 2017, determined by the Secretary of State to inter-  
 11 fere in efforts by the Republic of Cyprus to explore  
 12 and exploit natural resources in its Exclusive Eco-  
 13 nomic Zone.

14 (2) A listing of incidents since January 1,  
 15 2017, determined by the Secretary of State to be  
 16 violations of the airspace of Greece by its neighbors.

17 (c) FORM.—The report required under subsection (a)  
 18 shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain  
 19 a classified annex.

## 20 **SEC. 13. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.**

21 In this Act, the term “appropriate congressional com-  
 22 mittees means” the Committee on Foreign Relations of  
 23 the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the  
 24 House of Representatives.

1 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

2       *This Act may be cited as the “Eastern Mediterranean*  
 3 *Security and Energy Partnership Act of 2019”.*

4 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

5       *Congress makes the following findings:*

6           (1) *The security of partners and allies in the*  
 7 *Eastern Mediterranean region is critical to the secu-*  
 8 *rity of the United States and Europe.*

9           (2) *Greece is a valuable member of the North At-*  
 10 *lantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and a key pillar*  
 11 *of stability in the Eastern Mediterranean.*

12           (3) *Israel is a steadfast ally of the United States*  
 13 *and has been designated a “major non-NATO ally”*  
 14 *and “major strategic partner”.*

15           (4) *Cyprus is a key strategic partner and signed*  
 16 *a Statement of Intent with the United States on No-*  
 17 *vember 6, 2018, to enhance bilateral security coopera-*  
 18 *tion.*

19           (5) *The countries of Greece, Cyprus, and Israel*  
 20 *have participated in critical trilateral summits to*  
 21 *improve cooperation on energy and security issues.*

22           (6) *Secretary of State Mike Pompeo participated*  
 23 *in the trilateral summit among Israel, Greece, and*  
 24 *Cyprus on March 20, 2019.*

25           (7) *The United States, Israel, Greece, and Cy-*  
 26 *prus oppose any action in the Eastern Mediterranean*

1       *and the Aegean Sea that could challenge stability,*  
2       *violate international law, or undermine good neigh-*  
3       *borly relations, and in a joint declaration on March*  
4       *21, 2019, agreed to “defend against external malign*  
5       *influences in the Eastern Mediterranean and the*  
6       *broader Middle East”.*

7               *(8) The recent discovery of what may be the re-*  
8       *gion’s largest natural gas field off the Egyptian coast*  
9       *and the newest discoveries of natural gas off the coast*  
10       *of Cyprus could represent a significant and positive*  
11       *development for the Eastern Mediterranean and the*  
12       *Middle East, enhancing the region’s strategic energy*  
13       *significance.*

14               *(9) Turkish government officials have expressed*  
15       *an intent to purchase the S–400 system from the Rus-*  
16       *sian Federation, which is subject to mandatory sanc-*  
17       *tions under the Countering America’s Adversaries*  
18       *Through Sanctions Act (Public Law 115–44).*

19               *(10) It is in the national security interest of the*  
20       *United States to promote, achieve, and maintain en-*  
21       *ergy security among, and through cooperation with,*  
22       *allies.*

23               *(11) Natural gas developments in the Eastern*  
24       *Mediterranean have the potential to provide economic*  
25       *gains and contribute to energy security in the region*

1        *and Europe, as well as support European efforts to*  
2        *diversify away from natural gas supplied by the Rus-*  
3        *sian Federation.*

4            *(12) The soon to be completed Trans Adriatic*  
5        *Pipeline is a critical component of the Southern Gas*  
6        *Corridor and the European Union's efforts to diver-*  
7        *sify energy resources.*

8            *(13) The proposed Eastern Mediterranean pipe-*  
9        *line, if commercially viable, would provide for energy*  
10       *diversification in accordance with the European*  
11       *Union's third energy package of reforms.*

12           *(14) The United States acknowledges the achieve-*  
13       *ments and importance of the Binational Industrial*  
14       *Research and Development Foundation (BIRD) and*  
15       *the United States-Israel Binational Science Founda-*  
16       *tion (BSF) and supports continued multiyear fund-*  
17       *ing to ensure the continuity of the programs of the*  
18       *Foundations.*

19           *(15) The United States has welcomed Greece's al-*  
20       *location of 2 percent of its gross domestic product*  
21       *(GDP) to defense in accordance with commitments*  
22       *made at the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales.*

