

117TH CONGRESS  
1ST SESSION

# H. R. 3972

To support the diplomatic, economic, and physical space of Taiwan, and  
for other purposes.

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## IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JUNE 17, 2021

Mr. BERA (for himself, Mr. CHABOT, Mr. KAHELE, Mr. BACON, Mr. CASE,  
and Mr. WOMACK) introduced the following bill; which was referred to  
the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on  
Ways and Means, for a period to be subsequently determined by the  
Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within  
the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

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## A BILL

To support the diplomatic, economic, and physical space of  
Taiwan, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*  
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.**

4 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the  
5 “Taiwan Peace and Stability Act”.

6 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for  
7 this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

Sec. 2. Findings and statement of policy.

TITLE I—SUPPORTING TAIWAN’S MEANINGFUL PARTICIPATION  
IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

- Sec. 101. Findings.  
 Sec. 102. Sense of Congress on Taiwan’s meaningful participation in the international community.  
 Sec. 103. Strategy to support Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations.  
 Sec. 104. Expanding United States-Taiwan development cooperation.  
 Sec. 105. Appropriate congressional committees.

TITLE II—ADVANCING TAIWAN’S ECONOMIC SPACE

- Sec. 201. Sense of Congress on expanding U.S. economic relations with Taiwan.  
 Sec. 202. Legal framework for expanding economic relations with Taiwan.  
 Sec. 203. Appropriate congressional committees.

TITLE III—ENHANCING DETERRENCE OVER TAIWAN

- Sec. 301. Sense of Congress on peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.  
 Sec. 302. Strategy to enhance deterrence over a cross-Strait conflict.  
 Sec. 303. Supporting Taiwan’s investment in asymmetric capabilities.  
 Sec. 304. Advancing Taiwan’s territorial defense force concept.  
 Sec. 305. Strengthening Taiwan’s civilian defense professionals.  
 Sec. 306. Appropriate congressional committees.

1 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

2 (a) Congress makes the following findings:

3 (1) The United States has consistently sought  
 4 to advance peace and stability in East Asia as a central  
 5 element of U.S. foreign policy toward the region.

6 (2) Peace and stability in East Asia has provided  
 7 the necessary environment for the tremendous  
 8 economic growth experienced by the region and remains  
 9 critical to the continued development and  
 10 prosperity of all people in the Indo-Pacific.

11 (3) The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (Public  
 12 Law 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) and the “Six Assurances”,  
 13 provided by the United States to Taiwan  
 14 in July 1982, are the cornerstones of U.S.-Taiwan

1 relations and continue to guide U.S. policy toward  
2 Taiwan.

3 (4) The Taiwan Relations Act states that it is  
4 the policy of the United States to—

5 “(A) preserve and promote extensive, close,  
6 and friendly commercial, cultural, and other re-  
7 lations between the people of the United States  
8 and the people on Taiwan, as well as the people  
9 on the China mainland and all other peoples of  
10 the Western Pacific area;

11 “(B) declare that peace and stability in the  
12 area are in the political, security, and economic  
13 interests of the United States, and are matters  
14 of international concern;

15 “(C) make clear that the United States de-  
16 cision to establish diplomatic relations with the  
17 People’s Republic of China rests upon the ex-  
18 pectation that the future of Taiwan will be de-  
19 termined by peaceful means;

20 “(D) consider any effort to determine the  
21 future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means,  
22 including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to  
23 the peace and security of the Western Pacific  
24 area and of grave concern to the United States;

1           “(E) provide Taiwan with arms of a defen-  
2           sive character; and

3           “(F) maintain the capacity of the United  
4           States to resist any resort to force or other  
5           forms of coercion that would jeopardize the se-  
6           curity, or the social or economic system, of the  
7           people on Taiwan.”.

8           (5) The Government of the People’s Republic of  
9           China (PRC), especially since the election of Tsai  
10          Ing-Wen in 2016, has conducted a coordinated cam-  
11          paign to weaken Taiwan diplomatically, economi-  
12          cally, and militarily in a manner that threatens to  
13          erode U.S. policy and create a fait accompli on ques-  
14          tions surrounding Taiwan’s future.

