

Calendar No. 95

117TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. 1061

To encourage the normalization of relations with Israel, and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MARCH 25, 2021

Mr. PORTMAN (for himself, Mr. BOOKER, Mr. CARDIN, Mr. YOUNG, Ms. ROSEN, Mr. RISCH, Mr. COONS, Ms. COLLINS, Mr. DURBIN, Mr. GRASSLEY, Mrs. FEINSTEIN, Mr. SASSE, Mr. WARNOCK, Mr. BOOZMAN, Ms. KLOBUCHAR, Mr. TILLIS, Mr. KAINE, Mr. HAWLEY, Mrs. CAPITO, Mr. TESTER, Ms. SINEMA, Mrs. BLACKBURN, Mr. WYDEN, Mr. SCOTT of South Carolina, Ms. STABENOW, Mr. MORAN, Mr. CRAPO, Mr. CORNYN, Mr. BENNET, Mr. ROUNDS, Mr. MANCHIN, Mr. WICKER, Mr. HICKENLOOPER, Mr. PADILLA, Mr. BRAUN, Mr. KELLY, Mr. HOEVEN, Ms. DUCKWORTH, Mr. THUNE, Mr. PETERS, Mrs. HYDE-SMITH, Mr. INHOFE, Mrs. FISCHER, Mr. PAUL, Ms. MURKOWSKI, Mr. LUJÁN, Mr. MARSHALL, Mr. MURPHY, Mr. BLUMENTHAL, Ms. CANTWELL, Mr. CRAMER, Mrs. MURRAY, Mr. BLUNT, Mr. RUBIO, Mr. HAGERTY, Mr. LANKFORD, Mr. SULLIVAN, and Ms. HASSAN) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

JUNE 24, 2021

Reported by Mr. MENENDEZ, with an amendment

[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed in italic]

A BILL

To encourage the normalization of relations with Israel, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Israel Relations Nor-
5 malization Act of 2021”.

6 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

7 Congress makes the following findings:

8 (1) Support for peace between Israel and its
9 neighbors has longstanding bipartisan support in
10 Congress.

11 (2) For decades, the United States Congress
12 has promoted Israel’s acceptance among Arab and
13 other relevant countries and regions to enact numer-
14 ous laws opposing efforts to boycott, isolate, and
15 stigmatize America’s ally, Israel.

16 (3) The recent peace and normalization agree-
17 ments between Israel and several Arab states—the
18 United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, and Mo-
19 rocco—have the potential to fundamentally trans-
20 form the security, diplomatic, and economic environ-
21 ment in the Middle East and North Africa and ad-
22 vance vital United States national security interests.

23 (4) These historic agreements could help ad-
24 vance peace between Israel, the Arab states, and rel-
25 evant countries and regions; further diplomatic

1 openings, and enhance efforts towards a negotiated
2 solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict resulting
3 in two states—a democratic Jewish state of Israel
4 and a viable democratic Palestinian state—living
5 side by side in peace, security, and mutual recogni-
6 tion.

7 (5) These agreements build upon the decades-
8 long leadership of the United States Government in
9 helping Israel broker peace treaties with Egypt and
10 Jordan and promoting peace talks between Israel
11 and Syria, Lebanon, and the Palestinians.

12 (6) These agreements also build on decades-
13 long private diplomatic and security engagement be-
14 tween Israel and countries in the region.

15 (7) These normalization and peace agreements
16 could begin to transform the region by spurring eco-
17 nomic growth, enhancing technological innovation,
18 advancing understanding, and forging closer people-
19 to-people relations.

20 (8) These agreements could promote invest-
21 ment, tourism, and direct flights, and promote co-
22 operation on security, telecommunications, tech-
23 nology, energy, healthcare, culture, the environment,
24 water security, and sustainable development.

1 **SEC. 3. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-**
2 **FINED.**

3 In this Act, the term “appropriate congressional com-
4 mittees” means—

5 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and
6 the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and

7 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
8 Committee on Armed Services of the House of Rep-
9 resentatives.

