

116TH CONGRESS  
1ST SESSION

# S. 1102

To promote security and energy partnerships in the Eastern Mediterranean,  
and for other purposes.

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IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

APRIL 10, 2019

Mr. MENENDEZ (for himself and Mr. RUBIO) introduced the following bill;  
which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

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## A BILL

To promote security and energy partnerships in the Eastern  
Mediterranean, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*  
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Eastern Mediterranean  
5 Security and Energy Partnership Act of 2019”.

6 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

7 Congress makes the following findings:

8 (1) The security of partners and allies in the  
9 Eastern Mediterranean region is critical to the secu-  
10 rity of the United States and Europe.

1           (2) Greece is a valuable member of the North  
2           Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and a key pil-  
3           lar of stability in the Eastern Mediterranean.

4           (3) Israel is a steadfast ally of the United  
5           States and has been designated a “major non-NATO  
6           ally” and “major strategic partner”.

7           (4) Cyprus is a key strategic partner and  
8           signed a Statement of Intent with the United States  
9           on November 6, 2018, to enhance bilateral security  
10          cooperation.

11          (5) The countries of Greece, Cyprus, and Israel  
12          have participated in critical trilateral summits to im-  
13          prove cooperation on energy and security issues.

14          (6) Secretary of State Mike Pompeo partici-  
15          pated in the trilateral summit among Israel, Greece,  
16          and Cyprus on March 20, 2019.

17          (7) All four countries oppose any action in the  
18          Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea that  
19          could challenge stability, violate international law, or  
20          undermine good neighborly relations, and in a joint  
21          declaration on March 21, 2019, agreed to “defend  
22          against external malign influences in the Eastern  
23          Mediterranean and the broader Middle East”.

24          (8) The recent discovery of potentially the re-  
25          gion’s largest natural gas field off the Egyptian

1 coast and the newest discoveries of natural gas off  
2 the Cypriot coast could represent a significant posi-  
3 tive development for the Eastern Mediterranean and  
4 the Middle East, enhancing the region's strategic en-  
5 ergy significance.

6 (9) Turkish government officials have expressed  
7 an intent to purchase the S-400 system from the  
8 Russian Federation, which could trigger the imposi-  
9 tion of mandatory sanctions under the Countering  
10 America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (Pub-  
11 lic Law 115-44).

12 (10) It is in the national security interests of  
13 the United States to promote, achieve, and maintain  
14 energy security among, and through cooperation  
15 with, allies.

16 (11) Natural gas developments in the Eastern  
17 Mediterranean have the potential to provide eco-  
18 nomic gains and contribute to energy security in the  
19 region and Europe, as well as support European ef-  
20 forts to diversify away from natural gas supplied by  
21 the Russian Federation.

22 (12) The soon to be completed Trans Adriatic  
23 Pipeline is a critical component of the Southern Gas  
24 Corridor and the European Union's efforts to diver-  
25 sify energy resources.

1           (13) The proposed Eastern Mediterranean pipe-  
2           line if commercially viable would provide for energy  
3           diversification in accordance with the European  
4           Union’s third energy package of reforms.

5           (14) The United States acknowledges the  
6           achievements and importance of the Binational In-  
7           dustrial Research and Development Foundation  
8           (BIRD) and the United States-Israel Binational  
9           Science Foundation (BSF) and supports continued  
10          multiyear funding to ensure the continuity of the  
11          programs of the Foundations.

12          (15) The United States has welcomed Greece’s  
13          allocation of 2 percent of its gross domestic product  
14          (GDP) to defense in accordance with commitments  
15          made at the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales.

16          (16) Energy exploration in the Eastern Medi-  
17          terranean region must be safeguarded against  
18          threats posed by terrorist and extremist groups, in-  
19          cluding Hezbollah and any other actor in the region.

20          (17) The energy exploration in the Republic of  
21          Cyprus’s Exclusive Economic Zone and territorial  
22          waters—

23                 (A) furthers United States interests by  
24                 providing a potential alternative to Russian gas  
25                 for United States allies and partners; and

1 (B) should not be impeded by other sov-  
2 ereign states.