23           *(16) Energy exploration in the Eastern Medi-*  
24       *terranean region must be safeguarded against threats*

1        *posed by terrorist and extremist groups, including*  
2        *Hezbollah and any other actor in the region.*

3                *(17) The energy exploration in the Republic of*  
4        *Cyprus's Exclusive Economic Zone and territorial*  
5        *waters—*

6                *(A) furthers United States interests by pro-*  
7        *viding a potential alternative to Russian gas for*  
8        *United States allies and partners; and*

9                *(B) should not be impeded by other sov-*  
10       *ereign states.*

11               *(18) The United States Government cooperates*  
12       *closely with Cyprus, Greece, and Israel through infor-*  
13       *mation sharing agreements.*

14               *(19) United States officials have assisted the*  
15       *Government of the Republic of Cyprus with crafting*  
16       *that nation's national security strategy.*

17               *(20) The United States Government provides*  
18       *training to Cypriot officials in areas such as cyberse-*  
19       *curity, counterterrorism, and explosive ordnance dis-*  
20       *posal and stockpile management.*

21               *(21) Israel, Greece, and Cyprus are valued mem-*  
22       *bers of the Proliferation Security Initiative to combat*  
23       *the trafficking of weapons of mass destruction.*

1           (22) *The Republic of Cyprus continues to work*  
 2           *closely with the United Nations and regional partners*  
 3           *in Europe to combat terrorism and violent extremism.*

4           (23) *Despite robust economic and security rela-*  
 5           *tions with the United States, the Republic of Cyprus*  
 6           *has been subject to a United States prohibition on the*  
 7           *export of defense articles and services since 1987.*

8           (24) *The 1987 arms prohibition was designed to*  
 9           *restrict United States arms sales and transfers to the*  
 10          *Republic of Cyprus and the occupied part of Cyprus*  
 11          *to avoid hindering reunification efforts.*

12          (25) *At least 40,000 Turkish troops are stationed*  
 13          *in the occupied part of Cyprus with some weapons*  
 14          *procured from the United States through mainland*  
 15          *Turkey.*

16          (26) *While the United States has, as a matter of*  
 17          *policy, avoided the provision of defense articles and*  
 18          *services to the Republic of Cyprus, the Government of*  
 19          *Cyprus has, in the past, sought to obtain defense arti-*  
 20          *cles from other countries, including countries, such as*  
 21          *Russia, that pose challenges to United States interests*  
 22          *around the world.*

23   **SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

24          *It is the policy of the United States—*



1           (1) to continue to actively participate in the tri-  
2 lateral dialogue on energy, maritime security, cyber-  
3 security and protection of critical infrastructure con-  
4 ducted among Israel, Greece, and Cyprus;

5           (2) to support diplomatic efforts with partners  
6 and allies to deepen energy security cooperation  
7 among Greece, Cyprus, and Israel and to encourage  
8 the private sector to make investments in energy in-  
9 frastructure in the Eastern Mediterranean region;

10          (3) to strongly support the completion of the  
11 Trans Adriatic and Eastern Mediterranean Pipelines  
12 and the establishment of liquified natural gas (LNG)  
13 terminals across the Eastern Mediterranean as a  
14 means of diversifying regional energy needs away  
15 from the Russian Federation;

16          (4) to maintain a robust United States naval  
17 presence and investments in the naval facility at  
18 Souda Bay, Greece and develop deeper security co-  
19 operation with Greece to include the recent MQ-9 de-  
20 ployments to the Larissa Air Force Base and United  
21 States Army helicopter training in central Greece;

22          (5) to welcome Greece's commitment to move for-  
23 ward with the Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria (IGB  
24 pipeline) and additional LNG terminals that will

1       *help facilitate delivery of non-Russian gas to the Bal-*  
2       *kans and central Europe;*

3           (6) *to support deepened security cooperation*  
4       *with the Republic of Cyprus through the removal of*  
5       *the arms embargo on the country;*

6           (7) *to support robust International Military*  
7       *Education and Training (IMET) programming with*  
8       *Greece and the Republic of Cyprus;*

9           (8) *to leverage relationships within the European*  
10      *Union to encourage investments in Cypriot border*  
11      *and maritime security;*

12          (9) *to support efforts to counter Russian Federa-*  
13      *tion interference and influence in the Eastern Medi-*  
14      *terranean through increased security cooperation with*  
15      *Greece, Cyprus, and Israel, to include intelligence*  
16      *sharing, cyber, and maritime domain awareness;*