10 **SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

11 It is the policy of the United States—

12 (1) to expand and strengthen the Abraham Ac-
13 cords to encourage other nations to normalize rela-
14 tions with Israel and ensure that existing agree-
15 ments reap tangible security and economic benefits
16 for the citizens of those countries;

17 (2) to develop and implement a regional strat-
18 egy to encourage economic cooperation among Israel,
19 Arab states, and the Palestinians to enhance the
20 prospects for peace, respect for human rights, and
21 transparent governance, and for cooperation to ad-
22 dress water scarcity, climate solutions, health care,
23 sustainable development, and other areas that result
24 in benefits for residents of those countries;

25 (3) to develop and implement a regional secu-
26 rity strategy that recognizes the shared threat posed

1 by Iran and violent extremist organizations, ensures
2 sufficient United States deterrence in the region,
3 builds partner capacity to address shared threats,
4 and explores multilateral security arrangements built
5 around like-minded partners;

6 (4) to support and encourage government-to-
7 government and grassroots initiatives aimed at nor-
8 malizing ties with the state of Israel and promoting
9 people-to-people contact between Israelis, Arabs, and
10 other relevant countries and regions, including by
11 expanding and enhancing the Abraham Accords;

12 (5) to oppose efforts to delegitimize the state of
13 Israel and legal barriers to normalization with
14 Israel;

15 (6) to work to combat anti-Semitism and sup-
16 port normalization with Israel, including by coun-
17 tering anti-Semitic narratives on social media and
18 state media and pressing for curricula reform in
19 education; and

20 (7) to encourage partnerships and collaboration
21 on climate solutions, water, health, sustainable de-
22 velopment, and other areas.

1 **SEC. 5. UNITED STATES STRATEGY TO STRENGTHEN AND**
2 **EXPAND ABRAHAM ACCORDS AND OTHER RE-**
3 **LATED NORMALIZATION AGREEMENTS WITH**
4 **ISRAEL.**

5 (a) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 90 days after the
6 date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter,
7 the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Adminis-
8 trator of the United States Agency for International De-
9 velopment, the Secretary of Defense, and the heads of
10 other appropriate Federal departments and agencies, shall
11 develop and submit to the appropriate congressional com-
12 mittees a strategy on expanding and strengthening the
13 Abraham Accords.

14 (b) **ELEMENTS.**—The strategy required under sub-
15 section (a) shall include the following elements:

16 (1) An assessment of future staffing and
17 resourcing requirements of entities within the De-
18 partment of State, the United States Agency for
19 International Development, the Department of De-
20 fense, and other appropriate Federal departments
21 and agencies with responsibility to coordinate United
22 States efforts to expand and strengthen the Abra-
23 ham Accords.

24 (2) An assessment of the bilateral and multilat-
25 eral cooperation between Israel, Arab states, and
26 other relevant countries and regions that have nor-

1 malized relations with Israel, including an assess-
2 ment of cooperation in the economic, social, cultural,
3 scientific, technical, educational, and health fields,
4 and an assessment of roadblocks to increased co-
5 operation.

6 (3) An assessment of bilateral and multilateral
7 security cooperation between Israel, the United
8 States, Arab states, and other relevant countries and
9 regions that have normalized relations with Israel,
10 including an assessment of potential roadblocks to
11 increased security cooperation, interoperability, and
12 information sharing.

13 (4) An assessment of the likelihood of addi-
14 tional Arab and other relevant countries and regions
15 to normalize relations with Israel.

16 (5) A detailed description of how the United
17 States Government will leverage diplomatic lines of
18 effort and resources from other stakeholders (includ-
19 ing from foreign governments, international donors,
20 and multilateral institutions) to encourage normal-
21 ization, economic development, and people-to-people
22 programming.

1 **SEC. 6. REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO PRO-**
2 **MOTE NORMALIZATION.**

3 (a) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 90 days after the
4 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State,
5 in coordination with the Administrator of the United
6 States Agency for International Development and the
7 heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies,
8 shall submit a report to the Committee on Foreign Rela-
9 tions of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs
10 of the House of Representatives regarding options for
11 United States international efforts to promote strength-
12 ening of ties between Israel, Arab states, and other rel-
13 evant countries and regions.

14 (b) **ELEMENTS.**—The report required under para-
15 graph (1) shall include the following elements:

16 (1) A description of options for leveraging con-
17 tributions of international donors, institutions, and
18 partner countries to facilitate people-to-people and
19 government-to-government relations between Israelis
20 and Arabs.