3 (18) The United States Government cooperates  
4 closely with the Government of the Republic of Cy-  
5 prus through information sharing agreements.

6 (19) United States officials have assisted the  
7 Government of the Republic of Cyprus with crafting  
8 that nation's national security strategy.

9 (20) The United States Government provides  
10 training to Cypriot officials in areas such as cyberse-  
11 curity, counterterrorism, and explosive ordnance dis-  
12 posal and stockpile management.

13 (21) The Republic of Cyprus is a valued mem-  
14 ber of the Proliferation Security Initiative to combat  
15 the trafficking of weapons of mass destruction.

16 (22) The Republic of Cyprus continues to work  
17 closely with the United Nations and regional part-  
18 ners in Europe to combat terrorism and violent ex-  
19 tremism.

20 (23) Despite robust economic and security rela-  
21 tions with the United States, the Republic of Cyprus  
22 has been subject to a United States prohibition on  
23 the export of defense articles and services since  
24 1987.

1           (24) The 1987 arms prohibition was designed  
2           to restrict United States arms sales and transfer to  
3           the Republic of Cyprus and the occupied part of Cy-  
4           prus to avoid hindering reunification efforts.

5           (25) At least 40,000 Turkish troops are sta-  
6           tioned in the occupied part of Cyprus with some  
7           weapons procured from the United States through  
8           mainland Turkey.

9           (26) While the United States has, as a matter  
10          of policy, avoided the provision of defense articles  
11          and services to the Republic of Cyprus, the Govern-  
12          ment of Cyprus has, in the past, sought to obtain  
13          defense articles from other countries, including coun-  
14          tries, such as Russia, that pose challenges to United  
15          States interests around the world.

16 **SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

17          It is the policy of the United States—

18               (1) to continue to actively participate in the tri-  
19          lateral dialogue on energy, maritime security, cyber  
20          security and protection of critical infrastructure con-  
21          ducted among Israel, Greece and Cyprus;

22               (2) to support diplomatic efforts with partners  
23          and allies to deepen energy security cooperation  
24          among Greece, Cyprus, and Israel and to encourage

1 the private sector to make investments in energy in-  
2 frastructure in the Eastern Mediterranean region;

3 (3) to strongly support the completion of the  
4 Trans Adriatic and Eastern Mediterranean Pipelines  
5 and the establishment of liquified natural gas (LNG)  
6 terminals across the Eastern Mediterranean as a  
7 means of diversifying regional energy needs away  
8 from the Russian Federation;

9 (4) to maintain a robust United States naval  
10 presence and investments in the naval facility at  
11 Souda Bay, Greece and develop deeper security co-  
12 operation with the latter to include the recent MQ-  
13 9 deployments to the Larissa Air Force Base and  
14 United States Army helicopter training in central  
15 Greece;

16 (5) to welcome Greece's commitment to move  
17 forward with the Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria  
18 (IGB pipeline) and additional LNG terminals that  
19 will help facilitate delivery of non-Russian gas to the  
20 Balkans and central Europe;

21 (6) to support deepened security cooperation  
22 with the Republic of Cyprus through the removal of  
23 the arms embargo on the country;

1           (7) to support robust International Military  
2 Education and Training (IMET) programming with  
3 Greece and the Republic of Cyprus;

4           (8) to leverage relationships within the Euro-  
5 pean Union to encourage investments in Cypriot bor-  
6 der and maritime security;

7           (9) to support efforts to counter Russian Fed-  
8 eration Government interference and influence in the  
9 Eastern Mediterranean through increased security  
10 cooperation with Greece, Cyprus, and Israel, to in-  
11 clude intelligence sharing, cyber, and maritime do-  
12 main awareness;

13           (10) to support the Republic of Cyprus efforts  
14 to regulate its banking industry to ensure that it is  
15 not used as a source of international money laun-  
16 dering and encourages additional measures toward  
17 that end;

18           (11) to strongly oppose any actions that would  
19 trigger mandatory sanctions pursuant to section 231  
20 of the Countering America's Adversaries Through  
21 Sanctions Act (CAATSA) (Public Law 115-44), to  
22 include the purchase by Turkey of an S-400 system  
23 from the Russian Federation;