15          (6) In order to ensure the longevity of U.S. pol-  
16          icy and preserve the ability of the people of Taiwan  
17          to determine their future independently, it is nec-  
18          essary to reinforce Taiwan’s diplomatic, economic,  
19          and physical space.

20          (b) It is the policy of the United States to—

21                 (1) maintain the position that peace and sta-  
22                 bility in the Western Pacific are in the political, se-  
23                 curity, and economic interests of the United States,  
24                 and are matters of international concern; and

1           (2) work with allies and partners to promote  
2           peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific and deter  
3           military acts or other forms of coercive behavior that  
4           would undermine regional stability.

5 **TITLE I—SUPPORTING TAIWAN’S**  
6 **MEANINGFUL PARTICIPA-**  
7 **TION IN THE INTERNATIONAL**  
8 **COMMUNITY**

9 **SEC. 101. FINDINGS.**

10           Congress makes the following findings:

11           (1) Taiwan has provided monetary, humani-  
12           tarian, and medical assistance to combat diseases  
13           such as AIDS, tuberculosis, Ebola, and dengue fever  
14           in countries around the world. During the COVID–  
15           19 pandemic, Taiwan donated millions of pieces of  
16           personal protective equipment and COVID–19 tests  
17           to countries in need.

18           (2) Since 2016, the Gambia, Sao Tome and  
19           Principe, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Burkina  
20           Faso, El Salvador, the Solomon Islands, and  
21           Kiribati have severed diplomatic relations with Tai-  
22           wan in favor of diplomatic relations with China.

23           (3) Taiwan was invited to participate in the  
24           World Health Assembly, the decision-making body of  
25           the World Health Organization (WHO), as an ob-

1 server annually between 2009 and 2016. Since the  
2 2016 election of President Tsai, the PRC has in-  
3 creasingly resisted Taiwan’s participation in the  
4 WHA. Taiwan was not invited to attend the WHA  
5 in 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, or 2021.

6 (4) The Taipei Flight Information Region re-  
7 portedly served 1.75 million flights and 68.9 million  
8 passengers in 2018 and is home to Taiwan Taoyuan  
9 International airport, the eleventh busiest airport in  
10 the world. Taiwan has been excluded from partici-  
11 pating at the International Civil Aviation Organiza-  
12 tion (ICAO) since 2013.

13 (5) United Nations (UN) General Assembly  
14 Resolution 2758 does not address the issue of rep-  
15 resentation of Taiwan and its people at the United  
16 Nations, nor does it give the PRC the right to rep-  
17 resent the people of Taiwan.

18 **SEC. 102. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON TAIWAN’S MEANINGFUL**  
19 **PARTICIPATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL**  
20 **COMMUNITY.**

21 It is the sense of Congress that—

22 (1) Taiwan is free, democratic, and prosperous,  
23 and is home to 23.5 million people. It is an impor-  
24 tant contributor to the global community, as a model  
25 for democracy, and by providing expertise in global

1 health, international aviation security, emerging  
2 technology development, and with forward looking  
3 environmental policies;

4 (2) multiple United States Government admin-  
5 istrations of both political parties have taken impor-  
6 tant steps to advance Taiwan's meaningful partici-  
7 pation in international organizations;

8 (3) existing efforts to enhance U.S. cooperation  
9 with Taiwan to provide global public goods, includ-  
10 ing through development assistance, humanitarian  
11 assistance, and disaster relief in trilateral and multi-  
12 lateral fora is laudable and should continue;

13 (4) nonetheless, significant structural, policy,  
14 and legal barriers remain to advancing Taiwan's  
15 meaningful participation in the international com-  
16 munity; and

17 (5) efforts to share Taiwan's expertise with  
18 other parts of the global community could be further  
19 enhanced through a systematic approach, along with  
20 greater attention from Congress and the American  
21 public to such efforts.

1 **SEC. 103. STRATEGY TO SUPPORT TAIWAN'S MEANINGFUL**  
2 **PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANI-**  
3 **ZATIONS.**

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the  
5 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,  
6 in consultation with other Federal departments and agen-  
7 cies as appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate con-  
8 gressional committees a strategy—

9 (1) to advance Taiwan's meaningful participa-  
10 tion in a prioritized set of international organiza-  
11 tions (IOs); and

12 (2) that responds to growing pressure from the  
13 PRC on foreign governments, IOs, commercial ac-  
14 tors, and civil society organizations to comply with  
15 its “One-China Principle”, with respect to Taiwan.