21 (2) Identification of existing investment funds
22 that support Israel-Arab state cooperation and rec-
23 ommendations for how such funds could be used to
24 support normalization and increase prosperity for all
25 relevant stakeholders.

1 (3) A proposal for how the United States Gov-
2 ernment and others can utilize the scholars and Ara-
3 bic language resources of the United States Holo-
4 caust Museum to counter Holocaust denial and anti-
5 Semitism.

6 (4) An assessment for creating an Abrahamic
7 Center for Pluralism to prepare educational mate-
8 rials, convene international seminars, promote toler-
9 ance and pluralism, and bring together scholars as
10 a means of advancing religious tolerance and coun-
11 tering political and religious extremism.

12 (5) An assessment of the value to Israel and its
13 neighbors of participating in a regional conference
14 on climate solutions, water, health, and sustainable
15 development.

16 (6) An assessment of the feasibility and value
17 of increasing the capacity of existing Department of
18 State and United States Agency for International
19 Development-funded programs for developing people-
20 to-people exchange programs for young people be-
21 tween Israel, Arab states, and other relevant coun-
22 tries and regions.

23 (7) Recommendations to improve Department
24 of State cooperation and coordination, particularly
25 between the Special Envoy to Monitor Anti-Semitism

1 and the Ambassador at Large for International Reli-
2 gious Freedom, and the Office of International Reli-
3 gious Freedom, to combat racism, xenophobia,
4 Islamophobia, and anti-Semitism, which hinder im-
5 provement of relations between Israel, Arab states,
6 and other relevant countries and regions.

7 (8) An assessment of the value and feasibility
8 of Federal support for interparliamentary exchange
9 programs for Members of Congress, Knesset, and
10 parliamentarians from Arab and other relevant
11 countries and regions, including through existing
12 Federal programs that support such exchanges.

13 **SEC. 7. BREAKING DOWN BARRIERS TO NORMALIZATION**
14 **WITH ISRAEL.**

15 (a) **SHORT TITLE.**—This section may be cited as the
16 “Strengthening Reporting of Actions Taken Against the
17 Normalization of Relations with Israel Act of 2021”.

18 (b) **FINDINGS.**—Congress makes the following find-
19 ings:

20 (1) The Arab League, an organization com-
21 prising 22 Middle Eastern and African countries
22 and entities, has maintained an official boycott of
23 Israeli companies and Israeli-made goods since the
24 founding of Israel in 1948.

1 (2) Longstanding United States policy has en-
2 couraged Arab League states to normalize their rela-
3 tions with Israel and has long prioritized funding co-
4 operative programs that promote normalization be-
5 tween Arab League States and Israel, including the
6 Middle East Regional Cooperation program, which
7 promotes Arab-Israeli scientific cooperation.

8 (3) While some Arab League governments are
9 signaling enhanced cooperation with the state of
10 Israel on the government-to-government level, most
11 continue to persecute their own citizens who estab-
12 lish people-to-people relations with Israelis in non-
13 governmental fora, through a combination of judicial
14 and extrajudicial retribution.

15 (4) Some Arab League states maintain draco-
16 nian anti-normalization laws that punish their citi-
17 zens for people-to-people relations with Israelis, with
18 punishments including imprisonment, revocation of
19 citizenship, and execution. Extrajudicial punish-
20 ments by these and other Arab states include sum-
21 mary imprisonment, accusations of “treason” in gov-
22 ernment-controlled media, and professional black-
23 listing.

24 (5) Anti-normalization laws, together with the
25 other forms of retribution, effectively condemn these

1 societies to mutual estrangement and, by extension,
2 reduce the possibility of conciliation and com-
3 promise.

4 (6) Former Israeli President Shimon Peres said
5 in 2008 at the United Nations that Israel agrees
6 with the Arab Peace Initiative that a military solu-
7 tion to the conflict “will not achieve peace or provide
8 security for the parties”.