17          (10) *to support the Republic of Cyprus' efforts to*  
18      *regulate its banking industry to ensure that it is not*  
19      *used as a source of international money laundering*  
20      *and encourage additional measures toward that end;*

21          (11) *to strongly oppose any actions that would*  
22      *trigger mandatory sanctions pursuant to section 231*  
23      *of the Countering America's Adversaries Through*  
24      *Sanctions Act (CAATSA) (Public Law 115–44), to*

1        *include the purchase by Turkey of an S-400 system*  
 2        *from the Russian Federation;*

3            *(12) to continue robust official strategic engage-*  
 4        *ment with Israel, Greece, and Cyprus;*

5            *(13) to urge countries in the region to deny port*  
 6        *services to Russian Federation vessels deployed to*  
 7        *support the government of Bashar Al-Assad in Syria;*

8            *(14) to support joint military exercises among*  
 9        *Israel, Greece, and Cyprus;*

10          *(15) to fully implement relevant CAATSA provi-*  
 11        *sions to prevent interference by the Russian Federa-*  
 12        *tion in the region;*

13          *(16) to support efforts by countries in the region*  
 14        *to demobilize military equipment supplied by the*  
 15        *Russian Federation in favor of equipment provided*  
 16        *by NATO and NATO-allied member countries; and*

17          *(17) to strongly support the active and robust*  
 18        *participation of Israel, Cyprus, and Greece in the*  
 19        *Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program.*

20    **SEC. 4. UNITED STATES-EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN EN-**  
 21        **ERGY COOPERATION.**

22          *(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in coordi-*  
 23        *nation with the Secretary of Energy, may enter into cooper-*  
 24        *ative agreements supporting and enhancing dialogue and*  
 25        *planning involving international partnerships between the*

1 *United States and Israel, Greece, and the Republic of Cy-*  
 2 *prus.*

3       (b) *ANNUAL REPORTS.*—*If the Secretary of State, in*  
 4 *coordination with the Secretary of Energy, enters into*  
 5 *agreements authorized under subsection (a), the Secretary*  
 6 *shall submit an annual report to the appropriate congres-*  
 7 *sional committees that describes—*

8               (1) *actions taken to implement such agreements;*  
 9       *and*

10              (2) *any projects undertaken pursuant to such*  
 11 *agreements.*

12       (c) *UNITED STATES-EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN EN-*  
 13 *ERGY CENTER.*—*The Secretary of Energy, in coordination*  
 14 *with the Secretary of State, may establish a joint United*  
 15 *States-Eastern Mediterranean Energy Center in the United*  
 16 *States leveraging the experience, knowledge, and expertise*  
 17 *of institutions of higher education and entities in the pri-*  
 18 *vate sector, among others, in offshore energy development*  
 19 *to further dialogue and collaboration to develop more robust*  
 20 *academic cooperation in energy innovation technology and*  
 21 *engineering, water science, technology transfer, and anal-*  
 22 *ysis of emerging geopolitical implications, which include*  
 23 *opportunities as well as crises and threats from foreign nat-*  
 24 *ural resource and energy acquisitions.*

1 **SEC. 5. REPEAL OF PROHIBITION ON TRANSFER OF ARTI-**  
 2 **CLES ON THE UNITED STATES MUNITIONS**  
 3 **LIST TO THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS.**

4 (a) *SENSE OF CONGRESS ON CYPRUS.—It is the sense*  
 5 *of Congress that—*

6 (1) *allowing for the export, re-export or transfer*  
 7 *of arms subject to the United States Munitions List*  
 8 *(part 121 of title 22, Code of Federal Regulations) to*  
 9 *the Republic of Cyprus would advance United States*  
 10 *security interests in Europe by helping to reduce the*  
 11 *dependence of the Government of the Republic of Cy-*  
 12 *prus on other countries, including countries that pose*  
 13 *challenges to United States interests around the*  
 14 *world, for defense-related materiel; and*

15 (2) *it is in the interest of the United States—*

16 (A) *to continue to support United Nations-*  
 17 *facilitated efforts toward a comprehensive solu-*  
 18 *tion to the division of Cyprus; and*

19 (B) *for the Republic of Cyprus to join*  
 20 *NATO's Partnership for Peace program.*