16 (b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—

17 (1) IN GENERAL.—The strategy required in  
18 paragraph (a) shall include:

19 (A) An assessment of the methods the  
20 PRC uses to coerce actors to into adhering to  
21 its “One-China Principle.” The methods shall  
22 include those employed against governments,  
23 IOs, and civil society organizations. The assess-  
24 ment shall also include pressure on commercial  
25 actors, to the extent it is relevant in the context  
26 of Taiwan's meaningful participation in IOs.



1           (B) An assessment of the policies of for-  
2           foreign governments toward the PRC and Taiwan,  
3           to identify likeminded allies and partners who  
4           might become public or private partners in the  
5           strategy.

6           (C) A systematic analysis of all IOs, as  
7           practicable, to identify IOs that best lend them-  
8           selves to advancing Taiwan’s participation. The  
9           analysis shall include, but is not limited to the  
10          IOs’—

11                   (i) policy on the requirements to ob-  
12                   tain membership and observer status, as  
13                   well as the foundational documents defin-  
14                   ing membership requirements and observer  
15                   status within the IO;

16                   (ii) participation rules;

17                   (iii) processes for developing member-  
18                   ship requirements and participation rules;

19                   (iv) policies of current members re-  
20                   garding Taiwan’s political status; and

21                   (v) relative reliance on contributions  
22                   from the PRC and how it may affect inter-  
23                   nal decision making.

24          (D) An evaluation of the feasibility and ad-  
25          visability of expanding economic, security, and

1 diplomatic engagement with nations that have  
2 demonstrably strengthened, enhanced, or up-  
3 graded relations with Taiwan, where it aligns  
4 with U.S. interests.

5 (E) A survey of IOs that have allowed Tai-  
6 wan’s meaningful participation, including an as-  
7 sessment of whether any erosion in Taiwan’s  
8 engagement has occurred within those organiza-  
9 tions and how Taiwan’s participation has posi-  
10 tively strengthened the capacity and activity of  
11 these organizations, thereby providing positive  
12 models for Taiwan’s inclusion in other similar  
13 forums.

14 (F) A list of no more than 20 IOs at which  
15 the U.S. Government will prioritize for using its  
16 voice, vote, and influence to advance Taiwan’s  
17 meaningful participation over the three-year pe-  
18 riod following the date of enactment of this Act.  
19 The list shall be derived from the IOs identified  
20 in paragraph (1)(C).

21 (G) A description of the diplomatic strate-  
22 gies and the coalitions the U.S. Government  
23 plans to develop to implement paragraph  
24 (b)(1)(F).

1 (c) FORM OF REPORT.—The strategy required in  
2 subsection (a) shall be classified, but it may include an  
3 unclassified summary, if the Secretary of State determines  
4 it appropriate.

5 (d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section—

6 (1) INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION.—The term  
7 “international organization” shall include, but is not  
8 limited to, UN funds, programs, specialized agen-  
9 cies, entities, and bodies. It shall also include other  
10 organizations outside of the UN system, as the Sec-  
11 retary of State or his or her designee deems appro-  
12 priate, and in consultation with other Federal de-  
13 partments and agencies.

14 (2) ONE-CHINA PRINCIPLE.—The term “One-  
15 China Principle” shall solely and exclusively refer to  
16 the PRC’s policy toward Taiwan.

17 (3) CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS.—The term  
18 “civil society organizations” means international  
19 civil society organizations that are critical to main-  
20 taining Taiwan’s international space and enabling  
21 Taiwan to play a positive and constructive role in  
22 the global community.

23 (e) CONSULTATION.—The Secretary of State or his  
24 or her designee, shall consult with the appropriate con-  
25 gressional committees—

1           (1) no later than 90 days after the date of en-  
2           actment of this Act, on the list of IOs identified in  
3           subsection (b)(1)(C); and

4           (2) 180 days after submitting the strategy re-  
5           quired in subsection (a), and 180 days thereafter for  
6           two years, regarding the development and implemen-  
7           tation of the strategy.