9 (7) Despite the risk of retaliatory action, a ris-
10 ing tide of Arab civic actors advocate direct engage-
11 ment with Israeli citizens and residents. These in-
12 clude the Arab Council for Regional Integration, a
13 group of 32 public figures from 15 Arab countries
14 who oppose the boycott of Israel on the grounds that
15 the boycott has denied Arabs the benefits of partner-
16 ship with Israelis, has blocked Arabs from helping to
17 bridge the Israeli-Palestinian divide, and inspired di-
18 vasive intra-Arab boycotts among diverse sects and
19 ethnic groups.

20 (8) On February 11, 2020, a delegation of the
21 Arab Council to the French National Assembly in
22 Paris testified to the harmful effects of “anti-nor-
23 malization laws”, called on the Assembly to enact a
24 law instructing the relevant French authorities to
25 issue an annual report on instances of Arab govern-

1 ment retribution for any of their citizens or resi-
2 dents who call for peace with Israel or engage in di-
3 rect civil relations with Israeli citizens, and re-
4 quested democratic legislatures to help defend the
5 region's civil peacemakers.

6 (9) On May 11, 2020, 85 leaders in France
7 published an endorsement of the Arab Council's pro-
8 posal, calling on France and other democratic gov-
9 ernments to "protect Arabs who engage in dialogue
10 with Israeli citizens" and proposing "the creation of
11 a study group in the National Assembly as well as
12 in the Senate whose mission would be to ensure a
13 legal and technical monitoring of the obstacles which
14 Arab proponents of dialogue with Israelis face".

15 (10) Arab-Israeli cooperation provides signifi-
16 cant symbiotic benefit to the security and economic
17 prosperity of the region.

18 (c) ANNUAL REPORT.—

19 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after
20 the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually
21 thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State shall
22 submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of
23 the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of
24 the House of Representatives a report on the status
25 of the normalization of relations with Israel.

1 (2) ELEMENTS.—The report required under
2 paragraph (1) shall include the following informa-
3 tion:

4 (A) The status of “anti-normalization
5 laws” in each country within the jurisdiction of
6 the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, including
7 efforts within each country to sharpen existing
8 laws, enact new or additional “anti-normaliza-
9 tion legislation”, or repeal such laws.

10 (B) Instances of prosecution of citizens or
11 residents of Arab countries for calling for peace
12 with Israel, visiting the state of Israel, or en-
13 gaging Israeli citizens in any way.

14 (C) Instances of extrajudicial retribution
15 by Arab governments or government-controlled
16 institutions against citizens or residents of Arab
17 countries for any of the same actions referred
18 to in subparagraph (B).

19 (D) Evidence of steps taken by Arab gov-
20 ernments toward permitting or encouraging
21 people-to-people relations between their citizens
22 or residents and Israeli citizens.

23 (E) Instances where Arab governments
24 used state-owned or state-operated media out-
25 lets to promote anti-Semitic propaganda.

1 **SEC. 8. SUNSET.**

2 This Act shall cease to be effective on the date that
3 is 5 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.

4 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

5 This Act may be cited as the “Israel Relations Normal-
6 ization Act of 2021”.

7 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

8 Congress makes the following findings:

9 (1) Support for peace between Israel and its
10 neighbors has longstanding bipartisan support in
11 Congress.

12 (2) For decades, Congress has promoted Israel’s
13 acceptance among Arab and other relevant countries
14 and regions by passing numerous laws opposing ef-
15 forts to boycott, isolate, and stigmatize America’s ally,
16 Israel.

17 (3) The recent peace and normalization agree-
18 ments between Israel and several Arab states—the
19 United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, and Mo-
20 rocco—have the potential to fundamentally transform
21 the security, diplomatic, and economic environment
22 in the Middle East and North Africa and advance
23 vital United States national security interests.