24           (12) to continue robust official strategic en-  
25 gagement with Israel, Greece, and Cyprus;

1           (13) to urge countries in the region to deny  
 2           port services to the Russian Federation vessels de-  
 3           ployed to support the government of Bashar Al-  
 4           Assad in Syria;

5           (14) to support joint military exercises among  
 6           Israel, Greece, and Cyprus;

7           (15) to fully implement relevant CAATSA pro-  
 8           visions to prevent interference by the Government of  
 9           the Russian Federation in the region;

10          (16) to support efforts by countries in the re-  
 11          gion to demobilize military equipment supplied by  
 12          the Government of the Russian Federation in favor  
 13          of equipment provided by NATO and NATO-allied  
 14          member countries; and

15          (17) to strongly support the active and robust  
 16          participation of Israel, Cyprus, and Greece in the  
 17          Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program.

18 **SEC. 4. UNITED STATES-EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN EN-**  
 19 **ERGY COOPERATION.**

20          (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in con-  
 21          sultation with the Secretary of Energy, may enter into co-  
 22          operative agreements supporting and enhancing dialogue  
 23          and planning involving international partnerships between  
 24          the United States and Israel, Greece, and Cyprus.

1 (b) ANNUAL REPORTS.—If the Secretary of State, in  
2 consultation with the Secretary of Energy, enters into  
3 agreements authorized under subsection (a), the Secretary  
4 shall submit an annual report to the appropriate congressional  
5 committees that describes—

6 (1) actions taken to implement such agreements; and  
7

8 (2) any projects undertaken pursuant to such  
9 agreements.

10 (c) UNITED STATES-EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN ENERGY CENTER.—The Secretary of Energy, in consultation  
11 with the Secretary of State, may establish a joint United  
12 States-Eastern Mediterranean Energy Center in the  
13 United States leveraging the experience, knowledge, and  
14 expertise of institutions of higher education and entities  
15 in the private sector, among others, in offshore energy development to further dialogue and collaboration to develop  
16 more robust academic cooperation in energy innovation  
17 technology and engineering, water science, technology  
18 transfer, and analysis of emerging geopolitical implications, which include opportunities as well as crises and  
19 threats from foreign natural resource and energy acquisitions.  
20  
21  
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23

1 **SEC. 5. REPEAL OF PROHIBITION ON TRANSFER OF ARTI-**  
 2 **CLES ON THE UNITED STATES MUNITIONS**  
 3 **LIST TO THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS.**

4 (a) SENSE OF THE SENATE ON CYPRUS.—It is the  
 5 sense of the Senate that—

6 (1) the direct sale or transfer of arms by the  
 7 United States to the Republic of Cyprus would ad-  
 8 vance United States security interests in Europe by  
 9 helping to reduce the dependence of the Government  
 10 of Cyprus on other countries for defense-related ma-  
 11 teriel, including countries that pose challenges to  
 12 United States interests around the world; and

13 (2) it is in the interest of the United States—

14 (A) to continue to support United Nations-  
 15 facilitated efforts toward a comprehensive solu-  
 16 tion to the division of Cyprus; and

17 (B) for the Republic of Cyprus to join  
 18 NATO's Partnership for Peace program.

19 (b) MODIFICATION OF PROHIBITION.—Section  
 20 620C(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C.  
 21 2373(e)) is amended by adding at the end the following  
 22 new paragraph:

23 “(3) The requirement under paragraph (1) shall not  
 24 apply to any sale or other provision of any defense article  
 25 or service to Cyprus if the end-user of such defense article  
 26 or service is the Republic of Cyprus.”.

1       (c) EXCLUSION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RE-  
2 PUBLIC OF CYPRUS FROM CERTAIN RELATED REGULA-  
3 TIONS.—Beginning on the date of the enactment of this  
4 Act, the Secretary of State shall not apply a policy of de-  
5 nial for exports, re-exports, or transfers of defense articles  
6 and defense services destined for the Republic of Cyprus  
7 if—

8           (1) the request is made by or on behalf of the  
9       Republic of Cyprus; and

10          (2) the end-user of such defense articles or de-  
11       fense services is the Republic of Cyprus.