8   **SEC. 104. EXPANDING UNITED STATES-TAIWAN DEVELOP-**  
9                                   **MENT COOPERATION.**

10          (a) **IN GENERAL.**—No later than 120 days following  
11          the date of enactment of this Act, the Administrator of  
12          the United States Agency for International Development  
13          (USAID), in consultation with the U.S. International De-  
14          velopment Finance Corporation (DFC), shall submit to  
15          the appropriate congressional committees a report on co-  
16          operation with Taiwan on trilateral and multilateral devel-  
17          opment initiatives.

18          (b) **MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.**—The report re-  
19          quired in paragraph (a) shall include:

20               (1) A comprehensive review of existing coopera-  
21               tion mechanisms and initiatives between USAID or  
22               DFC, and relevant departments and agencies in Tai-  
23               wan, including, but not limited to Taiwan’s Inter-  
24               national Cooperation and Development Fund  
25               (ICDF).

1           (2) An assessment of how USAID and DFC de-  
2           velopment cooperation with relevant departments  
3           and agencies in Taiwan compares to comparable co-  
4           operation with partners of similar economic size and  
5           foreign assistance capacity.

6           (3) An analysis of the opportunities and chal-  
7           lenges the cooperation reviewed in paragraph (b)(1)  
8           has offered to date. The analysis shall include, but  
9           is not limited to—

10                   (A) opportunities collaboration has offered  
11                   to expand USAID and DFC’s ability to deliver  
12                   assistance into a wider range communities;

13                   (B) sectors where USAID, DFC, ICDF,  
14                   other relevant agencies and departments in Tai-  
15                   wan, or the organizations’ implementing part-  
16                   ners have a comparative advantage in providing  
17                   assistance;

18                   (C) opportunities to transition virtual ca-  
19                   pacity building events with relevant depart-  
20                   ments and agencies in Taiwan, through the  
21                   Global Cooperation and Training Framework  
22                   (GCTF) as well as other forums, into in-person,  
23                   enduring forms of development cooperation.

24           (4) An assessment of any legal, policy,  
25           logistical, financial, or administrative barriers to ex-

1       panding cooperation in trilateral or multilateral de-  
2       velopment. The analysis shall include, but is not lim-  
3       ited to—

4               (A) availability of personnel at the Amer-  
5       ican Institute in Taiwan (AIT) responsible for  
6       coordinating development assistance coopera-  
7       tion;

8               (B) volume of current cooperation initia-  
9       tives and barriers to expanding it;

10              (C) diplomatic, policy, or legal barriers fac-  
11       ing the United States or other partners to in-  
12       cluding Taiwan in formal and informal multilat-  
13       eral development cooperation mechanisms;

14              (D) resource or capacity barriers to ex-  
15       panding cooperation facing the United States or  
16       Taiwan; and

17              (E) geopolitical barriers that complicate  
18       U.S.-Taiwan cooperation in third countries.

19       (5) Recommendations to address the challenges  
20       identified in paragraph (b)(4).

21       (6) A description of any additional resources or  
22       authorities that expanding cooperation might re-  
23       quire.

24       (c) FORM OF REPORT.—The strategy required in  
25       subsection (a) shall be unclassified, but it may include a

1 classified annex if the Administrator of USAID deter-  
2 mines it appropriate.

3 **SEC. 105. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.**

4 In this title, the term “appropriate congressional  
5 committees” means—

6 (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the  
7 House of Representatives; and

8 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the  
9 Senate.

10 **TITLE II—ADVANCING TAIWAN’S**  
11 **ECONOMIC SPACE**

12 **SEC. 201. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON EXPANDING U.S. ECO-**  
13 **NOMIC RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN.**

14 It is the sense of the Congress that—

15 (1) expanding U.S. economic relations with Tai-  
16 wan has benefited the people of both the United  
17 States and Taiwan. Taiwan is now the United States  
18 10th largest goods trading partner, 13th largest ex-  
19 port market, 13th largest source of imports, and a  
20 key destination for U.S. agricultural exports;

21 (2) further integration, consistent with robust  
22 environmental standard and labor rights, would ben-  
23 efit both peoples and is in the strategic and diplo-  
24 matic interests of the United States; and

1           (3) the United States should explore opportuni-  
2           ties to expand economic agreements between Taiwan  
3           and the United States, through dialogue, and by de-  
4           veloping the legal templates required to support po-  
5           tential future agreements.