24 (4) These historic agreements could help advance
25 peace between and among Israel, the Arab states, and
26 other relevant countries and regions, further diplo-

1 *matic openings, and enhance efforts towards a nego-*
2 *tiated solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict re-*
3 *sulting in two states—a democratic Jewish state of*
4 *Israel and a viable, democratic Palestinian state—*
5 *living side by side in peace, security, and mutual rec-*
6 *ognition.*

7 *(5) These agreements build upon the decades-long*
8 *leadership of the United States Government in help-*
9 *ing Israel broker peace treaties with Egypt and Jor-*
10 *dan and promoting peace talks between Israel and*
11 *Syria, Lebanon, and the Palestinians.*

12 *(6) These agreements also build on decades of*
13 *private diplomatic and security engagement between*
14 *Israel and countries in the region.*

15 *(7) These normalization and peace agreements*
16 *could begin to transform the region by spurring eco-*
17 *nomical growth, investment, and tourism, enhancing*
18 *technological innovation, promoting security coopera-*
19 *tion, bolstering water security and sustainable devel-*
20 *opment, advancing understanding, and forging closer*
21 *people-to-people relations.*

22 **SEC. 3. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE-**
23 **FINED.**

24 *In this Act, the term “appropriate congressional com-*
25 *mittees” means the Committee on Foreign Relations of the*

1 *Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House*
2 *of Representatives.*

3 **SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

4 *It is the policy of the United States—*

5 *(1) to expand and strengthen the Abraham Ac-*
6 *cords to encourage other nations to normalize rela-*
7 *tions with Israel and ensure that existing agreements*
8 *reap tangible security and economic benefits for the*
9 *citizens of those countries;*

10 *(2) to develop and implement a regional strategy*
11 *to encourage economic cooperation between and*
12 *among Israel, Arab states, and the Palestinians to en-*
13 *hance the prospects for peace, respect for human*
14 *rights, transparent governance, and for cooperation to*
15 *address water scarcity, climate solutions, health care,*
16 *sustainable development, and other areas that result*
17 *in benefits for residents of those countries and regions;*

18 *(3) to develop and implement a regional security*
19 *strategy that recognizes the shared threat posed by*
20 *Iran and violent extremist organizations, ensures suf-*
21 *ficient United States deterrence in the region, builds*
22 *partner capacity to address shared threats, and ex-*
23 *plores multilateral security arrangements built*
24 *around like-minded partners;*

1 (4) to support and encourage government-to-gov-
2 ernment and grassroots initiatives aimed at normal-
3 izing ties with the state of Israel and promoting peo-
4 ple-to-people contact between Israelis, Arabs, and resi-
5 dents of other relevant countries and regions, includ-
6 ing by expanding and enhancing the Abraham Ac-
7 cords;

8 (5) to support a negotiated solution to the
9 Israeli-Palestinian conflict resulting in two states liv-
10 ing side by side in peace, security, and mutual rec-
11 ognition;

12 (6) to implement the Nita M. Lowey Middle East
13 Partnership for Peace Act (title VIII of division K of
14 Public Law 116–260), which will support economic
15 development and peacebuilding efforts among Israelis
16 and Palestinians, in a manner which encourages re-
17 gional allies to become international donors to these
18 efforts;

19 (7) to oppose efforts to delegitimize the state of
20 Israel and legal barriers to normalization with Israel;
21 and

22 (8) to work to combat anti-Semitism and sup-
23 port normalization with Israel, including by coun-
24 tering anti-Semitic narratives on social media and

1 *state media and pressing for curricula reform in edu-*
2 *cation.*

3 **SEC. 5. UNITED STATES STRATEGY TO STRENGTHEN AND**
4 **EXPAND THE ABRAHAM ACCORDS AND**
5 **OTHER RELATED NORMALIZATION AGREE-**
6 **MENTS WITH ISRAEL.**

7 *(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the*
8 *date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter,*
9 *the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Adminis-*
10 *trator of the United States Agency for International Devel-*
11 *opment and the heads of other appropriate Federal depart-*
12 *ments and agencies, shall develop and submit to the appro-*
13 *priate congressional committees a strategy on expanding*
14 *and strengthening the Abraham Accords.*

15 *(b) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under sub-*
16 *section (a) shall include the following elements:*

17 *(1) An assessment of future staffing and*
18 *resourcing requirements of entities within the Depart-*
19 *ment of State, the United States Agency for Inter-*
20 *national Development, and other appropriate Federal*
21 *departments and agencies with responsibility to co-*
22 *ordinate United States efforts to expand and strength-*
23 *en the Abraham Accords.*

24 *(2) An assessment of opportunities to further*
25 *promote bilateral and multilateral cooperation be-*