21 (b) *MODIFICATION OF PROHIBITION.—Section 620C(e)*  
 22 *of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2373(e))*  
 23 *is amended—*

24 (1) *in paragraph (1), by striking “Any agree-*  
 25 *ment” and inserting “Except as provided in para-*  
 26 *graph (3), any agreement”; and*

1           (2) *by adding at the end the following new para-*  
 2 *graph:*

3           “(3) *The requirement under paragraph (1) shall*  
 4 *not apply to any sale or other provision of any de-*  
 5 *fense article or defense service to Cyprus if the end-*  
 6 *user of such defense article or defense service is the*  
 7 *Government of the Republic of Cyprus.”.*

8           (c) *EXCLUSION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUB-*  
 9 *LIC OF CYPRUS FROM CERTAIN RELATED REGULATIONS.—*

10           (1) *IN GENERAL.—Subject to subsection (d) and*  
 11 *except as provided in paragraph (2), beginning on the*  
 12 *date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of*  
 13 *State shall not apply a policy of denial for exports,*  
 14 *re-exports, or transfers of defense articles and defense*  
 15 *services destined for or originating in the Republic of*  
 16 *Cyprus if—*

17                   (A) *the request is made by or on behalf of*  
 18 *the Government of the Republic of Cyprus; and*

19                   (B) *the end-user of such defense articles or*  
 20 *defense services is the Government of the Repub-*  
 21 *lic of Cyprus.*

22           (2) *EXCEPTION.—This exclusion shall not apply*  
 23 *to any denial based upon credible human rights con-*  
 24 *cerns.*

1       (d) *LIMITATIONS ON THE TRANSFER OF ARTICLES ON*  
 2 *THE UNITED STATES MUNITIONS LIST TO THE REPUBLIC*  
 3 *OF CYPRUS.*—

4           (1) *IN GENERAL.*—*The policy of denial for ex-*  
 5 *ports, re-exports, or transfers of defense articles on the*  
 6 *United States Munitions List to the Republic of Cy-*  
 7 *prus shall remain in place unless the President deter-*  
 8 *mines and certifies to the appropriate congressional*  
 9 *committees not less than annually that—*

10           (A) *the Government of the Republic of Cy-*  
 11 *prus is continuing to cooperate with the United*  
 12 *States Government in efforts to implement re-*  
 13 *forms on anti-money laundering regulations and*  
 14 *financial regulatory oversight; and*

15           (B) *the Government of the Republic of Cy-*  
 16 *prus has made and is continuing to take the*  
 17 *steps necessary to deny Russian military vessels*  
 18 *access to ports for refueling and servicing.*

19           (2) *WAIVER.*—*The President may waive the lim-*  
 20 *itations contained in this subsection for one fiscal*  
 21 *year if the President determines that it is essential to*  
 22 *the national security interests of the United States to*  
 23 *do so.*

1           (3) *APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES*  
 2       *DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate*  
 3       *congressional committees” means—*

4                   (A) *the Committee on Foreign Relations*  
 5                   *and the Committee on Armed Services of the*  
 6                   *Senate; and*

7                   (B) *the Committee on Foreign Affairs and*  
 8                   *the Committee on Armed Services of the House*  
 9                   *of Representatives.*

10 **SEC. 6. IMET COOPERATION WITH GREECE AND THE RE-**  
 11 **PUBLIC OF CYPRUS.**

12       *There is authorized to be appropriated \$1,300,000 for*  
 13 *fiscal year 2020, \$1,500,000 for fiscal year 2021, and*  
 14 *\$1,800,000 for fiscal year 2022 for International Military*  
 15 *Education and Training (IMET) assistance for Greece and*  
 16 *\$200,000 for fiscal year 2020, \$500,000 for fiscal year 2021,*  
 17 *and \$750,000 for fiscal year 2022 for such assistance for*  
 18 *the Republic of Cyprus. The assistance shall be made avail-*  
 19 *able for the following purposes:*

20                   (1) *Training of future leaders.*

21                   (2) *Fostering a better understanding of the*  
 22       *United States.*

23                   (3) *Establishing a rapport between the United*  
 24       *States military and the country’s military to build*  
 25       *alliances for the future.*



1           (4) *Enhancement of interoperability and capa-*  
2           *bilities for joint operations.*

3           (5) *Focusing on professional military education.*

4           (6) *Enabling countries to use their national*  
5           *funds to receive a reduced cost for other Department*  
6           *of Defense education and training.*