12 **SEC. 6. IMET COOPERATION WITH GREECE AND CYPRUS.**

13       There is authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year  
14 2020 \$2,000,000 for International Military Education and  
15 Training (IMET) assistance for Greece and \$2,000,000  
16 for such assistance for Cyprus. The assistance shall be  
17 made available for the following purposes:

18           (1) Training of future leaders.

19           (2) Fostering a better understanding of the  
20       United States.

21           (3) Establishing a rapport between the United  
22       States military and the country's military to build  
23       alliances for the future.

24           (4) Enhancement of interoperability and capa-  
25       bilities for joint operations.

1 (5) Focusing on professional military education.

2 (6) Enabling countries to use their national  
3 funds to receive a reduced cost for other Department  
4 of Defense education and training.

5 (7) Provision of English Language Training as-  
6 sistance.

7 **SEC. 7. FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING.**

8 There is authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year  
9 2020 \$3,000,000 for Foreign Military Financing (FMF)  
10 assistance for Greece to assist the country in meeting its  
11 commitment as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty  
12 Organization (NATO) to dedicate 20 percent of its de-  
13 fense budget to enhance research and development.

14 **SEC. 8. LIMITATION ON TRANSFER OF F-35 AIRCRAFT TO**  
15 **TURKEY.**

16 (a) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided under sub-  
17 section (b), no funds may be obligated or expended—

18 (1) to transfer, facilitate the transfer, or au-  
19 thorize the transfer of, an F-35 aircraft to the Re-  
20 public of Turkey;

21 (2) to transfer intellectual property or technical  
22 data necessary for or related to any maintenance or  
23 support of the F-35 aircraft; or

1           (3) to construct a storage facility for, or other-  
2       wise facilitate the storage in Turkey of, an F-35 air-  
3       craft transferred to Turkey.

4       (b) EXCEPTION.—The President may waive the limi-  
5       tation under subsection (a) upon a written certification to  
6       Congress that the Government of Turkey does not plan  
7       or intend to accept delivery of the S-400 air defense sys-  
8       tem.

9       (c) TRANSFER DEFINED.—In this section, the term  
10      “transfer” includes the physical relocation outside of the  
11      continental United States.

12      (d) APPLICABILITY.—The limitation under sub-  
13      section (a) does not apply to F-35 aircraft operated by  
14      the United States Armed Forces.

15      **SEC. 9. SENSE OF THE SENATE ON PURCHASE BY TURKEY**  
16                                      **OF S-400 AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM.**

17      It is the sense of the Senate that, if the Government  
18      of Turkey purchases the S-400 air defense system from  
19      the Russian Federation—

20           (1) such a purchase would constitute a signifi-  
21      cant transaction within the meaning of section  
22      231(a) of the Countering Russian Influence in Eu-  
23      rope and Eurasia Act of 2017 (22 U.S.C. 9525(a));

24           (2) such a purchase would endanger the integ-  
25      rity of the NATO alliance;

1           (3) such a purchase would adversely affect on-  
2           going operations of the United States Armed Forces,  
3           including coalition operations in which the United  
4           States Armed Forces participate;

5           (4) such a purchase would result in a signifi-  
6           cant impact to defense cooperation between the  
7           United States and Turkey;

8           (5) such a purchase would significantly increase  
9           the risk of compromising United States defense sys-  
10          tems and operational capabilities; and

11          (6) the President should faithfully execute the  
12          Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eur-  
13          asia Act of 2017 by imposing and applying sanctions  
14          under section 235 of that Act (22 U.S.C. 9529) with  
15          respect to any individual or entity determined to  
16          have engaged in such a significant transaction.

17 **SEC. 10. STRATEGY ON UNITED STATES SECURITY AND EN-**  
18 **ERGY COOPERATION IN THE EASTERN MEDI-**  
19 **TERRANEAN.**

20          (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the  
21          date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,  
22          in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Sec-  
23          retary of Energy, shall submit to the appropriate congres-  
24          sional committees a strategy on enhanced security and en-

1 ergy cooperation with countries in the Eastern Mediterra-  
2 nean region, including Israel, Cyprus, and Greece.