1 *tween Israel, Arab states, and other relevant countries*
2 *and in the economic, social, cultural, scientific, tech-*
3 *nical, educational, and health fields and an assess-*
4 *ment of roadblocks to increased cooperation.*

5 *(3) An assessment of bilateral and multilateral*
6 *security cooperation between Israel, the United States,*
7 *Arab states, and other relevant countries and regions*
8 *that have normalized relations with Israel, including*
9 *an assessment of potential roadblocks to increased se-*
10 *curity cooperation, interoperability, and information*
11 *sharing.*

12 *(4) An assessment of the likelihood of additional*
13 *Arab and other relevant countries and regions to nor-*
14 *malize relations with Israel.*

15 *(5) An assessment of opportunities created by*
16 *normalization agreements with Israel to advance*
17 *prospects for peace between Israelis and Palestinians.*

18 *(6) A detailed description of how the United*
19 *States Government will leverage diplomatic lines of*
20 *effort and resources from other stakeholders (including*
21 *from foreign governments, international donors, and*
22 *multilateral institutions) to encourage normalization,*
23 *economic development, and people-to-people program-*
24 *ming.*

1 (7) *Identification of existing investment funds*
2 *that support Israel-Arab state cooperation and rec-*
3 *ommendations for how such funds could be used to*
4 *support normalization and increase prosperity for all*
5 *relevant stakeholders.*

6 (8) *A proposal for how the United States Gov-*
7 *ernment and others can utilize the scholars and Ara-*
8 *bic language resources of the United States Holocaust*
9 *Museum to counter Holocaust denial and anti-Semi-*
10 *tism.*

11 (9) *An assessment for creating an Abrahamic*
12 *Center for Pluralism to prepare educational mate-*
13 *rials, convene international seminars, promote toler-*
14 *ance and pluralism, and bring together scholars as a*
15 *means of advancing religious tolerance and coun-*
16 *tering political and religious extremism.*

17 (10) *Recommendations to improve Department*
18 *of State cooperation and coordination, particularly*
19 *between the Special Envoy to Monitor Anti-Semitism*
20 *and the Ambassador at Large for International Reli-*
21 *gious Freedom, and the Office of International Reli-*
22 *gious Freedom, to combat racism, xenophobia,*
23 *Islamophobia, and anti-Semitism, which hinder im-*
24 *provement of relations between Israel, Arab states,*
25 *and other relevant countries and regions.*

1 (11) *An assessment on the value and feasibility*
2 *of Federal support for inter-parliamentary exchange*
3 *programs for Members of Congress, Knesset, and par-*
4 *liamentarians from Arab and other relevant countries*
5 *and regions, including through existing Federal pro-*
6 *grams that support such exchanges.*

7 (c) *FORM.—The report required under subsection (a)*
8 *shall be in unclassified form but may contain a classified*
9 *annex.*

10 **SEC. 6. BREAKING DOWN BARRIERS TO NORMALIZATION**
11 **WITH ISRAEL.**

12 (a) *SHORT TITLE.—This section may be cited as the*
13 *“Strengthening Reporting of Actions Taken Against the*
14 *Normalization of Relations with Israel Act of 2021”.*

15 (b) *FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:*

16 (1) *The Arab League, an organization com-*
17 *prising 22 Middle Eastern and African countries and*
18 *entities, has maintained an official boycott of Israeli*
19 *companies and Israeli-made goods since the founding*
20 *of Israel in 1948.*

21 (2) *Longstanding United States policy has en-*
22 *couraged Arab League states to normalize their rela-*
23 *tions with Israel and has long prioritized funding co-*
24 *operative programs that promote normalization be-*
25 *tween Arab League States and Israel, including the*

1 *Middle East Regional Cooperation program, which*
2 *promotes Arab-Israeli scientific cooperation.*

3 (3) *While some Arab League governments are*
4 *signaling enhanced cooperation with the state of*
5 *Israel on the government-to-government level, most*
6 *continue to persecute their own citizens who establish*
7 *people-to-people relations with Israelis in nongovern-*
8 *mental fora, through a combination of judicial and*
9 *extrajudicial retribution.*