7   **SEC. 7. FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING.**

8           (a) *AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is*  
9           *authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2020*  
10          *\$3,000,000 for Foreign Military Financing (FMF) assist-*  
11          *ance for Greece to assist the country in meeting its commit-*  
12          *ment as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-*  
13          *tion (NATO) to dedicate 20 percent of its defense budget*  
14          *to enhance research and development.*

15          (b) *SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress*  
16          *that Greece should receive robust support under the Euro-*  
17          *pean Recapitalization Incentive Program implemented by*  
18          *the Department of Defense.*

19   **SEC. 8. LIMITATION ON TRANSFER OF F-35 AIRCRAFT TO**  
20                **TURKEY.**

21          (a) *IN GENERAL.—Except as provided under sub-*  
22          *section (b), no funds may be obligated or expended—*

23                (1) *to transfer, facilitate the transfer, or author-*  
24                *ize the transfer of an F-35 aircraft to the Republic*  
25                *of Turkey;*

1           (2) *to transfer intellectual property or technical*  
 2           *data necessary for or related to any maintenance or*  
 3           *support of the F-35 aircraft; or*

4           (3) *to construct a storage facility for, or other-*  
 5           *wise facilitate the storage in Turkey of, an F-35 air-*  
 6           *craft transferred to Turkey.*

7           (b) *EXCEPTION.—The President may waive the limita-*  
 8           *tion under subsection (a) upon a written certification to*  
 9           *Congress that the Government of Turkey does not plan or*  
 10          *intend to accept delivery of the S-400 air defense system.*

11          (c) *TRANSFER DEFINED.—In this section, the term*  
 12          *“transfer” includes the physical relocation outside of the*  
 13          *continental United States.*

14          (d) *APPLICABILITY.—The limitation under subsection*  
 15          *(a) does not apply to F-35 aircraft operated by the United*  
 16          *States Armed Forces.*

17          **SEC. 9. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON PURCHASE BY TURKEY OF**  
 18                               **S-400 AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM.**

19          *It is the sense of Congress that, if the Government of*  
 20          *Turkey purchases the S-400 air defense system from the*  
 21          *Russian Federation—*

22               (1) *such a purchase would constitute a signifi-*  
 23               *cant transaction within the meaning of section 231(a)*  
 24               *of the Countering Russian Influence in Europe and*  
 25               *Eurasia Act of 2017 (22 U.S.C. 9525(a));*

1           (2) *such a purchase would endanger the integrity*  
 2           *and interoperability of the NATO alliance;*

3           (3) *such a purchase would adversely affect ongoing*  
 4           *operations of the United States Armed Forces, including*  
 5           *coalition operations in which the United*  
 6           *States Armed Forces participate;*

7           (4) *such a purchase would result in a significant*  
 8           *impact to defense cooperation between the United*  
 9           *States and Turkey;*

10          (5) *such a purchase would significantly increase*  
 11          *the risk of compromising United States defense systems*  
 12          *and operational capabilities; and*

13          (6) *the Countering Russian Influence in Europe*  
 14          *and Eurasia Act of 2017 mandates the imposition of*  
 15          *sanctions under section 235 of that Act (22 U.S.C.*  
 16          *9529) with respect to any individual or entity determined*  
 17          *to have engaged in such a significant transaction.*  
 18          *action.*

19 **SEC. 10. STRATEGY ON UNITED STATES SECURITY AND EN-**  
 20 **ERGY COOPERATION IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN.**  
 21 **TERRANEAN.**

22          (a) *IN GENERAL.*—*Not later than 90 days after the*  
 23          *date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,*  
 24          *in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Sec-*  
 25          *retary of Energy, shall submit to the appropriate congress-*

1 sional committees a strategy on enhanced security and en-  
 2 ergy cooperation with countries in the Eastern Mediterra-  
 3 nean region, including Israel, the Republic of Cyprus, and  
 4 Greece.

5 (b) *ELEMENTS.*—The report required under subsection  
 6 (a) shall include the following elements:

7 (1) A description of United States participation  
 8 in and support for the Eastern Mediterranean Nat-  
 9 ural Gas Forum.

10 (2) An evaluation of all possible delivery mecha-  
 11 nisms into Europe for natural gas discoveries in the  
 12 Eastern Mediterranean region.

13 (3) An evaluation of efforts to protect energy ex-  
 14 ploration infrastructure in the region, including in-  
 15 frastructure owned or operated by United States com-  
 16 panies.