6   **SEC. 202. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR EXPANDING ECONOMIC**  
7                           **RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN.**

8           (a) IN GENERAL.—No later than 180 days following  
9           the date of enactment of this Act, the United States Trade  
10          Representative, in consultation with other Federal depart-  
11          ments and agencies as appropriate, shall present to the  
12          appropriate congressional committees a legal template for  
13          establishing trade and investment agreements with Tai-  
14          wan that is consistent with the nature of the United States  
15          relations with Taiwan. Such template shall be designed to  
16          be applicable to a trade agreement, as well as other forms  
17          of trade and investment agreements.

18          (b) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required in sub-  
19          section (a) shall be unclassified, but it may include a clas-  
20          sified annex, if appropriate.

21   **SEC. 203. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.**

22          In this title, the term “appropriate congressional  
23          committees” means—



1 (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the  
2 Committee on Ways and Means of the House of  
3 Representatives; and

4 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, and  
5 the Committee on Finance of the Senate.

6 **TITLE III—ENHANCING**  
7 **DETERRENCE OVER TAIWAN**

8 **SEC. 301. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON PEACE AND STABILITY**  
9 **IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT.**

10 It is the sense of Congress that—

11 (1) the United States should continue to pursue  
12 a policy of promoting peace in the Indo-Pacific for  
13 the benefit of the peoples of Asia and of the United  
14 States;

15 (2) maintaining peace and stability in the Tai-  
16 wan Strait is in the national security interest of the  
17 United States;

18 (3) PRC attempts to intimidate Taiwan, includ-  
19 ing through high rates of PRC sorties into air space  
20 near Taiwan, and PRC amphibious assault exercises  
21 near Taiwan, jeopardizes the long-standing U.S. po-  
22 sition that differences in cross-Strait relations must  
23 be resolved peacefully;

24 (4) given the potential for a cross-Strait conflict  
25 to be highly destructive and destabilizing, any in-

1       crease in the risk of conflict demands attention and  
2       obligates leaders to reinforce deterrence, as the most  
3       viable means to prevent war;

4               (5) the United States should work with allies  
5       and partners to expand the community of partners  
6       involved in building a credible deterrent toward a  
7       cross-Strait conflict;

8               (6) Taiwan should continue to invest in and im-  
9       plement its asymmetric defense strategy, including  
10      but not limited to coastal defense cruise missiles,  
11      while also strengthening recruitment and training of  
12      its reserve force; and

13              (7) while enhancing deterrence, it is also essen-  
14      tial to maintain open and effective crisis communica-  
15      tion and risk reduction mechanisms as a means to  
16      reduce the risk of misunderstanding and ultimately,  
17      conflict.

18 **SEC. 302. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE DETERRENCE OVER A**

19                                   **CROSS-STRAIT CONFLICT.**

20              (a) IN GENERAL.—No later than 90 days after the  
21      date of enactment of this Act, the President shall submit  
22      to the appropriate congressional committees a whole-of-  
23      government strategy to enhance deterrence over a cross-  
24      Strait military conflict between the PRC and Taiwan.

1 (b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The strategy shall  
2 include:

3 (1) A comprehensive review of existing diplo-  
4 matic, economic, and military tools to establish de-  
5 terrence over a cross-Strait conflict and an assess-  
6 ment of their efficacy.

7 (2) An examination of the present and future  
8 capabilities of the United States and Taiwan to re-  
9 spond to the potential PLA campaigns against Tai-  
10 wan in 5, 10, and 15 years. The analysis shall in-  
11 clude an assessment of the progress Taiwan has  
12 made in developing the asymmetric capabilities need-  
13 ed to respond to its strategic environment, as well as  
14 the additional capabilities and reforms required.