10 (4) *Some Arab League states maintain draco-*
11 *nian anti-normalization laws that punish their citi-*
12 *zens for people-to-people relations with Israelis, with*
13 *punishments, including imprisonment, revocation of*
14 *citizenship, and execution. Extrajudicial punishments*
15 *by these and other Arab states include summary im-*
16 *prisonment, accusations of “treason” in government-*
17 *controlled media, and professional blacklisting.*

18 (5) *Anti-normalization laws, together with the*
19 *other forms of retribution, effectively condemn these*
20 *societies to mutual estrangement and, by extension,*
21 *reduce the possibility of conciliation and compromise.*

22 (6) *Former Israeli President Shimon Peres said*
23 *in 2008 at the United Nations that Israel agrees with*
24 *the Arab Peace Initiative that a military solution to*

1 *the conflict “will not achieve peace or provide security*
2 *for the parties”.*

3 *(7) Despite the risk of retaliatory action, a ris-*
4 *ing tide of Arab civic actors advocate direct engage-*
5 *ment with Israeli citizens and residents. These in-*
6 *clude the Arab Council for Regional Integration, a*
7 *group of 32 public figures from 15 Arab countries*
8 *who oppose the boycott of Israel on the grounds that*
9 *the boycott has denied Arabs the benefits of partner-*
10 *ship with Israelis, has blocked Arabs from helping to*
11 *bridge the Israeli-Palestinian divide, and inspired di-*
12 *visive intra-Arab boycotts among diverse sects and*
13 *ethnic groups.*

14 *(8) On February 11, 2020, a delegation of the*
15 *Arab Council to the French National Assembly in*
16 *Paris testified to the harmful effects of “anti-normal-*
17 *ization laws”, called on the Assembly to enact a law*
18 *instructing the relevant French authorities to issue an*
19 *annual report on instances of Arab government ret-*
20 *ribution for any of their citizens or residents who call*
21 *for peace with Israel or engage in direct civil rela-*
22 *tions with Israeli citizens, and requested democratic*
23 *legislatures to help defend the region’s civil peace-*
24 *makers.*

1 (9) *On May 11, 2020, 85 leaders in France pub-*
2 *lished an endorsement of the Arab Council’s proposal,*
3 *calling on France and other democratic governments*
4 *to “protect Arabs who engage in dialogue with Israeli*
5 *citizens” and proposing “the creation of a study*
6 *group in the National Assembly as well as in the Sen-*
7 *ate whose mission would be to ensure a legal and*
8 *technical monitoring of the obstacles which Arab pro-*
9 *ponents of dialogue with Israelis face”.*

10 (10) *Arab-Israeli cooperation provides signifi-*
11 *cant symbiotic benefit to the security and economic*
12 *prosperity of the region.*

13 (c) *ADDITIONAL REPORTING.—*

14 (1) *IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after*
15 *the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually*
16 *thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State shall sub-*
17 *mit to the appropriate congressional committees a re-*
18 *port on the status of efforts to promote normalization*
19 *of relations with Israel and other countries.*

20 (2) *ELEMENTS.—The report required under*
21 *paragraph (1) shall include the following informa-*
22 *tion:*

23 (A) *The status of “anti-normalization laws”*
24 *in countries comprising the Arab League, includ-*
25 *ing efforts within each country to sharpen exist-*

1 *ing laws, enact new or additional “anti-normal-*
2 *ization legislation”, or repeal such laws.*

3 *(B) Instances of the use of state-owned or*
4 *state-operated media outlets to promote anti-Se-*
5 *mitic propaganda, the prosecution of citizens or*
6 *residents of Arab countries for calling for peace*
7 *with Israel, visiting the state of Israel, or engag-*
8 *ing Israeli citizens in any way.*

9 *(C) Instances of extrajudicial retribution by*
10 *Arab governments or government-controlled in-*
11 *stitutions against citizens or residents of Arab*
12 *countries for any of the same actions referred to*
13 *in subparagraph (B).*

14 **SEC. 7. SUNSET.**

15 *This Act shall cease to be effective on the date that is*
16 *5 years after the date of the enactment of this Act.*

Calendar No. 95

117TH CONGRESS
1ST Session

S. 1061

A BILL

To encourage the normalization of relations with
Israel, and for other purposes.

JUNE 24, 2021

Reported with an amendment