17 (4) An assessment of the capacity of the Republic  
 18 of Cyprus to host an Energy Crisis Center in the re-  
 19 gion which could provide basing facilities in support  
 20 of search and rescue efforts in the event of an acci-  
 21 dent.

22 (5) An assessment of the timing of potential nat-  
 23 ural gas delivery in the region as well as an assess-  
 24 ment of the ultimate destination countries for the nat-  
 25 ural gas delivery from the region.

1           (6) *A plan to work with United States businesses*  
 2           *seeking to invest in Eastern Mediterranean energy ex-*  
 3           *ploration, development, and cooperation.*

4           (c) *FORM.*—*The report required under subsection (a)*  
 5           *shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain*  
 6           *a classified annex.*

7   **SEC. 11. REPORT ON RUSSIAN FEDERATION MALIGN INFLU-**  
 8           **ENCE IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN.**

9           (a) *IN GENERAL.*—*Not later than 90 days after the*  
 10          *date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State*  
 11          *shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a*  
 12          *report on Russian Federation malign influence in the Re-*  
 13          *public of Cyprus, Greece, and Israel since January 1, 2017.*

14          (b) *ELEMENTS.*—*The report required under subsection*  
 15          *(a) shall include the following elements:*

16               (1) *An assessment of security, political, and en-*  
 17               *ergy goals of the Russian Federation in the Eastern*  
 18               *Mediterranean.*

19               (2) *A description of energy projects of the Gov-*  
 20               *ernment of the Russian Federation in the Eastern*  
 21               *Mediterranean.*

22               (3) *A listing of Russian national ownership of*  
 23               *media outlets in these countries, including the name*  
 24               *of the media outlet, approximate viewership, and as-*

1        *assessment of whether the outlet promotes pro-Kremlin*  
 2        *views.*

3            *(4) An assessment of military engagement by the*  
 4        *Government of the Russian Federation in the security*  
 5        *sector, including engagement by military equipment*  
 6        *and personnel contractors.*

7            *(5) An assessment of efforts supported by the*  
 8        *Government of the Russian Federation to influence*  
 9        *elections in the three countries, through the use of*  
 10       *cyber attacks, social media campaigns, or other ma-*  
 11       *lign influence techniques.*

12           *(6) An assessment of efforts by the Government*  
 13        *of the Russian Federation to intimidate and influence*  
 14        *the decision by His All Holiness Ecumenical Patri-*  
 15        *arch Bartholomew, leader of 300,000,000 Orthodox*  
 16        *Christians worldwide, to grant autocephaly to the*  
 17        *Ukrainian Orthodox Church.*

18        *(c) FORM.—The report required under subsection (a)*  
 19        *shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain*  
 20        *a classified annex.*

21        **SEC. 12. REPORT ON INTERFERENCE BY OTHER COUNTRIES**  
 22                                **IN THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE OF THE**  
 23                                **REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS.**

24        *(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the*  
 25        *date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,*

1 *in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Sec-*  
 2 *retary of Energy, shall submit to the appropriate congres-*  
 3 *sional committees a report listing incidents since January*  
 4 *1, 2017, determined by the Secretary of State to interfere*  
 5 *in efforts by the Republic of Cyprus to explore and exploit*  
 6 *natural resources in its Exclusive Economic Zone.*

7 (b) *FORM.*—The report required under subsection (a)  
 8 shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain  
 9 a classified annex.

10 **SEC. 13. REPORT ON INTERFERENCE BY OTHER COUNTRIES**  
 11 **IN THE AIRSPACE OF GREECE.**

12 (a) *IN GENERAL.*—Not later than 90 days after the  
 13 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,  
 14 in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit  
 15 to the appropriate congressional committees a report listing  
 16 incidents since January 1, 2017, determined by the Sec-  
 17 retary of State to be violations of the airspace of the sov-  
 18 ereign territory of Greece by its neighbors.

19 (b) *FORM.*—The report required under subsection (a)  
 20 shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain  
 21 a classified annex.

22 **SEC. 14. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.**

23 In this Act, the term “appropriate congressional com-  
 24 mittees” means the Committee on Foreign Relations of the

- 1 *Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House*
- 2 *of Representatives.*





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**A BILL**

To promote security and energy partnerships in the Eastern Mediterranean, and for other purposes.

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