15 (3) An evaluation of the feasibility of expanding  
16 coordination with U.S. allies and partners to en-  
17 hance deterrence over a cross-Strait conflict. The re-  
18 view shall include, but is not limited to, a review of  
19 the following matters:

20 (A) Expanding coordination of public or  
21 private messaging on deterrence vis-à-vis Tai-  
22 wan.

23 (B) Coordinating use of economic tools to  
24 raise the costs of PRC military action that  
25 could precipitate a cross-Strait conflict.

1           (C) Enhancing co-development and co-de-  
2           ployment of military capabilities related to de-  
3           terrence over a cross-Strait conflict, or enhanc-  
4           ing coordinated training of Taiwan’s military  
5           forces.

6           (4) Recommendations on significant additional  
7           diplomatic, economic, and military steps available to  
8           the U.S. Government, unilaterally and in concert  
9           with U.S. allies and partners, to enhance the clarity  
10          and credibility of deterrence over a cross-Strait con-  
11          flict.

12          (5) A description of any additional resources or  
13          authorities needed to implement the recommenda-  
14          tions identified in paragraph (5).

15          (c) FORM OF REPORT.—The strategy required in  
16          subsection (b) shall be classified, but it may include an  
17          unclassified annex, if determined appropriate by the Presi-  
18          dent.

19          (d) CONSULTATION.—No later than 90 days after the  
20          date of enactment of this Act, and not less frequently than  
21          every 180 days thereafter for seven years, the President  
22          or his or her designee, as well as representatives from the  
23          agencies and departments involved in developing the strat-  
24          egy required in paragraph (a) shall consult with the appro-  
25          priate congressional committees regarding the develop-

1 ment and implementation of the strategy required in this  
2 section. The representatives shall be at the Undersecretary  
3 level or above.

4 (e) DEFINITIONS.—

5 In this section, the term “potential PLA cam-  
6 paigns” shall mean—

7 (1) a naval blockade of Taiwan;

8 (2) an amphibious assault and ground invasion  
9 of Taiwan, especially such invasion designed to ac-  
10 complish a fiat accompli before intervention is pos-  
11 sible; and

12 (3) a seizure of one or more of Taiwan’s out-  
13 lying islands.

14 **SEC. 303. SUPPORTING TAIWAN’S INVESTMENT IN ASYM-**  
15 **METRIC CAPABILITIES.**

16 (a) IN GENERAL.—No later than 180 days following  
17 enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in con-  
18 sultation with the Secretary of State, shall submit to the  
19 appropriate congressional committees a report on options  
20 to support Taiwan’s defense budgeting and procurement  
21 process in a manner that facilitates sustained investment  
22 in capabilities aligned with Taiwan’s asymmetric defense  
23 strategy. The report shall include the following:

24 (1) A review of technical advisory options for  
25 enhancing defense budgeting across Taiwan’s mili-

1 tary services in Taiwan that is aligned with Tai-  
2 wan’s asymmetric defense strategy.

3 (2) An evaluation of any administrative, institu-  
4 tional, or personnel barriers in the United States or  
5 Taiwan to implementing the options provided in  
6 paragraph (a)(1).

7 (3) An evaluation of the most appropriate enti-  
8 ties within the U.S. Department of Defense to lead  
9 the options provided in paragraph (a)(1).

10 (4) An evaluation of the appropriate entities in  
11 Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense and its Na-  
12 tional Security Council to participate in options pro-  
13 vided in paragraph (a)(1).

14 (5) A description of additional personnel, re-  
15 sources, and authorities in Taiwan or in the United  
16 States that may be required to execute the options  
17 provided in paragraph (a)(1).

18 (b) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required in sub-  
19 section (a) shall be classified, but it may include an un-  
20 classified summary, if the Secretary of Defense determines  
21 it appropriate.

22 **SEC. 304. ADVANCING TAIWAN’S TERRITORIAL DEFENSE**  
23 **FORCE CONCEPT.**

24 (a) IN GENERAL.—No later than 180 days following  
25 enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, in con-

1 sultation with the Secretary of State, shall submit to the  
2 appropriate congressional committees a report on options  
3 to strengthen Taiwan’s implementation of its territorial  
4 defense force concept.