3 (b) ELEMENTS.—The report required under sub-  
4 section (a) shall include the following elements:

5 (1) A description of United States participation  
6 in and support for the Eastern Mediterranean Nat-  
7 ural Gas Forum.

8 (2) An evaluation of all possible delivery mecha-  
9 nisms into Europe for natural gas discoveries in the  
10 Eastern Mediterranean region.

11 (3) An evaluation of efforts to protect energy  
12 exploration infrastructure in the region, including  
13 United States companies.

14 (4) An assessment of the capacity of Cyprus to  
15 host an Energy Crisis Center in the region which  
16 could provide basing facilities in support search and  
17 rescue efforts in the event of an accident.

18 (5) An assessment of the timing of natural gas  
19 delivery in the region as well as assessment of the  
20 ultimate destination countries for the natural gas  
21 delivery from the region.

22 (6) A plan to work with United States busi-  
23 nesses seeking to invest in Eastern Mediterranean  
24 energy exploration, development, and cooperation.

1 (c) FORM.—The report required under subsection (a)  
 2 shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain  
 3 a classified annex.

4 **SEC. 11. REPORT ON RUSSIAN FEDERATION MALIGN INFLU-**  
 5 **ENCE IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN.**

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the  
 7 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State  
 8 shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees  
 9 a report on Russian Federation malign influence in Cy-  
 10 prus, Greece, and Israel since January 1, 2017.

11 (b) ELEMENTS.—The report required under sub-  
 12 section (a) shall include the following elements:

13 (1) An assessment of security, political, and en-  
 14 ergy goals of the Government of the Russian Fed-  
 15 eration in the Eastern Mediterranean.

16 (2) A description of energy projects of the Gov-  
 17 ernment of the Russian Federation in the Eastern  
 18 Mediterranean.

19 (3) A listing of Russian national ownership of  
 20 media outlets in these countries, including the name  
 21 of the media outlet, approximate viewership, and as-  
 22 sessment of whether the outlet promotes pro-Krem-  
 23 lin views.

24 (4) An assessment of military engagement by  
 25 the Government of the Russian Federation in the se-

1       curity sector, including engagement by military  
2       equipment and personnel contractors.

3               (5) An assessment of efforts supported by the  
4       Government of the Russian Federation to influence  
5       elections in the three countries, through the use of  
6       cyber attacks, social media campaigns, or other ma-  
7       lign influence techniques.

8               (6) An assessment of efforts by the Government  
9       of the Russian Federation to intimidate and influ-  
10      ence the decision by His All Holiness Ecumenical  
11      Patriarch Bartholomew, leader of 300,000,000 Or-  
12      thodox Christians worldwide, to grant autocephaly to  
13      the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.

14      (c) FORM.—The report required under subsection (a)  
15   shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain  
16   a classified annex.

17   **SEC. 12. REPORT ON INTERFERENCE BY OTHER COUN-**  
18                               **TRIES IN THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE**  
19                               **OF CYPRUS AND AIRSPACE OF GREECE.**

20      (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the  
21   date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,  
22   in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Sec-  
23   retary of Energy, shall submit to the appropriate congres-  
24   sional committees a report listing incidents of interference  
25   in efforts by the Republic of Cyprus to explore and exploit

1 natural resources in its Exclusive Economic Zone and vio-  
2 lations of the airspace of the sovereign territory of Greece.

3 (b) ELEMENTS.—The report required under sub-  
4 section (a) shall include the following elements:

5 (1) A listing of incidents since January 1,  
6 2017, determined by the Secretary of State to inter-  
7 fere in efforts by the Republic of Cyprus to explore  
8 and exploit natural resources in its Exclusive Eco-  
9 nomic Zone.

10 (2) A listing of incidents since January 1,  
11 2017, determined by the Secretary of State to be  
12 violations of the airspace of Greece by its neighbors.

13 (c) FORM.—The report required under subsection (a)  
14 shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain  
15 a classified annex.

16 **SEC. 13. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.**

17 In this Act, the term “appropriate congressional com-  
18 mittees means” the Committee on Foreign Relations of  
19 the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the  
20 House of Representatives.