5 (b) POLICY OBJECTIVES.—The review shall take into  
6 consideration, but is not limited to, the following policy  
7 goals:

8 (1) Advance Taiwan Reserve’s Command ability  
9 to recruit, train, and equip its forces, including its  
10 ability to require and provide regular individual and  
11 collective training to all reserve forces.

12 (2) Enhance Taiwan’s ability to respond to hu-  
13 manitarian disasters.

14 (3) Strengthen Taiwan’s ability to defend  
15 against, and resist if necessary, PRC military ag-  
16 gression.

17 (c) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—

18 (1) A review of options to provide additional  
19 technical advice, training, or institution building to  
20 support the objectives discussed in subsection (b),  
21 and any other appropriate policy objectives.

22 (2) An assessment of the policy opportunities  
23 and challenges associated with the options provided  
24 in paragraph (c)(1).

1           (3) An assessment of any statutory or adminis-  
2           trative barriers to the options provided in paragraph  
3           (c)(1).

4           (4) A determination of the most appropriate en-  
5           tities within the U.S. Department of Defense and in  
6           the Taiwan Reserve Command to lead the options  
7           provided in paragraph (c)(1).

8           (5) An evaluation of the capacity of appropriate  
9           entities in the U.S. Department of Defense to sup-  
10          port the options provided in paragraph (c)(1) and of  
11          the Taiwan Reserve Command to absorb the options  
12          provided in paragraph (c)(1).

13          (6) A description of additional resources and  
14          authorities that may be required to execute any of  
15          the options provided in paragraph (c)(1).

16          (d) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required in sub-  
17          section (a) shall be classified, but it may include an un-  
18          classified summary, if the Secretary of Defense determines  
19          it appropriate.

20   **SEC. 305. STRENGTHENING TAIWAN'S CIVILIAN DEFENSE**  
21                           **PROFESSIONALS.**

22          (a) IN GENERAL.—No later than 180 days following  
23          enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consulta-  
24          tion with the Secretary of Defense, shall present to the  
25          appropriate congressional committees a plan for strength-



1 ening the community of civilian defense professionals in  
2 Taiwan.

3 (b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report shall  
4 include the following:

5 (1) A comprehensive review of existing U.S.  
6 Government and non-U.S. Government program-  
7 matic and funding modalities to support Taiwan’s  
8 civilian defense professionals in pursuing profes-  
9 sional development, educational, and cultural ex-  
10 changes in the United States. The review shall in-  
11 clude, but is not limited to—

12 (A) opportunities through U.S. Depart-  
13 ment of State-supported programs, such as the  
14 International Visitor Leaders Program; and

15 (B) opportunities offered through non-gov-  
16 ernmental institutions, such as think tanks, to  
17 the extent the review can practicably make such  
18 an assessment.

19 (2) A description of the frequency that civilian  
20 defense professionals from Taiwan pursue or are se-  
21 lected for the programs reviewed in paragraph  
22 (b)(1).

23 (3) An analysis of any funding, policy, adminis-  
24 trative, or other barriers preventing greater partici-

1       pation from Taiwan’s civilian defense professionals  
2       in the opportunities identified in paragraph (b)(1).

3           (4) An evaluation of the value expanding the  
4       opportunities reviewed in paragraph (b)(1) would  
5       offer for strengthening Taiwan’s existing civilian de-  
6       fense community, and for increasing the perceived  
7       value of the field for young professionals in Taiwan.

8           (5) An assessment of options the United States  
9       Government could take individually, with partners in  
10      Taiwan, or with foreign governments or non-govern-  
11      mental partners, to expand the opportunities re-  
12      viewed in paragraph (b)(1).

13          (6) A description of additional resources and  
14      authorities that may be required to execute the op-  
15      tions in paragraph (b)(5).

16      (c) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required in para-  
17      graph (a) shall be unclassified, but it may include a classi-  
18      fied annex, if determined appropriate.

19      **SEC. 306. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.**

20      In this title, the term “appropriate congressional  
21      committees” means—

22          (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the  
23      Committee on Armed Services of the House of Rep-  
24      resentatives; and

- 1           (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, and
- 2           the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.

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